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WARRANTLESS INVESTIGATIVE SEIZURES OF REAL AND 
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
Steven G. Davison· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution I protects two types 
of expectations-expectations involving "seizures" and expectations involving 
"searches."z The protections of the fourth amendment do not apply to a par-
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Cornell University 
(1968); J.D., Yale University School of Law (1971). 
I. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secllre in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Although the fourth amendment regulates only the conduct of federal officials, Barron v. Bal-
timore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the conduct of state and local government law enforcement 
officers is regulated by the fourteenth amendment in exactly the same manner as that of their 
federal law counterparts. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). 
2. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Neither the interest protected by the 
fourth amendment injunction against unreasonable searches nor its injunction against unreasona-
ble seizures "is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection." Arizona v. 
Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987). The Court in Hicks asserts that the Supreme Court has 
never "drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justifi-
cation needed to establish the reasonableness of police action." [d. 
"In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreason-
able within the meaning of the fourth amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judi-
cial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized." 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (footnote and citation omitted). However, some 
exceptions to this general rule requiring a warrant for a seizure of property have been recog-
nized. [d. at 701-02; see Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (discussing "securing-of-
the-premisess" exception to this general rule); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (holding 
fourth amendment's protection inapplicable to search or seizure effected by private individual). 
An exception to this general rule may be recognized either when there are exigent circumstances, 
or when the importance of the governmental interests are found to outweigh the nature and 
quality of the intrusion. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (chemical test that 
merely discloses whether or not substance is cocaine does not compromise fourth amendment 
interest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (exigent circumstance may pres-
ent exception to warrant requirement). This balancing test for measuring the reasonableness of a 
particular warrantless practice "usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an 
intrusion is based be capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be 
probable cause or a less stringent test." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). 
The fourth amendment also ordinarily requires law enforcement officers to have probable cause 
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ticular method of criminal investigation unless the method is either a "search" 
or a "seizure."3 Furthermore, an item of evidence obtained by police will not 
be excluded under the fourth amendment at a defendant's trial unless the item 
was obtained by means of an unreasonable search or seizure, was the fruit of 
an unlawful arrest, 4 or was otherwise the fruit of a violation of the defen-
dant's constitutional rights. s A particular investigatory method may be held to 
be a seizure but not a search under the fourth amendment.6 
In a number of cases decided in the last twenty years, the United States 
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of when a fourth amendment search 
occurs.7 In addition, the Supreme Court has over the years given considerable 
attention to the issue of when a fourth amendment seizure of a person occurs 
in cases dealing with arrests,8 stops and frisks,9 and other investigative deten-
in order to make a seizure of personal property. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 701. How-
ever, although a seizure of an object located in a dwelling-place requires probable cause, Arizona 
v, Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154, exceptions to the general rule requiring probable cause to seize 
personal property have been recognized. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (officer may 
briefly detain luggage to conduct canine "sniff test" on less than probable cause). The Supreme 
Court has held that a seizure of property based on reasonable suspicion Oess than probable 
cause) is reasonable under the fourth amendment when important governmental interests out-
weigh the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment interests. [d.; see infra notes 304-72 
and accompanying text (discussing Place and temporary detention of .Iuggage based on reasonable 
suspicion). The Court has not addressed whether a seizure of property based on less than proba-
bie cause is permitted under the fourth amendment on the basis of exigent circumstances when 
the seizure could not be upheld under this balancing test. See infra note 323 (discussing possibil-
ity that loss or destruction of evidence would justify such seizure). 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (monitoring of loeational "beeper" 
in private residence constituted search); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (field test 
of white powder suspected to be cocaine did not constitute unlawful search or seizure); Illinois v. 
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (subsequent re-opening of container known to contain contraband 
did not constitute search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring beeper to 
follow and locate car held not to constitute unlawful search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979) (installation and use of "pen register" to record telephone numbers did not constitute 
search). 
4. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1985). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant's rights not violated 
where bank records obtained by illegal search of bank officer's briefcase); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) ("fruits" of unlawful arrest may not be admissible evidence). 
6. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (discussing warrantless field tests of contra-
band). 
7. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987); 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Illinois v. Andreas,463 U.S. 765 (1983); United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
8. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S 491 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
9. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985);. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984): Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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tions of a person.1O But not until 1984, in United States v. Jacobsen,1I did the 
Supreme Court provide, within the meaning of the fourth amendment, a defi-
nition of a seizure of property. Furthermore, except for cases addressing war-
rantless "plain view" seizures12 and one case involving the temporary detention 
of mail,13 only since 1983 has the Supreme Court decided cases involving war-
rantless seizures of property. 14 
In these recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of situa-
tions where warrantless seizures of real and tangible personal property do not 
violate the fourth amendmentY "Permanent" seizures16 of personal property 
10. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
11. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
12. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Wash-
ington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982); a.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 
(1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 
(1968); see infra text accompanying notes 131-209 (discussing "plain view" exception to warrant 
clause). 
13. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970); see infra notes 263-98 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Van Leeuwen case and temporary detention of mailed articles). 
14. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.' 696 (1983). 
15. The Court has not addressed the issue of whether intangible personal property can be 
subject to a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. This Article will not analyze 
this issue since criminal cases involving the admissibility of intangible personal property are un-
likely to arise because such property rarely would seem to have a nexus to criminal activity. See 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) ("There must, of course, be a nexus-automati-
cally provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be 
seized and criminal behavior"). 
16. The term "permanent" seizure is used in this Article to refer to: (1) situations when the 
government obtains title to part or all of an item that has bren seized (or the right to deny title 
to or possession of part or all of the item to a particular person or persons), (2) situations when 
the government destroys the item or a part thereof, (3) and situations when the state retains 
possession of the item seized until the termination of the criminal proceedings in which the item 
has been introduced in evidence. 
Examples of the first type of permanent seizure include the seizure of contraband (property 
the possession of which is a crime), the seizure of stolen property, the seizure of instrumentali-
ties of crime and the seizure of items which transported contraband or which were purchased 
with income generated by crime. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 170-74, 
458 A.2d 820, 831-33 (1983). An example of the second type of permanent seizure is when gov-
ernment agents conduct a "field" test on a substance, such as a process involving a chemical 
test that destroys a small amount of a substance and identifies the substance. United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25 (1984). Examples of the third type of permanent seizure involve 
items eventually returned to the person from whom they were seized. They incluce items such as 
evidence of a crime and lawfully possessed weapons taken from an arrested person to protect 
police or the public from I.arm or a potential escape. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
226 (1973). 
Such items may be recoverable pursuant to statutory procedures when the government has no 
further need for the property, such as when criminal charges are dismissed, the person is acquit-
ted of criminal charges, or the time for appeal of a criminal conviction by a defendant has 
expired. See In re Special Investigation No.' 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (discussing 
statutory scheme addressed to circumstances under which property seized should be restored to 
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without a search warrant have been authorized by the Court in several situa-
tions.17 The Court also has authorized "temporary" seizures IS of personal 
property without a search warrant in other circumstances. '9 
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's decisions with respect to the law-
fulness under the fourth amendment of warrantless seizures of real and per-
sonal property by law enforcement officers during criminal investigations.20 
Part II of the Article analyzes general principles under the fourth amendment 
governing "seizures" of property used as evidence in criminal trials. This part 
of the Article first analyzes the types of real and personal property that are 
protected under the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. 
The types of property that law enforcement officers are. authorized to seize 
under the fourth amendment, with or without a warrant, are discussed in Part 
II.B of the Article. Part II.C analyzes the Supreme Court's definition of a 
seizure of property under the fourth amendment, which provides the fourth 
amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures of property only to per-
sons with undefined "possessory" interests in that property. A thesis of this 
part of the Article is that the definition of a seizure of property should be 
expanded to provide fourth amendment protection to persons who have non-
possessory interests in property. In Part n.D of the Article, the uncertain is-
person from whom it was taken). Alternatively, a person with a property interest in the item 
seized may be able to recover damages for the value of the iteseized if it is not returned, after 
the government no longer has a need to retain the item to prosecute, on the .grounds that the 
failure to return the item constitutes a taking of property without just compensation in violation 
of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. Id. at 160-66, 458 A.2d at 826-29. 
17. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730. 
18. The term "temporary" seizure is used in this Article to refer to situations when property 
is seized for the time necessary to obtain a search warrant authorizing police to seize perma-
nently the property or an item of property located within that property. E.g.. Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121 (discussing various cases ad-
dressing this issue). The term also refers to situations in which an item is seized for a period of 
time necessary to investigate whether the item or its contents provide a nexus to criminal activ-
ity. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (police possessed authority to briefly detain 
luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics). The results of an investigation during the 
latter type of temporary seizure may cause the police to make a permanent seizure of an item of 
property or to continue the seizure of the item of property for the period of time necessary to 
obtain a search warrant authorizing a permanent seizure of an item. Id at 702-03. 
19. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 
(1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
20. This Article will not analyze warrantless seizures that are incident to the seizure of a 
person for investigatory purposes, nor those incident to the seizure of property for the collection 
of taxes or the enforcement of liens, nor those incident to seizure of property by prison officials 
from inmates. E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); a.M. Leasing Corp. v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). This 
Article also does not analyze warrantless seizures of property by administrative agency inspectors 
during non-criminal code enforcement inspections. See Davison, Fourth Amendment and Statu-
tory Limitations on Entry and Inspection of Commercial Property in Environmental Enforce-
ment, 3 U.C.L.A. J. OF ENVTL. LAW 75, 1I0-11, 1I3-17 (1982) (examining limitations that fourth 
amendment places upon inspections by government agents enforcing federal environmental sta-
tutes). 
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sue of when a person has the right ("standing") to seek to suppress property 
seized by law enforcement officers and offered as evidence at that person's 
criminal trial is analyzed. The Article proposes in this part that a person 
should have the right to seek to suppress an item of property offered as evi-
dence at their criminal trial if law enforcement officers obtained the item 
through a seizure in violation of that person's own fourth amendment rights. 
Parts II-VIII of the Article analyze Supreme Court decisions that have iden-
tified . situations where warrantless seizures of property by law enforcement of-
ficers have been held not to be unreasonable and thus not in violation of the 
fourth amendment. Supreme Court decisions holding that a warrantless seizure 
of property in "plain view" does not violate the fourth amendment are ana-
lyzed in Part III. The Article concludes in this part that although precedents 
cited by the Court in support of this plain view doctrine do not support the 
doctrine, the policy considerations cited by the Court do support the Court's 
definition of the doctrine. 
In Part IV, the Article analyzes the doctrine that authorizes a warrantless 
search of an item of property that does not support any justifiable expectation 
of privacy. The Article concludes that this doctrine, the exact contours of 
which remain uncertain, is supported by policy considerations even though the 
precedents cited by the Court do not authorize the doctrine. 
Supreme Court decisions authorizing law enforcement officers to seize prop-
erty without a· warrant for investigative purposes are discussed in Parts V and 
VI of the Article. Part V discusses a Court decision authorizing a law enforce-
ment officer, without a search warrant, to conduct a field test (a test which 
determines only whether or not a substance is cocaine) on a substance which 
the officer has lawfully seized and has reason to believe is cocaine. A Court 
decision discussed in Part VI.A authorizes a law enforcement officer, without 
a search warrant, to detain mail temporarily for investigative purposes when 
the officer has reasonable suspicion (short of probable cause) that the mail 
contains contraband. In Part VI.B, the Article discusses another Court deci-
sion that authorizes a law enforcement officer, without a search warrant, to 
seize temporarily luggage which is reasonably suspected to contain contraband 
narcotics, for the purpose of exposing it to a trained narcotics detection dog. 
The Article concludes the these decisions are supported by policy considera-
tions. 
The Article next analyzes, in Part VII, dicta in various Court decisions au-
thorizing a warrantless seizure of property when necessary to prevent the prop-
erty from being lost, removed, or destroyed. The Article finds that the Court 
has not made clear in this dicta whether such seizures can be made when po-
lice only have reasonable suspicion (short of probable cause) that the property 
in question will be lost, removed or destroyed. However, policy considerations 
might authorize a warrantless seizure of property by a law enforcement officer 
when he has only such reasonable suspicion. Part VIII analyzes a doctrine ap-
proved by the Court that authorizes a law enforcement officer, without a 
search warrant, to enter a person's residence and remain inside while other 
officers seek to obtain a search warrant to seize items of property in the resi-
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dence, when the officers have the requisite· probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant. The Article concludes that this "securing-of-the-premises" doctrine is 
bad law because the doctrine allows warrantless securing of a person's resi-
dence despite the fact that the warrantless entry required to secure the prem-
ises is assumed to be an unreasonable search. The doctrine is also bad law 
because it does not require the officers to establish that they had probable 
cause (or even reasonable suspicion) to believe that the property they sought 
to seize would be lost, removed or destroyed if the residence were not secured. 
Nor does it require the officers to show why the loss, removal or destruction 
of the property sought could not have been prevented by securing the premises 
from the outside rather than from within. 
The Article finds that a number of the doctrines discussed in Parts III-VIII 
authorizing warrantless seizures of property present problems for law enforce-
ment officers, courts and members of the public, because they fail to indicate 
whether they apply to factual situations that vary from the facts in the cases 
where the doctrines were recognized. The Article provides recommendations in 
the application of these Supreme Court doctrines to varied factual situations. 
II. ·GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT GOVERNING SEIZURES 
A. Types of Property Protected 
The fourth amendment states that "the right of the people to be secure in 
their . . . houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures . . . shall 
not be violated. "21 This proscription of unreasonable seizures arguably applies 
to some types of real property and personal property. However, determining 
what property enjoys fourth amendment protections and whether certain prop-
erty will be treated as real or personal may be complicated. 
On its face, the fourth amendment protects a person's house from unrea-
sonable seizures. A person's house within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment appears to include a person's residence whether he owns or rents it.22 In 
Oliver v. United States,23 the Court held that the fourth amendment's protec-
tions that apply to the home also apply to the curtilage-"the land immedi-
ately surrounding and associated with the home."24 However, the Court chose 
21. u.s. CONST. amend. IV. 
22. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984) (warrantless entry and securing of 
apartment constituted unreasonable seizure of entire apartment and its contents); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 382-461 (discussing securing of premises pending issuance of search war-
rant). 
23. 464 U.S. 170 (1984). 
24. [d. at 180. "[T]he extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether 
an individual reasonably may ~xpect that the area in question should be treated as the home 
itself." United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. at 180). The factors that are of particular importance in determining whether an area is 
within the curtilage are "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether 
the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is 
put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing 
by." [d. 
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not to extend these protections to "open fields."2!1 Although the Oliver Court 
focused on whether a trespass by government agents onto the open fields of a 
person's land was a search under the fourth amendment, the Court made no 
distinction between the proscriptions against unreasonable searches and unrea-
sonable seizures.26 The majority in Oliver held that "the term 'effects' is less 
inclusive than 'property' and cannot be said to encompass open fields. "27 The 
Court added that "the Framers would have understood the term 'effects' to 
be limited to personal, rather than real property. "28 
Justice Marshall joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens dissented from the 
Oliver holding that "effects" within the meaning of the fourth amendment do 
not include real property.29 Justice Marshall argued that this holding was in-
consistent with previous decisions applying the fourth amendment's protections 
to conversations conducted within public telephone booths30 and to offices and 
commercial establishments. 31 Justice Marshall argued that those situations are 
not covered by the plain meaning of the fourth amendment terms "persons, 
houses, papers, and effects."32 Justice Marshall also questioned how the ma-
25. "Open fields" may include any unoccupied or underdeveloped area outside of the curti-
lage; " 'open fields' neither have to be 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common 
speech." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 180 n.ll (discussing law enforcement officers' tres-
pass into areas defined as open fields and their observations that were introduced into evidence 
and used as basis of search warrant). See United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141 (holding 
that barn sixty yards from home was outside curtilage). 
26. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 177. 
27. [d. The Court noted that James Madison's proposed draft of the fourth amendment re-
ferred to "other property" rather than to "effects" as the fourth amendment does. [d. (citing 
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTI1UTION 100 n.77 (1937». 
28. [d. at 177 n.7 (citing Doe v. Dri~, 2 M. & S. 448, 454 (1814) and 2 BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES "16, 384-85). In Doe v. Dring, 2 M. & S. at 454, Lord EUenborough, Chief 
Justice, concluded that the term "effects" applied only to personalty and not to real estate. 
Blackstone's COMMENTARIES distinguishes things real from things personal, but does not refer to 
the term "effects" in its passages discussing what constituted things personal or personal prop-
erty. BLACKSTONE, supra, at "384-85. The Oliver Court buttressed its holding on the alternative 
ground that people do not have a fourth amendment reasonable expectation or privacy in open 
fields. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 179. However, this part of the opinion appears to be 
addressing only the issue of whether a trespass onto open fields is a search within the meaning 
of the fourth amendment. A search is defined as occurring "when an expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
113 (1984). A seizure of property occurs "when there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual's possessory interests in the property." [d. A trespass by police officers onto an open 
field might constitute a seizure if they remained for a significant period of time and denied the 
owner use and enjoyment of his field. 
29. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 184. 
30. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (applying fourth amendment protec-
tion to telephone booths fitted with electronic listening devices). 
31. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (applying fourth amendment pro-
tection to commercial establishments); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358-
59 (1977) (same). 
32. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 185. Justice Marshall noted that although "an auto-
mobile surely does constitute an 'effect' ... [and] should therefore stand on the same constitu-
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jority's holding that the curtilage is entitled to fourth amendment protection 
could be reconciled with its interpretation of the term "effects." He noted 
that the majority did not explain whether the curtilage is a house or an effect, 
or why the curtilage, but not an open field, can be protected by the fourth 
amendment. 33 
Justice Marshall challenged the majority's holding in Oliver on a second 
ground. He argued that the majority failed to interpret the fourth amendment 
in a way that effected the purposes of the Bill of Rights. 34 He believed that 
the majority's holding was' inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions which 
held that the fourth amendment protects persons "from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusions into ... legitimate expectations of privacy. "35 Justice Mar-
shall argued that the majority's interpretation of the term "effects" was 
inconsistent with the proposition, adopted earlier in Katz v. United States,36 
that the fourth amendment" 'protects people, not places.' "37 
The holding in Oliver that the term "effects" does not apply to open fields 
limits the seizure clause as well as the search clause of the fourth amendment. 
The fourth amendment right to be secure in one's effects applies to both un-
reasonable searches and unreasonable seizures. 38 Since the fourth amendment's 
protection against unreasonable seizures does not apply to governmental tres-
pass onto open fields, evidence acquired by government officials while tres-
passing onto and occupying open fields would not be subject to the 
exclusionary rule at a criminal trial of the landowner. 39 The landowner in such 
a case, however, may have a claim for damages under the fifth or fourteenth 
amendments if such a trespass and occupation constitutes a taking of the 
property.40 He also may claim damages if the governmental trespass and occu-
tional footing as houses," the Court has accorded it reduced constitutional protection because of 
the owner's diminished expectation of privacy in his car. [d. at 186 n.2 (citation omitted). 
33. [d. at 186. 
34. [d. at 186-87. 
35. [d. at 188 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 7 (1977». 
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
37. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 188 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361). 
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's alternative ground for its holding that a per-
son has no legitimate expectation of privacy in open field areas. He argued that the parties 
involved in the two companion cases in Oliver had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
open field areas in question because they had marked the land in a fashion sufficient to render 
entry a criminal trespass under the state law. [d.; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text 
(discussing Framers' understanding of term "effects"). 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
39. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985) (police officer's entry into bookstore to 
purchase obscene material for evidence was not unreasonable and admission of material was 
therefore not suppressed). 
40. A taking of property may be found when the interference with property can be character-
ized as a physical invasion by government. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. United States, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (dictum». The Supreme 
Court "has almost invariably found that the permanent physical occupation of property consti-
tutes a taking." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1244 n.18 
(1987) (citing Loretto v. Telprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982) (dic-
tum». 
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pation of the open field violates the due process clause of the fifth or four-
teenth amendments.41 
As noted earlier. the Supreme Court in Oliver held that the term "effects" 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment includes personal property. but 
not real property or open fields. The Court has also stated. without citation 
to supporting authority. that footlockers and automobiles are effects under the 
fourth amendment42 and that a parcel "was unquestionably an 'effect' within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" at the time it was delivered to a 
private freight carrier.43 However, the Court has not otherwise defined or lim-
ited the types of personal property that are included within the terms "pa-
pers" and "effects." The Court has held that the fourth amendment's 
protection against unreasonable searches does not extend to a person's per-
sonal property, the contents of which are not concealed from plain view,44 or 
which have other~ise lost a legitimate expectation of privacy.4s However, the 
Court has not held that the fourth amendment's protection against unreasona-
ble seizures is inapplicable to such property.46 Since the Court has referred to 
Blackstone's Commentaries and early nineteenth century court decisions in in-
terpreting "effects" in the case of a search,47 the Court may also look to 
these or similar sources in defining what personal property constitutes papers 
and effects in the case of a fourth amendment seizure. If this approach was 
followed, the term "effects" would encompass tangible items of personal 
property such as money, goods and movables, 4~ but not intangible items such 
41. See Fuertes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due process requires hearing prior to depriva-
tion of one's property); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) 
(same). 
42. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12 (1977). 
43. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114. In dictum, the Court in Jacobsen also indi-
cated that "letters and other sealed packages" are "effects" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. [d. 
44. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) {citing Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420, 427 (1981). 
45. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 118-19 (no legitimate privacy interest in previ-
ously opened container); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771-72 (1983) (same). 
46. No such limitation is appropriate because the fourth amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches is designed to protect legitimate privacy interests, Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, while the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures is designed to 
protect possessory interests in property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125; see infra 
text accompanying notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing differences in definition of 
what constitutes search and what constitutes seizure under fourth amendment). Although the na-
ture of a container may be such that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
item of personal property, the person may still have sufficient possessory interests in such item 
through ownership or leasehold interests to be entitled to the fourth amendment's protection 
against unreasonable seizures. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122 n.22 (quoting 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (l978) (legitimization of privacy expectation must 
have source outside fourth amendment, such as by reference to concepts of real or personal 
property law». 
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 177 n.7; see supra note 28 (discussing sources cited 
by Oliver Court). 
48. See generally 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "15-16, 384-85 (defining personal property 
to include goods, money, and all other moveables). 
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as debts, corporate stock and copyrights.49 The term "papers" would encom-
pass letters, diaries and personal and business documents. so 
B. Items Subject to Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment 
"[H]istorically the right to search for and seize property depended upon the 
assertion by the Government [or complainant] of a valid claim of a superior 
interest, and ... it was not enough that the purpose of the search and seizure 
was to obtain evidence to use in apprehending and convicting criminals."sl 
Under this approach, the government, even under the authority of a valid 
search warrant, could seize only stolen property, instrumentalities of crime and 
contraband.s2 Under this historical rule, objects that were "mere evidence" of 
a crime could not be seized because the government had no recognized prop-
erty interest in such items and also because there was "[n]o separate govern-
mental interest in seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals. "S3 In 
1967, this rule was overturned by the Court in Warden v. Hayden, which 
noted that the rule prohibiting the government from seizing mere evidence of 
a crime was not supported by the language of the fourth amendment. S4 The 
Court also noted that privacy is disturbed no more by a search for mere evi-
dence than by a search for other seizeable items.ss Furthermore, the nature of 
other seizeable items are not necessarily more private than the nature of items 
that are mere evidence.s6 The Warden Court also argued that the distinction 
between evidence and other seizeable items "is wholly irrational, since, de-
pending on the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects' maybe 'mere evi-
dence' in one case and 'instrumentality' in another. "S7 The prohibition on the 
seizure of mere evidence was also rejected because it was based on the prem-
ises "that property interests control the right of the Government to search and 
seize,"s8 and that the government may not seize evidence "simply for the pur-
49. See R. BROWN, PERSONAl. PROPERTY 9-12 (3d ed. 1975) (distinguishing choses in action 
from choses in possession, such as personal property). 
50. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886) (court order to produce invoice 
or other private papers for court inspection held to be unreasonable search and seizure). 
51. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967); see e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 
298, 310 (1921) (rejecting government seizure of papers as evidence where government lacked 
"legitimate and important interest in seizing such paper in order to prevent further frauds"). 
52. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303. Police were also permitted to seize weapons which 
could be used by the arrestee to effect an escape, apparently even if the weapon was lawfully 
possessed by the arrestee. [d. at 296 (quoting Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947»; 
see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (permitting seizure of contraband found as 
result of search incident to arrest). 
53. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 302-03. 
54. [d. at 301. 
55. [d. at 301-02. 
56. [d. at 302. 
57. [d. (citation omitted). 
58. [d. at 304. 
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pose of proving crime"59-premises that the Court found to be discredited.60 
The Warden Court concluded that the only fourth amendment limitation on 
what items can be seized by the government is that there must be a nexus 
between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. In the case of items of 
mere evidence, "probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe 
that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. "61 
C. Definition of a Fourth Amendment Seizure 
The Supreme Court did not explicitly define what constitutes a seizure of 
property within the meaning of the fourth amendment until the decision in 
United States v. Jacobsen.62 The Court in Jacobsen held that for purposes of 
the fourth amendment "a 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that prop-
erty."63 
The Jacobsen Court's definition of a seizure was stated to follow "from 
[theJ oft-repeated definition of the 'seizure' of a person within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment-meaningful interference, however brief, with an indi-
vidual's freedom of movement."64 This definition of a seizure of property was 
59. [d. at 306. 
60. [d. at 304-08. The Court noted that the most frequently suggested rationale for the rule 
prohibiting the seizure of "mere evidence" was that the rule limited the scope of searches, but 
the Court argued that privacy could be equally served by limiting searches to certain days of the 
month. [d. at 309. 
61. [d. at 307. The Court also noted that intrusions under search warrants to seize evidence 
would be subject to the particularity requirements of the fourth amendment and the intervention 
of a neutral and detached magistrate. [d. at 309-10. Justice Douglas argued that the Framers 
intended the fourth amendment to prohibit the seizure of mere evidence in order to protect an 
individual's privacy in his personal effects (apart from contraband and the like). [d. at 312-25 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas argued that the case should have been decided on alter-
native grounds to avoid "gratuitously striking down the 'mere evidence' rule." [d. at 312 (For-
tas, J., concurring). 
62. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 109-26 (1984). In Jacobsen, a cardboard box 
addressed to respondents was damaged while under bailment with the Federal Express delivery 
service. In examining the box, Federal Express employees observed a white powdery substance 
concealed in the box and summoned the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DBA"). The DEA, 
without a search warrant, removed an amount of the powder and conducted a chemical test that 
identified the powder as cocaine. [d. at 111-12. The DEA agents then rewrapped -the box, ob-
tained a warrant to search the place to which it was addressed, executed the warrant, and ar-
rested the respondents. [d. at 112. The respondents filed a motion to suppress use of the 
contents of the box as evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal 
search and seizure. [d. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to sup-
press. 
63. [d. at 113 (footnote omitted) (cited with approval in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
712 (1984) and Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985». 
64. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.S. None of the cases cited by Jacobsen in 
support of its definition of a seizure of a person, however, actually use the exact or similar 
language in defining a seizure of a person. See infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing "meaningful interference" in context of detention cases in which reasonable person would 
not believe he was free to leave). The cited case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), how-
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not supported, however, by any analysis of the intent of the Framers since 
historical sources of the fourth amendment are silent as to how the term sei-
zure should be defined.65 
The Jacobsen decision's definition of a fourth amendment seizure of prop-
erty differs from the Court's definition of a fourth amendment search. A 
search occurs when the government invades an individual's actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy that is recognized by society, on an objective basis, as 
justifiable, reasonable or legitimate.66 The Jacobsen Court did not explain ex-
plicitly why a seizure is defined differently than a search for fourth amend-
ment purposes. However, the reason for the difference in definitions is that 
the purpose of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches is 
to protect privacy expectations, while that of unreasonable seizures is to pro-
tect possessory interests in property.6' 
The Jacobsen Court did not state explicitly what types of interest in prop-
erty constitute the "possessory interests" with which there must be some 
meaningful interference for a seizure to occur. By using the term "possessory 
interests," the Jacobsen decision might be interpreted as holding that the 
fourth amendment protects only those interests that involve the possession of 
the property in question.68 Under this analysis of Jacobsen, interests in prop-
ever, does state in the context of a subpoenas duces tecum for books and documents, without 
citation of supporting authorities, that a "seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the 
owner." Id. at 76. 
65. See N. LASSON, supra note 27, at 79-103 (discussing Framers' distinction between other 
property and effects). 
66. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979). Demonstration of a violation of a sub-
jective expectation of privacy may not be required as a prerequisite to a finding of a fourth 
amendment search. Governmental conduct or an individual's experiences in a foreign country 
may cause him not to have an actual expectation of privacy in his home, papers and effects. Id. 
at 740 n.5. 
67. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (dis-
cussing application of fourth amendment as depending on whether person invoking protection 
can claim legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (same); see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984) 
("Different interests are implicated by a seizure than by a search .... A seizure affects only the 
person's possessory interests; a search affects a person's privacy interests" (citations omitted»; 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 716 (1983) (discussing reasonableness of property searches 
for purposes of fourth amendment); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744-47 (1983) ("Although 
our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer indiscriminately to searches and seizures, there are 
important differences between the two .... The Amendment protects two different interests of 
the citizen-the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining per-
sonal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter."). The Supreme' Court has 
stated that "[a)lthough the interest protected by the fourth amendment injunction against unrea-
sonable searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable sei-
zures, .. . neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser 
protection." Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987). 
68. See United States v. 1982 Sanger 24' Spectra Boat, 738 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(seizure occurs when there is meaningful interference with individual's possessory interest, regard-
less of whether claimant alleges ownership). The property interest of possession is a lesser prop-
erty interest than ownership. Id. The common law of personal property and criminal law 
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erty that do not involve possession, including reversions, rights of the inheri-
tance easements and equitable servitudes, would be excluded from fourth 
amendment protection.69 
If Jacobsen limits the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable 
seizures to persons who have possession of property, an issue that still must 
be addressed is whether possession of property must involve actual, physical 
possession or only constructive possession at the time of the governmental in-
terference.7o The Jacobsen Court held that a seizure occurred both when a 
Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent asserted dominion and con-
trol over a cardboard box in the actual physical possession of a freight carrier 
and when the DEA agent destroyed a trace amount of powder found in the 
box while making a field test on the powder. Thus, since the respondents were 
not in actual physical possession of the box in question, the Court in Jacob-
sen implicitly held that a fourth amendment seizure can occur when the owner 
of the property does not have actual possession of the property.71 
recognize a ~umber of situations where a person who does not have actual physical possession of 
an item of personal property is considered to have constructive possession of that property. See 
R. BROWN, supra note 49, at 19-23 (discussing distinctions between actual and constructive pos-
session); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAl: LAW 703-04 (2d ed. 1986) (same). For example, 
under criminal law the owner of a lost article of personal property is considered to be in con-
structive possession of that item. Id. at 711. In the context of real property, a person is consid-
ered to have actual "possession" of residential real property if the person resides on the real 
property. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 13 (2d ed. 1975). The determination 
of what constitutes actual possession of real property as opposed to constructive possession is 
unclear because rights in real property generally are determined on the basis of "seisin" rather 
than possession. Id. at 14-16. 
Under the common law of personal property and criminal law, the respondents who owned the 
box in question in Jacobsen may not have had either actual physical possession or constructive 
possession of the box in question. Federal Express would be considered to have been in posses-
sion of the box when the DEA agent took custody of it because Federal Express apparently had 
entered into a contract of bailment with respect to the box and had physical control over it with 
intent to exercise that control. See R. BROWN, supra note 49, at 209-28 (discussing different 
types of bailments). The respondents, even if they were bailors of the box rather than only the 
intended recipient of the bailed box, would only have been considered to have been in construc-
tive possession of the box if the bailee had "broken the bulk" and converted the contents to 
their own use. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra, at 703. The Court in Jacobsen does not 
explain how possessory interests-as opposed to respondents' other property interests in the 
box-were interfered with by the actions of the DEA agent. 
69. Property which has been abandoned also would not be protected. "Abandonment occurs 
when there is a 'giving up, a total desertion, and absolute relinquishment' of private goods by 
the former owner." R. BROWN, supra note 49, at 9. Consequently, a person who abandons 
property should no longer be considered to retain possession of the property. Therefore, the 
exertion of dominion and control over abandoned property by police should not constitute a 
seizure because such police action would not meaningfully interfere with anyone's possessory in-
terests in the property. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (no seizure where 
officers examined abandoned items). 
70. See supra note 68 (explaining that fourth amendment seizure occurs when there is mean-
ingful interference with individual's possessory interest, regardless of whether claimant alleges 
ownership). 
71. see Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 1984) (officer's assertion of domin-
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If Jacobsen limits the fourth amendment's protection only to persons in ac-
tual physical possession of the property at the time of governmental interfer-
ence, ihe fourth amendment would only protect the right of present use and 
enjoyment of the property and the right to transfer possession through sale, 
lease, bailment, bequest or gift. 72 Such an interpretation of the Jacobsen hold-
ing would not provide protection for the right to the future use and enjoy-
ment of property held by persons with constructive possession or by persons 
with reversions. In addition, such an interpretation would provide no protec-
tion to persons who are not in actual physical possession of property but who 
are nevertheless adversely affected by governmental control or custody of their 
real or personal property. For example, the temporary secl,lring of real prop-
erty by government officials may prevent a holder of an easement from exer-
cising his right of easement. 
Even if Jacobsen broadens the fourth amendment's protection to persons 
with constructive possession of property, as well as those with actual posses-
sion, this interpretation would still permit government agents to affect ad-
versely the recognized non-possessory property interests of many persons. 
Government control or custody of property may decrease the economic value 
of non-possessory interests in property because the control. makes the property 
less attractive to potential purchasers. Furthermore, if government agents took 
permanent control of a piece of property, all persons with recognized property 
interests in that property-possessory or non-possessory-would be adversely 
affected. Although persons without actual or constructive. possession may re-
ceive just compensation, if such adverse effects are a taking under the fifth 
and fourteenth amendments, such an award of just compensation does not 
undo the adverse effects that are suffered as a result of the governmental con-
trol of the property. 73 
The Jacobsen decision contains no reasoning that supports giving fourth 
amendment protection only to persons in actual physical possession of prop-
erty while excluding the recognized rights or interests of others in that prop-
erty. A broader interpretation of the protection against seizures that gives 
protection to all persons with rights or interests in property would be consis-
tent with the modern trend. This trend is to protect a broad range of property 
rights and interests through criminal law theft offenses74 and to prohibit the 
taking of property without just compensation.7s 
ion and control over package that had been mailed to appellee was seizure under Jacobsen where 
the appellee had not yet received actual physical possession). 
72. Such an interpretation also might limit the persons who have "standing" to challenge the 
admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial on the grounds that the evidence was obtained di-
rectly or indirectly as the result of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. See infra text accompanying notes 123-30 (discussing principle of standing in relation to 
exclusionary rule). 
73. The Supreme Court has held that "the wrong condemned by the [Fourth) Amendment is 
'fully accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 906 (l984) (quoting United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974». 
74. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 223.2 comment 3 at 166-68 (proposed Official Draft 1962) (com-
ments revised 1980). 
75. See Rickelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1~ (l984) (discussing whether per-
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The Jacobsen Court also did not explain why a fourth amendment seizure 
only occurs if there is a "meaningful" interference with possessory interests in 
property. In addition, the Court did not explain why the criterion of "mean-
ingful" is relevant to the issue of whether a seizure has occurred, and not to 
the issue of whether a seizure was unreasonable.76 The Jacobsen decision did 
not provide a definition of "meaningful" or any relevant factors for determin-
ing when a "meaningful" interference occurs. The decision also did not state 
whether "meaningful" is defined on a subjective basis (from the standpoint of 
the possessor), on an objective basis (from a normative perspective), or on 
both a subjective and an objective basis. The Jacobsen Court might have in-
tended its "meaningful" interference test to be a two-prong test (subjective 
and objective), similar to the subjective two-prong test (actual and legitimate 
expectations of privacy) used to determine whether a search has occurred. 77 
To support its definition of a seizure, the Jacobsen Court cited to some of 
the cases that, in the Court's estimation, define the seizure of a person as a 
"meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of 
movement. "78 These cases variously define a seizure of a person in view of all 
the circumstances as occurring: when a reasonable person would not believe he 
is free to leave;79 when a person is detained against his will;sU when a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away;81 when a 
police officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,· restrains the 
liberty of that person;82 or when there is any curtailment of a person's lib-
erty.83 
son can have property interest in trade secret for purposes of fifth amendment's taking clause). 
76. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (warrantless field test of powder 
was reasonable under fourth amendment because substantial law enforcement interests justified 
the seizure and only de minimis impact on property interest incurred since only trace amounts of 
powder destroyed); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 706 (detention of luggage for 
exposure to narcotics detection dog was reasonable when officer had reasonable belief that lug-
gage contained narcotics since brief seizures are minimally intrusive when balanced against strong 
governmental interest in preventing drug trafficking). 
77. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding actual and 
legitimate expectations of privacy). 
78. See United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. at 113 n.5 (listing cases as supporting authority). 
79. United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
80. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294 (1973). 
81. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981); Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873. 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968). 
82. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. 
83. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980). On the other hand, some of the cases involv-
ing seizure of a person. cited by Jacobsen in support of its definition of a seizure of property, 
state that a policeman who merely addresses questions to a citizen has not seized that person 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. at 31. 32-33. 34 (1968) (White. J., concurring». Further, no 
seizure of a person occurs if, when questioned by police. a person remains free to walk away. 
id. at 554, or when there is a brief detention of a person short of a traditional arrest. Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. at 440; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; Brown v. Texas. 443 
U.S. at 50; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878; see Davis v. Mississippi. 394 U.S. 
721, 726-27 (1969) (stating in dictum that detention for sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints 
constitutes less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of detentions and there-
fore may not require probable cause) (cited in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at t 13 n.5.). 
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These general definitions of a seizure of a person unfortunately provide no 
assistance in defining what constitutes a "meaningful" interference with an in-
dividual's possessory interest in property. The standard of whether a "reasona-
ble person would not believe he is free to leave" suggests, however, an 
objective rather than subjective standard. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in 
United States v. Mendenhall,84 which is among the cases cited in Jacobsen, 
identifies specific criteria to be considered in determining whether a seizure of 
a person has occurred. Justice Stewart stated that a person would be seized, 
even when he did not attempt to leave, when there was the threatening pres-
ence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.8~ On the other hand, 
Justice Stewart also stated that an officer's subjective intent to detain a person 
if he had attempted to leave is irrelevant except insofar as it may have been 
conveyed to that person.86 
. As applied to seizures of property, Justice Stewart's criteria of the threaten-
ing presence of police or the display of weapons would constitute a seizure of 
property only if such police conduct was directed at the person with a posses-
sory interest in that property and such conduct "meaningfully" interfered with 
the person's possessory interests. Such conduct, although not involving actual 
physical touching of the property in question, arguably might constitute a 
meaningful interference with a person's possessory interests if the conduct pre-
vented the person from using, entering, or transporting the property in ques-
tion. Examples of such conduct might be police officers' preventing a person 
from entering his or her apartment, home, or automobile. 87 Furthermore, 
Justice Stewart's criterion of a physical touching is clearly relevant to the de-
termination of whether a seizure of personal property has occurred. If the 
physical touching of the property gives government officials exclusive posses-
sion or dominion and control over an item, their conduct constitutes a 
"meaningful interference" by preventing that person from possession, use, en-
joyment and transfer of that property. 
The Jacobsen decision's definition of a seizure of property does not include 
the term "however brief" that the Court uses in its definition of a seizure of 
a person.88 The absence of this phrase in the definition of a seizure of prop-
erty might imply that a "brief" interference with an individual's possessory 
interests in an item of property is not a "meaningful interference" and thus is 
not a seizure of that property. 
This interpretation is supported by the Jacobsen Court's later statement that 
a chemical "field test did affect respondents' possessory interests protected by 
84. 446 u.s. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
85. [d. at 554. 
86. [d. at 554 n.6. 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94 (providing as another example DEA agents as-
serting dominion and control over wrapped cardboard box). 
88. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5. 
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the [Fourth] Amendment, since by destroying a quantity of the powder it con-
verted what had been only a temporary deprivation of possessory interests into 
a permanent one. "89 This statement indicates that the discussion of a tempo-
rary deprivation as opposed to a permanent one was relevant to the issue of 
whether there was a seizure, and not to the issue of whether a seizure was 
unreasonable. Under this interpretation of Jacobsen, a police officer's act of 
picking up an item of personal property for several seconds to inspect its 
charac.teristics might not constitute a fourth amendment "seizure." Such an 
interpretation, however, is arguably rebutted by other holdings in Jacobsen. 
The Jacobsen Court held that the assertion by DEA agents of dominion and 
control over a cardboard box in taking custody of it for their own purposes 
constituted a seizure. 90 In reaching this holding, the majority in Jacobsen did 
not refer to how long a period of time the DEA agents asserted dominion and 
control. In fact, less than a minute may have passed between the time that the 
first DEA agent on the scene picked up and inspected the contents of the box 
and the time that a DEA agent conducted the field test on the white powder 
found in the box. Consequently, this part of the Jacobsen decision might be 
interpreted as holding that a seizure occurs when a government official asserts 
dominion and control over an item of personal property for even a brief pe-
riod of time. 
While holding that the DEA agents' exercise of dominion and control over 
the package was a seizure, the majority in Jacobsen did not define what types 
of governmental conduct constitute dominion and control over or custody of 
personal property. In his statement of the facts, Justice Stevens stated that the 
box was placed on a desk after a DEA agent arrived. 91 The DEA agent re-
moved four plastic bags from a tube in the box whose end had already been 
opened by the transporter. 92 The DEA agent then removed a trace amount of 
white powder from the bags to use in the field tesU3 Justice Stevens did not 
state which of the actions by the DEA agent were determinative in his holding 
that the package had been seized. He did not make clear whether a seizure of 
an item can only take place if a government agent physically picks up and 
holds an item in his hands or whether a fourth amendment seizure also occurs 
if a government agent prevents an item from being moved or prevent other 
persons from taking custody or possession of the item. 94 
89. Id. at 124-25. The field test involved taking a small amount of the white powder and 
placing it in three test tubes containing liquids which would take on a certain sequence of colors 
if the powder was cocaine. Id. at 112 n.1. 
90. Id. at 120 n.18. 
91. Id. at III. The facts do not state whether it was a government agent or an employee of 
Federal Express who moved the box. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 111-12. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86 (subjective intent of officer to detain individual 
is only relevant insofar as that intent was conveyed to detainee); see also Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984) (assuming seizure of contents of petitioner's apartment when 
contents secured from within); United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1985) 
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Under the common law of personal property, a governmental agent who 
does not acquire physical possesion of an item of personal property might be 
considered to have dominion and control-constructive possession-over the 
item by preventing it from being moved, transported or accessible to other 
persons.9S However, although the common law of property may be relevant to 
determining whether a fourth amendment seizure has occurred, it is not deter-
minative.96 
The Court in United States v. Karo97 concluded that the transfer of a can 
to which an electronic "beeper"98 had been attached did not constitute a sei-
zure on the grounds that "it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest 
was interfered with in a meaningful way."99 Although the presence of the 
beeper in the can may have constituted a technical common law trespass on 
the space occupied by the beeper, 100 the Karo Court stated that "the existence 
of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether 
the fourth amendment has been violated." 101 For an actual trespass, it is nei-
ther "necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation." 102 
The Supreme Court also has made clear that in most cases the purchase of 
an item of property by a police officer does not constitute a seizure within the 
(suggesting that seizure of package may have occurred when federal agents demanded that airline 
employee hold passenger's checked 'package); cf. United States v.Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292 
(9th Cir.) (holding that no seizure of suspect's luggage occurred when trained narcotics detection 
dog sniffed luggage in checked baggage area since suspect "was not detained or otherwise incon-
venienced, nor were his travel plans interfered with in the slightest"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 
(1984). 
95. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., supra note 68, at 201. 
96. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 70S, 712-13 (1984) (Physical trespass only marginally 
relevant to fourth amendment). Compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) 
(trespass, but no fourth amendment violation) with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347. 353 
(1967) (no trespass, but fourth amendment violation). 
97.468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
98. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals 
that can be picked up by a radio receiver." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
99. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 712-13. 
102. Id. at 713. The Court in Koro also stated, "[o]f course, if the presence of a beeper in 
the can constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it would follow that the 
presence of any object, regardless of its nature. would violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
The Court in Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), concluded that the mere recording by 
a police officer of the serial numbers on stereo components was not a seizure because it did not 
"[i]n and of itself ... 'meaningfully interfere' with respondent's possessory interest in either the 
serial numbers or the equipment . . . [even though it] was the first step in a process by which 
respondent was eventually deprived of the [stolen] stereo equipment." [d. at llS2. Although the 
police officer had to move some of the stereo components in question to record their serial 
numbers, id., the Court in Hicks did not address the issue of whether moving the equipment 
constituted a seizure. Moving the stereo components might be held to be a seizure because such 
movement involved the assertion of dominion and control over the stereo components. Cf. 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 (agents' dominion and control over package consti-
tuted reasonable seizure). 
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meaning of the fourth amendment. In Maryland v. Macon,lo3 the Court held 
that no seizure, as defined by Jacobsen, occurred when a police undercover 
officer purchased two allegedly obscene magazines at a book store. I04 The Ma-
con Court reached this conclusion on the grounds that the sales clerk who 
sold the officer the magazines "voluntarily transferred any possessory interest 
he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser upon the receipt of the 
funds."IO' Furthermore, the police officer who purchased the' magazines "did 
not 'interfere' with any interest of the seller." 106 Rather the officer took only 
"that which was intended as a necessary part of the exchange."I07 The Court 
added in Macon that • 'the use of undercover officers is essential to the en-
forcement of vice laws"l08 and that "an undercover officer does not violate 
the fourth amendment merely by accepting an offer to do business that is 
freely made to the public." 109 
The Court in Macon argued that "the risk of prior restraint, which is the 
underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protections accorded 
searches for and seizures of First Amendment materials"IIO was not present 
103. 472 U.S. 463 (1985). 
104. This holding is in accordance with the prior holdings of a majority of state courts. [d. at 
467. The Macon Court in also concluded that the officer's entry into the store and examination 
of the magazines that he purchased did not constitute a fourth amendment search. [d. In addi-
tion, even if the warrantless arrest of the sales clerk was an unreasonable seizure, the magazines 
were not inadmissible as evidence because they were not the fruit of the arrest and the officer 
did not obtain possession by means of the arrest. [d. at 471. The Court reasoned that the seIl-
er's arrest "yielded nothing of evidentiary value that was not already in the lawful possession of 
the police" and that the exclusionary rule "does not reach backward to taint information" that 
was in' possession of the government prior to any illegality. [d: 
Justice Brennan dissented in Macon on the grounds that the purchased magazines should have 
been suppressed and the seller's conviction reversed because of the warrantless arrest of the seller 
of the magazines. [d. at 473-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan first noted that the 
Court requires a search warrant and a magistrate's prior determination of obscenity for a seizure 
of allegedly obscene material. See id. at 473 (without authority of constitutionally sufficient war-
rant, prior restraint occurs, which is unreasonable under fourth amendment). He then argued 
that a warrantless arrest of a seller of allegedly obscene material poses the same risks involved in 
warrantless seizures of such material. These risks are erroneous police determinations of obscen-
ity and prior restraints on first amendment freedoms. /d. at 473-74. He contended that prior 
restraint occurs through the arrest of a seller because ,the arrest may force him to close his 
business, or otherwise stop distribution or exhibition of the materials. [d. at 474. Justice Bren-
nan noted that the Court left the respondent-seller without a remedy for his illegal arrest, such 
as invalidation of the conviction or suppression of tlie magazines. [d. at 475. He contended that 
the "countervailing public interest in ensuring the broad exercise of First Amendment freedoms" 
required an exception to the normal rule that the illegality of an arrest in itself is not grounds 
for reversal of a conviction or for suppression of evidence lawfuliy obtained prior to an arrest. 
[d. at 476. 
lOS. [d. at 469. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. • 
108. [d. at 470. 
109. [d. "A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invita-
tion to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the 
occupant." [d. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966». 
110. [d. 
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where police purchased a few of a large number of magazines and other mate-
rials offered for sale,lll Such a purchase is analogous to a lawful police pur-
chase of other unlawful substances, which has previously been found not to 
violate the fourth amendment. 1I2 This holding will allow police to avoid the 
Supreme Court's rulings that books, magazines and films presumptively pro-
tected by the first amendment normally cannot. be seized lawfully under the 
fourth amendment, unless the seizure is pursuant to a search warrant meeting 
the requirements of the fourth amendment. 113 
The Macon Court did not explicitly address the issue of whether a fourth 
amendment seizure would occur if police engaged in a mass purchase of mate-
rials that removed all or most of the allegedly obscene materials from the sell-
er's premises. However, the Court implied that such action would not be 
upheld in stating that "a police officer may not engage in a 'wholesale 
searc[hj and seizur[e]' " when he enters a business premises to purchase an 
item offered to the public.'14 In addition the Court explicitly approved only 
the purchase of "a few of a large number of magazines and other materials 
offered for sale."lIs 
A mass purchase of allegedly obscene materials might be held to be analo-
gous to a mass seizure of such materials for the purpose. of their destruction. 
Such a seizure is not permitted without a warrant issued after a prior adver-
sary proceeding and a judicial determination of obscenity.1I6 A rule allowing 
police to avoid these requirements by purchasing mass amounts of the materi-
als would give police unfettered discretion to prevent public distribution of 
materials presumed to be protected by the first amendment. Such a rule would 
be contrary to both the general fourth amendment rule that a neutral and 
Ill. Id. 
112. Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. at 210 (holding fourth amendment was not 
violated where undercover police officer accepted defendant's offer to purchase narcotics in de-
fendant's home». 
113. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 
U.S. 496, 504 (1973). A search warrant arguably may not be required to seize an allegedly ob-
scene film when exigent circumstances exist. See id. at 505 & n.6 (taking judicial notice that 
films can be destroyed, removed from jurisdiction, or altered before trial). Exigent circumstances 
do not exist in the case of a film exhibited in a commercial theater open to the public with 
regularly scheduled performances. [d. at 505-06. 
There is no right to an adversary hearing prior to seizure of one copy of an allegedly obscene 
film when the copy is seized pursuant to a valid warrant in order to preserve it as evidence in a 
criminal prosecution, and when following the seizure a prompt judicial determination of the ob-
scenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available at the request of any interested party. Heller 
v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973). The holding in Heller would probably apply to the 
seizure of a single copy or several copies of allegedly obscene books or films. See id. at 492-93 
(when single copy of film has been seized and other copies of film are not available to owner, 
court must either permit copying of seized film or return film to owner so that its exhibition can 
continue pending obscenity determination). 
114. Macon v. Maryland, 472 U.S. at 470 (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 
at 329). 
115. Id. 
116. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. lOS, 212-13 (1964). 
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detached magistrate should authorize searches and seizures in advance through 
a search warrant ll7 and the general first amendment rule prohibiting prior re-
straint of expression. lIS 
The Macon Court also held that the officer's purchase of the magazines "is 
not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the offi-
cer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evidence."1l9 
The Court reasoned that the determination of "[w]hether a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's 
actions in· light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the 
time,' "120 not on the actual subjective state of mind of the officer.121 The 
Court concluded that if the officer's warrantless retrieval of the money used 
to purchase the magazines violated the fourth amendment, the remedy for 
such violation would be the suppression of the money, not the exclusion of 
the previously purchased magazines. 122 
D. Standing to Invoke the Exclusionary Rule 
Related to the issue of what constitutes a fourth amendment seizure is the 
issue of which persons have "standing" to challenge the admissibility of evi-
dence on fourth amendment grounds. The exclusionary rule prohibits evidence 
obtained by a search or seizure in violation of the fourth amendment from 
admission in a criminal case in state court l23 or in federal court,124 unless one 
of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule applies. m 
117. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
118. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. at 504 (seizing film exhibited to general public without 
search warrant constitutes form of prior restraint unreasonable under fourth amendment; book-
store and commercial theater are each presumptively protected by first amendment and fourth 
amendment warrant requirements are thereby invoked). 
119. Macon v. Maryland, 472 U.S. at 471. 
120. [d. at 470 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978». 
121. [d. at 470-71. 
122. [d. at 471. 
123. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
124. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914). The exclusionary rule applies to 
indirect products of a seizure in violation of the fourth amendment (derivative, "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" evidence), as well as direct products of such violations. Segura v. United States, 
468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) and 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939». 
125. The exclusionary rule is not applied when the connection between the lawless conduct of 
the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate 
the taint of the lawless conduct. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 4117; Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. at 341. The exclusionary rule also does not require the suppression of 
evidence obtained after the police have violated a defendant's fourth amendment rights if the 
evidence was acquired as a result of an independent act of free will by the defendant. Rawlings 
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). Evidence also will not be suppressed under the exclusion-
ary rule when the police had an independent source for the discovery of the evidence. Murray v. 
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 805 (quoting Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 487). When the prosecutor establishes that the evidence in 
question inevitably would have been discovered if the police had not acquired the evidence iIIe-
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However, only a person whose own personal constitutional rights have been 
violated has standing to have evidence suppressed under the exclusionary 
rule. 126 A defendant, seeking to suppress evidence on the grounds of an illegal 
search, must establish that the governmental conduct in obtaining the evidence 
violated his own actual and legitimate expectations of privacy in the premises 
where the evidence was discovered. l27 
The Supreme Court has not stated whether this standing rule, which has 
been applied only to cases alleging illegal searches, also applies where a seizure 
is allegedly in violation of the fourth amendment. In United States v. Sal-
vucci,128 the Court stated in dictum that "legal possession of the seized good 
may be sufficient in some circumstances to entitle a defendant to seek the 
return of the seized property if the seizure, as opposed to the search, was 
illegal. ' , 129 
A meaningful interference with a person's possessory interests in property 
should alone be sufficient to give a defendant standing to object to the admis-
sibility of evidence. The defendant should not be required to show an actual 
or legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises where the item was discov-
ered. The purpose of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable 
gaIly, the exclusionary rule is also not applied. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). 
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule established by United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), applies only when police 
have acted in objective good faith and in compliance with a search warrant or statute later held 
unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987). The good faith exception therefore is 
not applicable when there has been a warrantless seizure of property that was not authorized by 
statute. 
·126. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (overruling "automatic standing 
rule" of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and limiting availability of exclusionary 
rule to defendants whose fourth amendment rights were violated); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 138-40 (1978) (favoring reference to whether criminal defendant'S own fourth amendment 
rights were violated, rather than to term "standing," in determining whether defendant.is permit-
ted to object to admissibility of evidence). 
127. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 100 (petitioner denied standing to challenge illegal-
ity of search of friend's purse in which he had no expectation of privacy); United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 95 (respondent must establish that he had legitimate expectation of privacy 
in mother's home where evidence was seized in order to challenge its admissibility); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (search within meaning of fourth amendment occurs when 
there is violation of actual and legitimate expectation of privacy); Rakas v. Dlinois, 439 V.S. 
128, 143 (1978) (petitioners denied standing to challenge illegality of search of areas of car in 
which they were passengers). 
128. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
129. [d. at 91 n.6. (citing United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1078 (1976». The Salvucci Court did not directly address this issue because the respon-
dents did not challenge the constitutionality of the seizure. The Lisk court held that an owner 
had standing to challenge the seizure of his chattel while it was in the possession of a third 
party. United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d at 230-31. In denying a petition for rehearing, the Lisk 
majority rejected the defendant's argument that United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), 
grants a person with an interest in the seized property standing to challenge the search that led 
to the seizure as well as the seizure itself. United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d at 232-33. 
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seizures is to protect possessory interests in property, not privacy interests. l3o 
III. PLAIN VIEW SEIZURE DoCTRINE 
The so-called "plain view seizure" doctrine was the first doctrine adopted 
by the Supreme Court that explicitly authorized warrantless seizures of prop-
erty. The doctrine was stated for the first time in 1968 in Harris v. United 
States.13l The Court reasoned that "it has long been settled that objects falling 
in the' plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have 
that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." 132 In 
authorizing such plain view seizures, Harris authorizes "permanent seizures" 
of items in plain view.133 Warrantless plain view seizures are distinguishable 
from cases where a court holds that no search occurred when an officer 
merely observed an item in plain view. 134 
In 1971 a plurality of the Supreme Court characterized the plain view sei-
zure doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement. m However, in 1983, 
a plurality of the Court argued that "at least from an analytical perspective" 
characterizing the plain view seizure doctrine "as an independent exception to 
the warrant requirement . . . may be somewhat inaccurate" and that the plain. 
view seizure doctrine "is perhaps better understood . . . not as an independent 
'exception' to the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of. whatever the 
prior justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be. "136 
130. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (explaining differences between search and 
seizure). If the definition of a fourth amendment seizure is expanded to protect recognized inter-
ests in property other than possessory interests, the persons who are accorded standing should be 
expanded to the same extent. 
131. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (upholding warrantless seizure of registration card observed in an 
automobile's passenger compartment). 
132. [d. at 236. However, the cases cited by the Harris Court in support of its proposition do 
not support it. The decision in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1%3), only addressed the issue of 
whether a warrantless entry constituted a violation of the fourth amendment. The decision in 
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), upheld a warrantless seizure and search of a vessel by 
the Coast Guard only on the grounds of the Coast Guard's statutory authority to do so. 
133. See supra note 16 (defining "permanent seizures"). 
134. As the Court stated in another case: 
It is important to distinguish 'plain view,' as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of 
an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in plain view. 
Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment search, ... the former 
generally does implicate the Amendment's limitations upon seizures of personal 
property. The information obtained as a result of observation of an object in plain 
sight may be the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. 
In turn, these levels of suspicion may, in some cases, ... justify police conduct 
affording them access to a particular item. 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
135. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
136. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39 (plurality opinion). In support of these arguments, 
Justice Rehnquist noted that on the basis of probable cause police may seize objects found in a 
public place without a warrant because such a seizure involves no invasion of privacy. [d. at 
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Justice Stewart supported the plain view seizure exception to the general rule 
that requires a search warrant for a seizure because the doctrine provides a 
"major gain in effective law enforcement" but presents only a "minor peril to 
Fourth Amendment protections."137 He argued that the plain view seizure doc-
trine does not conflict with the two objectives of the fourth amendment's gen-
eral warrant requirement: (1) the elimination of searches not based on 
738. Justice Rehnquist noted in· his opinIOn for the Court that "our decisions have come to 
reflect the rule that if, while lawfully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers 
perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immediately." Id. at 739 (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 
394 U.S. 731 (1969); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v. Lefkow-
itz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); 
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927». 
However, the Marron Court made no reference to the authority of law enforcement officers 
who are executing a search warrant to seize items, not authorized to be seized by the warrant,. if 
they are in plain view. The Marron Court rather concluded that the evidence in question was 
la""fully seized as incident to an arrest. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. at 199. The Go-Bart 
Import Co. decision also makes no reference to the seizure of items in plain view. Rather, the 
Court held that the false claim by police that they had a warrant made the search "a lawless 
invasion of the premises and a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence might be 
found." Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. at 358. The Lefkowitz Court held 
that a warrantless search of an office, which followed a lawful arrest, violated the fourth 
amendment on the grounds that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evi-
dence." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 465, 467. 
In Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a 
warrantless plain view seizure by police is "ipso facto unreasonable" in violation of the fourth 
amendment when the officer's action directed to the seized item is unrelated to the justification 
for the officer's entry into the premises. "[Llack of relationship always exists with regard to 
action validated under the 'plain view' doctrine; where action is taken for the purpose justifying 
the entry, invocation of the doctrine is superfluous." Id. at 1153 (emphasis in original). 
The Hicks Court also ruled that the statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) that 
a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initia-
tion," id. at 393 (citation omitted), "was addressing only the scope of the primary search itself, 
and was not overruling by implication the many cases acknowledging that the 'plain view' doc-
trine can legitimate action beyond that scope." Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. The Hicks 
Court also held that when police seize an item under the plain view doctrine, they may also 
make a warrantless search of the item by moving it to examine any parts that are concealed 
from plain view. Id. at 1153-54. The Hicks Court also rejected arguments that a search of an 
object in plain view could be sustained on less than probable cause. "[AI dwelling-place search, 
no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory 
or practicality why application of the plain-view doctrine would supplant that requirement." Id. 
at U54-55; see infra note 209 (discussing facts and holding in Hicks case). 
137. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467. Justice White stated in Coolidge that he 
took this argument of Justice Stewart 
to mean that both the possessory interest of the defendant and the importance of 
having a magistrate confirm that what the officer saw with his own eyes is in fact 
contraband or evidence of crime are not substantial constitutional considerations. 
Officers in these circumstances need neither guard nor ignore the evidence while a 
warrant is sought. Immediate seizure is justified and reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
[d. at 516 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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probable cause; and (2) the limitation on the scope of searches. 138 He asserted 
that the plain view seizure doctrine does not conflict with this first objective 
since it does not allow a warrantless seizure of property in a person's home or 
automobile without an "extraneous valid reason" justifying the initial intru-
sion.139 Nor does the seizure of an object in plain view frustrate the second 
objective, since it does not convert the search into a general or exploratory 
one. l40 He also contended that during an otherwise lawful search when "the 
police. inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a need-
less inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous-to the evidence or to the police 
themselves-to require them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant 
particularly describing it." 141 
In 1983, Justice Rehnquist presented a different argument in Texas v. 
Brown 142 in support of the plain view seizure doctrine. Arguing "that 'the per-
missibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its 
intrusion on . . . Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests,' "143 he deemed warrantless plain view seizures 
permissible. The plain view seizure rule "reflects the fact that requiring police 
to obtain a warrant once they have obtained a first-hand perception of contra-
band, stolen property, or incriminating evidence generally would be a 'needless 
inconvenience' ... that might involve danger to the police and pUblic. "144 On 
the other side of the balance, the remaining interests of an object that a po-
lice officer has observed in plain view "are merely those of possession and 
ownership. "14' 
In Payton v. New York,.46 the Court indicated that a warrantless plain view 
seizure in a public place is valid if the police, at the time of the seizure, had 
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.147 The Court 
138. [d. at 467. 
139. [d.; see infra text accompanying notes 150-64 (discussing "prior valid intrusion" doc-
trine). 
140. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467. 
141. [d. at 467-68; see Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (holding that plain view doctrine 
spares police, who legitimately see object in first place, inconvenience and risk of obtaining war-
rant). 
142. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
143. [d. at 739 (quoting from Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979». 
144. [d. (quoting from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 468). 
145. [d.; see Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("[t)he plain view doctrine is 
grounded on the proposition that once police are .lawfully in a position to observe an item first-
hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title 
and possession but not privacy"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 515 (White, J., 
concurring and dissenting) ("[I]t is apparent that .... [o)nly the possessory interest of a defen-
dant in his effects is implicated [in a plain view seizure)"). 
146. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
147. [d. at 587. The Court stated in dictum that "objects such as weapons or contraband 
found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant. The seizure of property 
in plain view ... is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate 
the property with crimirial activity." [d. Justice Rehnquist quoted this statement favorably in 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S; at 738. Justice Stevens, concurring in Brown, added that "if an offi-
602 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:577 
reasoned that the seizure does not violate· the fourth amendment since it in-
volves no invasion of privacy and is based on probable cause. l48 The risk of 
the item's disappearance or illegal use before the warrant arrives outweighs a 
person's interest in possession of the item,149 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined what constitutes a "public 
place" for purposes of this rule. However, Justice White has stated that no 
warrant is needed to seize items found on public property such as parks, 
streets, or parking 10ts. uO A public place for purposes of the plain view doc-
trine may refer to a situation where a fourth amendment search does not oc-
cur when the police enter the place. Under this definition, since the police's 
entry into that place is lawful, a public place would be a place where a defen-
dant has no actual and legitimate expectation of privacy}'1 
cer has probable cause to believe that a publicly situated item is associated with criminal activity, 
... [he) may ... seize it without a warrant." [d. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587 and O.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 
(1975». 
148. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587. 
149. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1983) (" 'objects such as weapons or 
contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without ·a warrant,' ... because, 
under these circumstances, the risk of the item's disappearance or use for its intended purpose 
before a warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in possession") (citation omitted); Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 748 ("[1]f an officer has probable cause to believe that a publicly situated 
item is associated with criminal activity, the interest in possession is outweighed by the risk that 
such an item might disappear or be put to its intended use before a warrant could be obtained. 
The officer may therefore seize it without a warrant."). 
ISO. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 513 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). The 
Supreme Court has stated that the threshold of a person's dwelling and the yard surrounding a 
person's dwelling are a public place for purposes of the fourth amendment. United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). However, this statement was made in a case concerning a war-
rantless arrest in a public place based upon probable cause. Justice Scalia, in Arizona v. Hicks, 
107 S. Ct. 1149, referred to the plain view doctrine as extending Payton v. New York's public 
place rule to "nonpublic places such as the home, where searches and seizures without a warrant 
are presumptively unreasonable." [d. at 1153. 
151. If this former premise is correct, the latter conclusion follows from the definition of a 
fourth amendment search as "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). As further sup-
port for this definition of a "public place," the Court has stated that a threshold of a dwelling 
is a "public place" because a person has no expectation of privacy in this area. United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. The implication of this statement is that no fourth amendment search 
occurs when police enter a "public place" and vice versa. The Court has also stated that an 
"open field" is a "public place" because a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
"open fields." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); see supra notes 22-41 and 
accompanying text (explaining that only curtilage, not "open fields," is protected by the fourth 
amendment). However, the Court indicated that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his dwelling and its curtilage. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 180. Consequently, a per-
son's home and the curtilage of his home are not "public places" under the plain view seizure 
doctrine. See infra notes ISO-57 and accompanying text (discussing plain view seizures in "non-
public places"). 
It is unclear whether a person's office or place of business is considered a public place or is 
considered analogous to a person's home. An office worker, however, has been held to have a 
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The rule that authorizes plain view seizures in public places apparently re-
quires no police justification for their presence at the place of the seizure. 152 
This approach can be justified because police intrusion into a public place 
does not violate any actual or legitimate expectation of privacy of the defen-
dant.1$3 Moreover, the intrusion does not meaningfully interfere with the de-
fendant's possessory interests in property. Therefore, the police's action would 
not be subject to the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
search~ and seizures. 
Police apparently can make a warrantless seizure in a public place regardless 
of whether there existed either probable cause sufficient to authorize the issu-
ance of a search warrant lS4 or exigent circumstances. 15S The failure of the po-
lice to obtain a warrant to seize an item in a public place when they have 
probable cause would not violate the owner's fourth amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches. The police entry into a public place dcies not violate 
the defendant's expectation of privacy}S6 However, the warrantless seizure of 
an item arguably might be unreasonable if the police acquired probable cause 
before going to the public place and had the opportunity to obtain a warrant. 
In this situation, a magistrate's determination of probable cause prior to the 
seizure, rather than after the seizure, would provide greater protection of 
fourth amendment rights without adversely affecting law enforcement inter-
ests. U7 On the other hand, the property located in a public place might be 
removed, tampered with, or destroyed during the time required to obtain a 
search warrant. Therefore, it is reasonable for police, based upon probable 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office even though he shares that office with other 
workers. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
A person's office or place of work therefore probably would not be held a "public place" under 
the plain view doctrine. 
152. "Police may need no justification under the Fourth Amendment for their access to an 
item, such as when property is left in a public place." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 732, 738 n.4 
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587); cf. infra notes 150-65 and accompanying text 
(discussing legality of plain view based on legality of officer's presence in place where seizure 
occurred). 
153. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text. (explaining that fourth amendment is im-
plicated only when reasonable expectations of privacy are invaded). 
154. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 513, 520 (White, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (indicating that no warrant is required despite presence of probable cause). 
ISS. See infra notes 373-81 and accompanying text (explaining that police may seize property 
to prevent destruction of evidence). 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 6lHi9 (fourth amendment search does not occur unless 
reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded). 
157. This argument is supported by the following statement by Justice Jackson: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous offi-
cers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
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cause, to seize property located in a public place without a search warrant to 
prevent such an occurrence. 
The Court has judged differently the legality of plain view seizures that oc-
cur in private places. In Texas v. Brown, the Court stated that its review of 
the police action changes "when the property in open view is 'situated on 
private premises to which access is not otherwise. available for the seizing offi-
cer.' "m In determining whether such a warrantless seizure of property is 
valid under the plain view doctrine, three criteria have been applied by a plu-
rality of the Supreme Couit1S9 and by a majority of the lower courts. l60 
The first criterion, which is sometimes labeled the "prior valid intrusion" 
requirement, consists of two components that require the police to lawfully 
enter both the private premises where the item in question was seized and the 
particular area of the premises where the item was in plain view. 161 "The 
question whether property in plain view of the police may be seized therefore 
must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and 
physically seize the property in question."162 The prior valid intrusion require-
ment may be met where "the police have a warrant to search a given area for 
specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other arti-
cle of incriminating nature."163 It is also satisfied "where. the initial intrusion 
that brings the police within plain view of such article is supported, not by a 
warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. "164 When police are in compliance with the prior valid intrusion require-
158. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 
U.S. 338, 354 (1977». 
159. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 445, 464-73 (1971) (plurality opinion); Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (plurality opinion) ("In the Coolidge plurality view, the 'plain view' 
doctrine permits the warrantless seizure by police of private possessions where three requirements 
are satisfied" (footnote omitted»; see Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5~ (1982) (applying 
plain view doctrine without specifically referring to three criteria). In Coolidge, Brown, and 
Chrisman, none of the Justices addressed the issue of whether they should judge the validity of 
the warrantless seizures in question by the rules applicable to such seizures in public places. See 
supra text accompanying notes 150-57 (discussing warrantless plain view seizures in public places). 
160. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 746 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing seven circuit 
court of appeal decisions which generally accept Coolidge plurality's articulation of plain view 
doctrine). 
161. This two-part requirement follows from two sources. First, the Coolidge Court held that 
"what the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a 
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of 
evidence incriminating the accused." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 46. Second, 
Justice Rehnquist stated in Texas v. Brown, that " 'plain view' provides grounds for seizure of 
an item when an officer's access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth 
Amendment" and that "police may perceive an object while executing a search warrant, or they 
may come across an item while acting pursuant to some exception to the Warrant Clause." 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 & n.4 (citation omitted). 
162. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737. 
·163. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 465. 
164. [d. Such exceptions to the warrant requirement include "hot pursuit" of a fleeing sus-
pect, a search incident to a lawful arrest, an automobile inventory search, a search pursuant to a 
lawful consent, or a frisk of a lawfully stopped suspect for the purpose. of discovering weapons. 
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ment, they are allowed to proceed to the area where that object is located and 
seize the object. This is true even when the warrant or the exception to the 
warrant requirement justifying the intrusion does not authorize police to enter 
the area where the seized object was located.l6' 
The second criterion for a lawful plain view seizure is that the discovery 
must have been inadvertent. In other words, the police cannot know the item's 
location in advance and cannot intend to seize it by "relying on the plain-view 
doctrine only as a pretext." 166 The majority of lower courts have held that for 
the discovery of an item to be inadvertent, the police must not have had 
probable cause sufficient to have authorized issuance of a search warrant for 
the item prior to intruding into the premises where the item was discovered 
and seized.l67 
165. The Coolidge Court supported this conclusion in dictum stating that although only the 
area within an arrestee's immediate control may be searched incident to a lawful arrest, an ar-
resting officer may seize evidence in plain view outside of this area "so long as the plain view 
was obtained in the course of an appropriately limited search of the arrestee." [d. at 465 n.24. 
One issue that remains unclear is the standing that is required to challenge a seizure that does 
not satisfy the inadvertence requirement. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of 
whether a defendant must establish that the police violated his fourth amendment right against 
unreasonable searches in order to have standing to raise such a challenge. Although the plain 
view doctrine authorizes warrantless seizures of objects, the purpose of its prior valid intrusion 
element is to protect a person's private premises from unreasonable searches. See id. at 467-68 
(discussing the importance of protection from both intrusion per se, and from uncontrolled rum-
maging through a person's belongings). Consequently, a defendant might arguably have to estab-
lish that the intrusion interfered with his actual- and legitimate expectations of privacy and thus 
constituted an unreasonable search in order to have standing to argue that a warrantless seizure 
violated the prior valid intrusion requirement. 
166. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 470). 
In Coolidge the Court asserted that it had never permitted the legitimization of a planned war-
rantless seizure on plain-view grounds. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 471 n.27. On 
the other hand, it did not cite any precedent by the Court in support of the inadvertent discov-
ery requirement. [d. at 469 n.26. 
167. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CASES AND CONCEPTS 255-58 (2d ed. 1986). One court has held that the inadvertence requirement 
is not violated if police unintentionally omit an item from a search warrant since the police are 
not using the plain view doctrine as a pretext for seizing the item. State v. Oliver, 341 N. W .2d 
744 (Iowa 1983); see United States v. Wright, 641 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir.) (discussing seizure of 
shotgun made pursuant to search for controlled substances as valid, although not specifically 
listed on warrant), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United States v. Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 
321 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing seizure of firearm, which was not listed on warrant, but was 
considered a valid seizure). 
In Coolidge, the Court indicated that the seizure did not satisfy the inadvertence requirement 
by explaining that "[t)he police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the 
automobile's exact description and location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they 
came upon Coolidge's property." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 472. The Coolidge 
plurality noted that the case did not involve contraband, stolen goods or objects dangerous in 
themselves, which the Coolidge plurality implied could be seized under the plain view exception 
without complying with the inadvertent discovery requirement. [d.; see infra text accompanying 
notes 187-92 (discussing seizure of contraband as exception to inadvertence requirement). 
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, the Court did not define an inadvertent discovery. However, 
they held that the seizure of certain evidence from the respondent's automobile was not barred 
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In support of the inadvertent discovery element, the Coolidge plurality ar-
gued that when police know in advance the location of an item and intend to 
seize it, the warrantless seizure is contrary to "the basic rule that, no amount 
of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure. "168 In addition, the re-
quirement of a warrant "imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none 
which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless 
searches as 'per se unreasonable' in the absence of 'exigent circumstances.' "169 
The Court also argued that when the initial intrusion is based upon a warrant 
that fails to mention a particular item that police know is on the premises and 
intend to seize, "there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement 
of 'Warrants ... particularly describing ... [the] things to be seized.' "170 
Justice Stewart asserted that anticipated discoveries are distinguishable from 
the situations covered by the plain view doctrine because plain view seizures 
do not turn an initially valid and limited search into a general one. In addi-
tion, the inconvenience of procuring a warrant to cover an inadvertent discov-
ery is great. 171 
Justice White disagreed with the plurality'S inadvertent discovery criterion 
for plain view seizures for a number of reasons. First, he argued that in the 
seizure of an item whose discovery was anticipated, the interference with an 
individual's possession and the reliability of the police officer's appraisal of 
the item are the same as the seizure of an item whose. discovery was inadver-
tent. 172 There is no difference between the two situations in terms of the "mi-
nor" peril to fourth amendment values.173 Similarly, he maintained that the 
inadvertent discovery requirement is unnecessary to further any fourth amend-
by the inadvertence element, because no facts indicated a pretext by police to uncover narcotics 
violations through a driver's license checkpoint. [d. at 743. Furthermore, even though the police 
may have had some generalized expectation of discovering narcotics or paraphernalia, they did 
not have any reason to believe that any particular object would be in the respondent's automo-
bile. [d. at 744. The Court failed to note, however, that the discovery of the balloon was not 
inadvertent because the officer had probable cause to believe it contained contraband prior to his 
intrusion. However, this failure to meet the inadvertent discovery requirement might have been 
excused on the grounds that it was discovered during a search incident to a lawful arrest within 
the area of the arrestee's immediate control. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing search incident to lawful arrest as exception to inadvertence requirement). 
The failure to meet the inadvertence requirement also might have been excused on the grounds 
of exigent circumstances since the automobile might have disappeared while the police sought a 
search warrant or it might not have been safe for the police to guard while a search warrant was 
sought. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); see irifra notes 184-86 and accompanying 
text (discussing exigent circumstances as exception to inadvertence requirement). A third ground 
for excusing the failure might have been that the items seized in the automobile were contra-
band. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text (discussing seizure of contraband as excep-
tion to inadvertence requirement). 
168. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). 
169. [d. at 470-71. 
170. Id. at 471. 
171. Id. at 469-70. 
172. Id. at 516 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
173. [d. 
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ment ends because the rule "will in QO way reduce the number of places into 
which [police] may lawfully 100k."174 Second, he argued that in both the an-
ticipated discovery and the inadvertent discovery, the "actual inconvenience 
and danger to evidence remain identical if the officers must depart and secure 
a warrant."17S Third, Justice White argued that when the police proceed to 
obtain a warrant for a particular premises when they have probable cause to 
search for several items, they "could have no possible motive" for including 
one item but not the other in their application for the warrant. 176 He asserted 
that "[q]uite the contrary is true" and that police, if they are convinced they 
have probable cause to search for an item, will omit the item only because of 
"oversight or careless mistake." 177 
174. Id. at 517. Justice White argued that "[i)f the police stray outside the scope of an au-
thorized Chimel search they are already in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence so 
seized will be excluded; adding a second reason for excluding evidence hardly seems worth the 
candle." Id. Justice White postulated that the plurality might be concerned that police, having 
the right to intrude upon private property to make arrests, will use that right as a pretext to 
obtain entry to searcl. for objects in plain sight. However, he noted that under Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), police can only enter those portions of the property where entry is 
necessary to effect the arrest. Thus, police face a substantial risk that in making an arrest on the 
premises they will not enter into those portions of the property from which they can plainly see 
the items for which they are searching. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 517-18; see 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (limiting right of police to enter property to make 
arrest); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (same); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573 (1980) (same). 
Justice White made no reference to the importance under the fourth amendment of having a 
magistrate make a prior determination of probable cause before police seize an item of property. 
When police seize an item of property whose discovery was anticipated, absent the presence of 
exigent circumstances, they may have had an opportunity to have had a magistrate determine 
whether there was probable cause. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing pos-
sible exigent circumstances that would excuse compliance with inadvertent discovery). Justice Ste-
wart's plurality opinion in Coolidge stated that the "accepted" principle is "that a search or 
seizure carried out on suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the 
police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the 
presence of 'exigent circumstances.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 474-75 (footnote 
omittt:d). Furthermore, it criticizes Justice White's view that any search or seizure may be carried 
out without a warrant so long as probable cause exists because this position would "read the 
Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution." Id. at 480. 
175. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 516 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
176. Id. at 517. 
177. Id. Justice White also noted that police may not include an item in a warrant application 
because they may misjudge the facts and not realize they have probable cause for the item. [d. 
Justice Black argued that seizures of evidence in open view at the time and place of an arrest 
do not have to be inadvertent in order to be lawful. [d. at 505-06 (Black, J., dissenting). In 
addition, he argued that the plurality was confusing "the historically justified right of the police 
to seize visible evidence of the crime in open view at the scene of arrest with the 'plain view' 
exception to the requirement of particular description in search warrants." [d. at 506. Justice 
Black asserted, without citation, that "the right to seize items properly subject to seizure because 
in open view at the time of arrest is quite independent of any power to search for such items 
p.ursuant to a warrant." [d. at 509. He added that the plurality'S inadvertent discovery require-
ment, "for all practical purposes, abolishes seizure incident to arrest" because "[o)nly rarely" 
would weapons, contraband, or other evidence seized incident to arrest be "truly unexpected" or 
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The majority in Coolidge suggested in dictum that the inadvertent discovery 
requirement does not apply to the seizure of items discovered during a search 
incident to a lawful arrest. Regarding such a search, the majority stated that it 
did not mean to suggest "that the police must obtain a warrant if they antici-
pate that they will find specific evidence." 178 However, the majority held that 
"the police must obtain a warrant when they intend to seize an object outside 
the scope of a valid search incident to arrest." 179 The Coolidge majority then 
cited to the. dictum that the plain view doctrine authorizes police to seize 
weapons, destructible evidence, and other evidence that came to light during 
such an appropriately limited search. ISO The majority argued that plain view 
warrantless searches and seizures incident to a lawful arrest are authorized by 
the exigency arising "from the dangers of harm to the arresting officer and of 
destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee." 181 The Coolidge ma-
jority did not explain this distinction in the application of the inadvertence 
requirement. However, the majority suggested that neither the exigency of 
danger of harm to the arresting officer nor the exigency of destruction of evi-
dence exists when a weapon or evidence is outside the reach of the arrestee-
that is, outside the area of immediate control of the arrestee.182 Justice White 
noted that under the plurality's approach, "[iJf the police ... fully anticipate 
that, when they arrest a suspect as he is entering the front door of his home, 
they will find a credit card in his pocket and a picture in plain sight on the 
inadvertent and because a police officer would not make a search incident to an ·arrest if he had 
no expectation of discovering such items. [d.; see infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing majority's dictum in Coolidge that inadvertent discovery requirement does not apply to 
seizures of items during course of valid search incident to arrest). 
Justice Black also argued that the cases cited by the plurality did not support its rule prohibit-
ing police who are executing a search warrant from seizing items not named in the warrant 
unless their discovery was unanticipated or inadvertent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 
508 n.5. The plurality argued, however, that none of the cases cited by Justice Black in this part 
of his opinion "casts any doubt" upon their conclusion that the discovery of evidence in plain 
view must be inadvertent. [d. at 469 n.26. Finally, Justice Black argued that the relevant test 
under the Fourth Amendment is not the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonable-
ness of the seizure under all the circumstances and facts of each case. [d. at 509-10 (Black. J., 
dissenting) . 
178. [d. at 482; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (police, incident to lawful 
arrest of person, may conduct warrantless search of arrestee's person and area within his imme-
diate control-the area from within which he may gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence). 
179. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 484. 
180. [d. at 465 n.24. 
181. [d. at 478. 
182. [d. "Where ... the arresting officer inadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of 
evidence, not concealed. although outside of the area under the immediate control of the arres-
tee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view was obtained in the course of an appro-
priately limited search of the arrestee." [d. Justice White interpreted this statement as permitting 
seizure only if the plain view was inadvertently obtained. [d. at 519 (White, J., concurring and 
dissenting) . 
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wall opposite the door, both of which will implicate him in a crime, they may 
... seize the credit card but not the picture. "183 
The Coolidge plurality also suggested that the inadvertent discovery require-
ment would not apply when there are exigent circumstances. l84 The plurality 
did not define the exigent circumstances that would excuse compliance with 
the inadvertent discovery requirement. It may have had in mind the exceptions 
to the general warrant requirement such as the probability that the item may 
disappear or be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained,18s or where the 
police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. 186 
The Coolidge plurality also suggested that the inadvertent discovery require-
ment would not apply to the seizure of contraband, stolen or dangerous mate-
rials where the initial intrusion was authorized by one of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. 187 The plurality offered no rationale for such an excep-
tion. It might have believed the exception was justified because the govern-
mental interests in seizing such items are great and because persons have no 
right to possess contraband or stolen items and have limited, if any, rights to 
possess dangerous items. Although warrantless seizures of contraband, stolen 
and dangerous items may not involve meaningful interference with possessory 
interests,188 the warrantless intrusion of private premises to seize such items 
183. [d. at 519 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
184. "The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least 
none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as 
'per se unreasonable' in the absence of 'exigent circumstances.' " [d. at 470-71. In Coolidge, 
there was no "exigent circumstance" because "the police knew of the presence of the automobile 
and planned all along to seize it." [d. at 478. 
185. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (recognizing concern that item to be 
seized may disappear before police obtain warrant); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) 
(same); infra notes 373-81 and accompanying text (discussing seizures of property to prevent loss 
of evidence). 
186. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (hot pursuit exception). 
187. The plurality stated: 
The initial intrusion may . . . be legitimated not by a warrant but by one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit or search incident to 
lawful arrest. But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of ob-
jects-not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police 
know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the 
face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless 
seizure. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). According to Justice White, 
the plurality "apparently" held that "contraband, stolen or dangerous material: may be seized 
when discovered in the course of an otherwise authorized search even if the discovery is fully 
anticipated and a warrant could have been obtained." [d. at 519 (White, J., concurring and 
dissenting). The plurality held that the warrantless seizure of petitioner's automobile at issue did 
not involve contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves. [d. at 472; see 
United States v. Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1983) (firearms held to be in plain view, 
even though hidden and under bed, since they were in place where officers executing search 
warrant had right to be). 
188. See supra notes 62-122 and accompanying text ("meaningful" interference with possessory 
interest in property necessary for fourth amendment seizure). 
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might be an unreasonable search when no exigent circumstances are present. 189 
However, the plurality indicated that this exception to the inadvertence re-
quirement would apply only when the initial intrusion was made without a 
warrant. Thus, exigent circumstances would have to exist to make the search 
involved in the intrusion reasonable. l90 According to Justice White, the plurali-
ty's distinction between contraband and mere evidence of crime is "reminiscent 
of the unworkable approach that I thought Warden v. Hayden 191 '" had 
firmly put aside."I92 
Another situation that inight give rise to an exception to the inadvertent 
discovery requirement is where the police have the authority to enter a private 
premises, but exercise that authority only after observing an item that gives 
them probable cause to seize or investigate further. These facts were presented 
by Washington v. Chrisman,193 where the Supreme Court held that police can 
accompany a lawfully arrested person into his residence. In Chrisman, a police 
officer lawfully arrested a student for the offense of illegal possession of alco-
holic beverages by a minor. The officer accompanied the student to his resi-
dence in a university dormitory to retrieve his identification. The student's 
roommate, the respondent in this case, was present in the dormitory room. 
The arresting officer initially remained in the open doorway of the room while 
the student went inside. Soon thereafter, however, the officer entered the 
room because he observed on a table what he believed to be marijuana seeds 
and a pipe used to smoke marijuana. The respondent waived his Miranda 
rights. The arresting officer then asked the respondent if he had any other 
marijuana, and the respondent handed over additional bags of marijuana. The 
respondent and his roommate then consented to a search of their room, which 
resulted in the seizure of additional quantities of marijuana and a quantity of 
LSD.194 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the respondent's convictions for 
the offenses of illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of LSD. 
The court held that the marijuana seeds and pipe should have been suppressed 
because they were the result of an illegal entry of the respondent's residence 
by the arresting officer. 19s Furthermore, the court stated that the additional 
quantities of marijuana and the quantity of LSD should be suppressed because 
they were the fruits of the arresting officer's illegal entry of the respondent's 
residence. 196 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court's 
decision and held that the arresting officer's entry was lawful and that the 
189. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of probable cause to 
inadvertent discovery). 
190. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 471. 
191. 387 U.S. 294 (1967); see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text (discussing items sub-
ject to seizure under fourth amendment). 
192. Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. at 519 (White, 1.," concurring and dissenting). 
193. 455 U.S. I (1982). 
194. [d. at 7. 
195. ld. at 5. 
196. [d. 
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warrantless seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine. 197 Although the 
Court did not address explicitly the inadvertent discovery requirement, the 
Chrisman holding might be interpreted as making that requirement inapplicable 
to certain situations. Those situations would be where the police have legal 
authority, unrelated to the seizure of the evidence in question, to enter private 
premises and acquired probable cause to seize the item from observations of 
the premises just prior to the intrusion. The Chrisman Court held that an 
officer who has lawfully arrested a person may, as a matter of routine, moni-
tor the movements of the arrested person and accompany him wherever he 
goes after the lawful arrest. 198 Furthermore, an officer who does not initially 
accompany an arrestee into his residence does not abandon this right. l99 The 
Court reasoned that to hold the entry illegal "would have the perverse effect 
of penalizing the officer for exercising more restraint than was required under 
the circumstances."200 If an exception to the inadvertent discovery requirement 
was not recognized, an officer in this situation would be in a predicament. If 
he abandoned his lawful intrusion for purposes other than seizure of the item 
in order to obtain a warrant authorizing seizure of the item, successful accom-
plishment of the original purpose for the intrusion may be jeopardized. Specif-
ically, the officer's earlier presence might alert occupants to the police interest 
in the premises and result in disappearance of potential arrestees or seizeable 
evidence. On the other hand, if the officer intruded onto the premises without 
seizing the item and later sought a warrant for the item, it might disappear or 
be destroyed by persons alerted by the earlier police intrusion. 
The third requirement for a plain view seizure under the Coolidge plurality's 
view is that it must be "immediately apparent to the police that they have 
evidence before them. "201 The Court subsequently referred to the plain view 
exception as permitting police to seize "what clearly is incriminating evi-
dence."202 A lower court interpreted this "immediately apparent" criterion as 
requiring the police to possess "near certainty as to the seizeable nature of the 
197. [d. at 9. The Court, in finding the seizure legal, stated that the case was "a classic 
instance of incriminating evidence found in plain view when a police officer, for unrelated but 
entirely legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual's area of privacy." [d. Al-
though the reference to "unrelated reasons" may have been intended to refer to the Coolidge 
inadvertent discovery requirement, the Court in Chrisman made no explicit reference to it. The 
Court only stated that "[t)he 'plain view' exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contra-
band when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be." [d. at 5-6 (citing 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443). . 
198. [d. at 7. The purpose of this per se rule is to protect the arresting officer from potential 
danger if the arrestee gains access to an available weapon and to prevent against the possibility 
of an escape attempt by an arrestee who is not properly supervised. [d. at 6-7. 
199. [d. at 9. 
200. [d. a~ 8. The Court noted that had the arresting officer "exercised his undoubted right to 
remain at [the arrestee's) side, he might well have observed the contraband sooner" [d. at 7. 
201. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466. 
202. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 6. 
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items. "203 However, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in 1987 in 
Arizona v. Hicks. The Court instead held that an item can be seized under 
the plain view doctrine when the police have probable cause to associate it 
with criminal activity. 204 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Hicks rejected the contention that the 
seizure of an item in plain view may be permitted on less than probable 
cause. He reasoned that the "practical justification" for the plain view doc-
trine "is the desirability of sparing police . . . the inconvenience and the risk 
... of going to obtain a warrant. "20S Moreover, "[n]o reason is apparent why 
an object should routinely be seizeable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated 
search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a warrant for that 
same object if it had been known to be on the premises. "206 Justice Scalia 
conceded that a seizure can be "justified on less than probable cause '" 
where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessi-
ties render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of 
crime. "207 Consistent with this, he concluded that no special operational neces-
sities were relied upon in the case at hand, only "the mere fact that the items 
in question came lawfully within the officer's plain view." He asserted that 
this was insufficient to supplant the requirement. 2~ 
Under the plain view seizure doctrine, the information that gives police 
probable cause to believe that an item has a nexus to criminal activity cannot 
be based upon a search or seizure that is not authorized by the doctrine that 
originally permitted the entry and search of the premises or by some other 
doctrine providing police with "independent power to search certain objects in 
plain view. "209 
203. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion) (rejecting "near certain" 
requirement imposed at appellate level). Justice Rehnquist found in Brown that probable cause 
was sufficient to allow police to seize items under the plain view seizure doctrine. Id. at 742-43. 
204. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987). 
205. Id. at ll53. 
206. Id. at ll53-54. 
207. Id. at 1154; see, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 & n.9 (1983) (dictum) 
(permitting seizure of suspected drug dealer's luggage at airport to permit exposure to specially 
trained dog); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (permitting investigative detention of 
vehicles suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873 (1975) (same). 
208. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154. Justice O'Connor, although dissenting in Hicks, 
agreed with the majority that probable cause is required before the police can seize an item 
under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 1157 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. at 1154. The police officer made a lawful warrantless search of an apartment for the 
person and weapon that had fired a bullet through the floor, thereby injuring a man in the 
apartment below. Id. at 1152. The police moved a stereo turntable and some other components 
to record their serial numbers. Id. Although holding that "the mere recording of the serial num-
bers" was not a seizure, the Court held that the police officer's moving of the equipment consti-
tuted a search. Id. The Court then found that the search of the stereo equipment was not 
reasonable. 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion stated that when police have the right to seize an item under 
the plain view doctrine they have'the right to search the item by moving it for closer examina-
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IV. WARRANTLESS SEIZURES OF EFFECTS NOT SUPPORTING ANY EXPECTATIONS 
OF PRIVACY 
In United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court held that no unreasonable 
seizure occurred when Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents as-
serted dominion and control over a package. 210 The Court first reasoned that 
the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy and that such 
containers may be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant. 211 Moreover, 
the Court also reasoned that "it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags 
contained contraband and little else" and that police may make a warrantless 
tion. [d. at 1153. However, the search in question could not be upheld under this principle of 
the plain view doctrine because the doctrine requires probable cause for the initial seizure. The 
state had already conceded that the officer had only reasonable suspicion, which is something 
less than probable cause. [d. Justice Scalia also asserted that "[a) dwelling-place search, no less 
than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practi-
cality why application of the plain-view doctrine would supplant that requirement." [d. at 1154. 
He stated that the Court "ha[d) not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the 
[fourth amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches and its injunction against unrea-
sonable seizures) insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasona-
bleness of police action." [d. The Court saw "no reason for a distinction in the particular 
circumstances" of the Hicks case. [d. 
Justice Scalia began Part III of his majority opinion in Hicks by stating that "[t)he remaining 
question is whether the search was 'reasonable' under the fourth amendment." He concluded 
that the search involved in moving the stereo equipment could not be justified under the exi-
gency doctrine that originally justified the warrantless entry of the respondent's apartment. It 
was also not justified under the plain view doctrine, or under any "special operational necessi-
ties" doctrine. It follows that this warrantless search was not "reasonable" under the fourth 
amendment. The Hicks decision therefore implicitly holds that the probable cause that is required 
to search or seize an object under the plain view doctrine must be acquired through conduct that 
is not an unreasonable search or seizure. In addition, if such probable cause is acquired through 
a fourth amendment search or seizure, the search or seizure will only be reasonable and not in 
violation of the fourth amendment if it is authorized by (he doctrine that authorized the initial 
entry of the private premises in question or by some other legal principle. 
210. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). The package was a cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. [d. at 
Ill. It contained a tube with a series of four zip-lock bags, each enclosed inside the other, with 
the innermost bag containing about six and one half ounces of white powder. [d. The DEA 
removed the tube from the box, the plastic bags from the tube, and a trace of powder from the 
innermost tube. Additionally, they conducted a chemical test of the powder. [d. at 118, 120-22. 
211. [d. at 121. The Court referred to a number of circumstances that led them to conclude 
that the box in question could no longer support any expectation of privacy. The Court initially 
noted that it was "highly relevant to the reasonableness of the agents' conduct" in asserting 
dominion and control over the box that the respondent's privacy interest in the contents of the 
box "had been largely compromised." [d. The Court then explained that "the agents had al-
ready learned a great deal about the contents of the package from the Federal Express employ-
ees, all of which was consistent with what they could see. The package itself, which had 
previously been opened, remained unsealed, and the Federal Express employees had invited the 
agents to examine its contents." [d. The Court analogized the package in question to a balloon 
whose "distinctive character spoke volumes as to its contents, particularly to the trained eye of 
the officer," or the hypothetical gun case whose contents can be inferred from its outward ap-
pearance. [d. (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979». 
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seizure of "effects" that have no justifiable expectation of privacy when they 
have probable cause to suspect contraband.212 
Although these two reasons may appear to state two different and alterna-
tive principles, they may also be interpreted as stating only one legal rule. The 
rule under this latter interpretation is that a container or other "effect" may 
be seized without a warrant, at least temporarily, when it does not support a 
justifiable expectation of privacy and when there is probable cause to believe 
that it contains contraband or another seizeable item. This interpretation of 
Jacobsen equates the Court's reference to containers whose character or ap-
pearance reveal their contents with the Court's other reference to probable 
cause. In other words, police may have probable cause to believe a container 
holds a specific item when the container's distinctive character or outward ap-
pearance causes the police to infer that the contents of the container include 
that specific item. Such an interpretation of Jacobsen might be based upon the 
language that the Court used in expressing its holding.213 An examination of 
the language would indicate that the latter principle is a rephrasing of the 
earlier statement that, at least temporarily, containers whose contents are ap-
parent no longer support any expectation of privacy with respect to the pol-
ice's right to seize. 
However, there are a number of differences in these two principles that 
might lead to a conclusion that they are expressing two different rules. First, 
the former principle makes reference to the right to seize "containers," while 
the latter principle refers to seizure of "effects;" effects might connote a 
broader class of objects than containers.214 Second, the latter principle refers 
to seizure of effects based on probable cause to believe they contain contra-
212. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-22. The Court referred only to a seizure when 
there is probable cause to believe contraband is present, and not to a seizure when there is 
probable cause to believe any seizeable item is present. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying 
text (discussing general history of judicially recognized seizures). However, the Court was dealing 
with a case involving the seizure of contraband and therefore may not have intended to limit 
this latter statement to the seizure of effects containing contraband. 
Since the respondents conceded that the DEA agents had probable cause to believe that the 
box contained narcotics, the Court did not decide whether the agents could have seized the pack-
age in question based on something less than probable cause. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. at 121 n.20. The Court noted that some seizures can be justified by an articulable suspicion 
of criminal activity. [d. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983»; see infra notes 267-
372 and accompanying text (discussing temporary seizures for investigatory purposes based on 
reasonable suspicion). 
213. The Court stated: 
Accordingly, since it was apparent that the tube and plastic bags contained contra-
band and little else, this warrantless seizure was reasonable, for it is well-settled 
that it is constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize 'effects' 
that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on 
probable cause to believe they contain contraband. 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-22 (footnote omitted). 
214. See supra notes 21-50 and accompanying text (discussing types of property that may be 
protected under fourth amendment). 
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band, while the former principle makes no explicit reference to probable cause 
as a basis for such seizures. Third, the former principle refers to the right to 
seize containers, "at least temporarily," whereas the latter principle does not 
suggest that such seizures can only be temporary seizures and not permanent 
seizures.2ls 
If these two principles in Jacobsen are interpreted as stating two alternative 
rules regarding warrantless seizures, the former principle might be interpreted 
as authorizing at least a temporary warrantless seizure of a container, but not 
any other type of effect, that does not support any expectation of privacy due 
to its distinctive character or outward appearance. This would be permitted 
even though there is no probable cause to believe it contains contraband or 
other seizeable items. Under this analysis, the latter principle would authorize 
a warrantless permanent seizure of any effect not supporting a justifiable ex-
pectation of privacy when there is probable cause to believe that the effect 
contains narcotics or other seizeable items. 216 
However, since the Court in Jacobsen included the phrase "at least tempo-
rarily" in its first reason supporting its holding but not in its second, it is 
unclear whether the Jacobsen decision authorized permanent seizures of con-
tainers or effects not supporting an expectation of privacy, or only temporary 
seizures of such containers or effects. Since the Court's focus in both of its 
stated reasons was on the contents of a container or an effect (and not on the 
container or effect itself), Jacobsen might be interpreted as authorizing only 
temporary seizures of containers or effects for the purpose of investigating, 
seizing, or testing their contents. 217 
215. See supra note 16 (discussing permanent seizures and giving examples). Finally, the for-
mer principle refers to a container or package that could no longer support any expectation of 
privacy. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121. It does not make clear whether the Court is 
referring to an actual, subjective expectation of privacy by the respondent or an objective, justi-
fiable expectation of privacy. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing whether there 
must be subjective expectation of privacy in fourth amendment search). The latter principle, 
however, refers to effects that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy. United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121-22. There is no difference between these two principles if the for-
mer principle is also referring to a justifiable expectation of privacy. 
216. Both of these interpretations of the Jacobsen Court's two stated principles differ from 
the plain view seizure doctrine in several respects. First, none of the Supreme Court's decisions 
interpreting the plain view seizure doctrine have ever stated. or suggested that the doctrine is 
limited to containers or effects that do not support any expectation of privacy. Second, neither 
of the two interpretations require a prior valid intrusion or an inadvertent discovery as required 
in plain view seizures not made in a public place. See supra notes 159-92 and accompanying text 
(discussing Coolidge and plain view doctrine). 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the earlier principle may not require a warrantless seizure of 
a container to be based upon probable cause, as is required under the plain view seizure doc-
trine. See supra notes 146-49, 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of reasona-
ble search under plain view doctrine when there is probable cause to associate property with 
criminal activity). Under the latter principle, there must be probable cause that the container or 
effect being seized contains contraband or an item that is seizeable. Under the plain view seizure 
doctrine, there must be probable cause to believe that the container or effect itself is contraband 
or otherwise is associated with criminal activity. 
217. Such an interpretation is consistent with the facts in Jacobsen since law enforcement offi-
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If either of these two interpretations of Jacobsen only permits warrantless 
temporary seizures of containers not supporting any expectation of privacy, 
courts will have to determine what kinds of inspection, investigation, or testing 
of a container or effect and its contents are permitted to be performed by 
police without a search warrant during such a lawful temporary seizure. The 
Court in Jacobsen held that the field test218 that DEA agents performed on 
the white powder in the zip-lock plastic bags after seizing the box and its 
contents was not a search regulated by the fourth amendment219 and was a 
reasonable seizure that did not violate the fourth amendment.22o However, the 
Jacobsen decision did not indicate whether any other types of tests can be 
performed on a container and its contents during a temporary seizure of a 
container not supporting an expectation of privacy.221 
cers seized the package in question only for the time necessary to examine visually the tube and 
zip-lock bags in the box and to perform a field test on the powder found inside the zip-lock 
hags. See infra note 221 (discussing field test in Jacobsen). Officers then rewrapped the package, 
obtained a warrant to search the place to which the package was addressed, executed the war-
rant, and arrested respondents. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112. 
Law enforcement officers may be authorized by the plain view seizure doctrine to make a 
warrantless permanent seizure of a container that does not support an expectation of privacy and 
that police have probable cause to believe contains contraband. In such a situation, the officers 
may have probable cause to believe that the container is evidence of the constructive possession 
of the contraband by the addressee or bailor of the package (or both) and thus may seize the 
package if the other requirements of the plain view seizure doctrine are satisfied .. See supra notes 
131-209 and accompanying text (discussing plain view seizure doctrine). 
218. See infra note 221 (discussing field test in Jacobsen). 
219. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122-24. 
220. Id. at 124-25; see infra text accompanying notes 244-66 (discussing implications of field 
test in Jacobsen). 
221. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (indicating that exterior "sniffing" of 
luggage by trained narcotics detection dog is only test which police can perform on luggage with-
out a warrant when container has been temporarily seized because police have reasonable suspi-
cion (but not probable cause) to believe that container contains narcotics); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 304-72 (discussing details of Place decision). 
No search within the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs when police open and inspect 
the contents of a container whose effects do not support any reasonable or justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748-49 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
jUdgment); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753, 764 n.l3 (1979). However, as the Jacobsen Court made clear, a fourth amendment "sei-
zure" may occur when police assert dominion and control over such a container and its contents 
while investigating them, see supra text accompanying notes 91-94, and when police destroy a 
small amount of an item in conducting a test upon it. See supru text accompanying notes 89-90. 
The general rule is that any search or seizure conducted without a warrant is unreasonable and 
in violation of the fourth amendment. See supra note 2 (discussing general requirements for 
searches and seizures). 
In order for law enforcement officials to make a permanent seizure of an item discovered 
during the course of an inspection of the contents of such a container or effect during such a 
temporary seizure, they would have to meet the requirements of the plain view seizure doctrine, 
the field test doctrine or another doctrine authorizing a warrantless permanent seizure of prop-
erty. See supra text accompanying notes 131-209 (discussing plain view seizure doctrine); infra 
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Furthermore, if Jacobsen authorizes only temporary warrantless seizures of 
containers not supporting any expectation of privacy, courts also will have to 
determine the permissible period of time that such containers may be seized 
without a warrant. The factors that should be considered in determining 
whether such a temporary seizure was unreasonable and thus in violation of 
the fourth amendment are the period of time that the container was seized by 
the police, the extent to which possessory interests protected by the fourth 
amendment were adversely affected by the seizure,222 and whether the police 
seized the container for a longer period of time than was reasonably necessary 
to carry out their investigation (that is, whether the police diligently pursued 
their investigation). 223 
text accompanying notes 244-66 (discussing field test doctrine). 
In a case involving a warrantless temporary seizure of a container which the police had rea-
sonable suspicion (but not probable cause) to believe contained narcotics, the Supreme Court has 
held that "the brevity of the invasion of the individual's interests is an important factor in de-
termining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspi-
cion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983); see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 685 (1985) (stating in dictum that if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some 
point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop). 
In Jacobsen, the warrantless seizure of the box and its contents was for an "apparently short 
but unspecified period of time, during which period of time federal DEA agents removed the 
plastic bags from the tube inside the package, removed a trace of white powder from each of 
the four bags, and performed a field test on the white powder removed from the bags. United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111-12. 
222. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985) (suggesting in dictum that delay by 
police in completing a warrantless search of an automobile, under the so-called "automobile ex-
ception" to the general rule requiring a warrant for a search, during which time the police re-
tained possession of the automobile and its contents, may be unreasonable if it adversely affects 
a privacy or possessory interest); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983) (90-minute 
detention of luggage being carried by a person when seized based only on reasonable suspicion 
that it contained narcotics, held to be unreasonable seizure under fourth amendment, with Court 
stressing in part that seizure intruded on the person's possessory interest in his luggage as well as 
effectively restrained him from proceeding with his itinerary by subjecting him to possible disrup-
tion of travel plans in order to remain with luggage or arrange for its return). 
223. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (in determining whether detention 
of a person is too long in duration to be justified as investigative stop based on reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, court should examine whether police diligently pursued means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicion quickly); United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. at 709 (90-minute detention of a person's luggage, based only on reasonable suspicion 
that it contained narcotics, held to be unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment, with 
the Court stressing, in part, that the police did not diligently pursue its investigation); Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, (1983) (plurality opinion) (in determining that person suspected of carrying 
contraband narcotics in his luggage was under arrest rather than merely stopped when he and his 
luggage were involuntarily moved from airport concourse to DEA office, the plurality noted it 
would have been feasible to have investigated contents of luggage by more expeditious method of 
using trained canine while luggage was momentarily detained); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 700 n.12 (1981) (indicating in dictum that in some situations police must be able to detain 
persons for more than a brief period in order to investigate criminal activity, but noting that 
doubt may be cast on reasonableness of detention if method of investigation makes the period of 
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The cases cited by the Jacobsen Court in support of its two stated principles 
with respect to the right of law enforcement officials to seize, without a war-
rant, containers that do not support any expectation of privacy, or a justifia-
ble expectation of privacy, do not support these statements. The portion of 
United States v. Ross224 cited in footnote 19 of Jacobsenm states only that the 
fourth amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that 
conceals its contents from plain view. 226 However, the Ross Court made this 
statement in addressing the issue of whether the opening and inspection of the 
contents of a container violates the fourth amendment's prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches. 227 The Ross decision at no point addressed the issue of 
whether the dominion and control involved in opening and inspecting the con-
tents of a container, the distinctive configuration or outward appearance of 
which reveals its contents to plain view (and therefore does not support any 
expectation of privacy),228 constitutes an unreasonable seizure in violation of 
the fourth amendment. The portion of Robbins v. California229 cited in foot-
note 19 of Jacobsen refers to a container that so clearly announces its con-
tents, whether by distinctive configuration, transparency, or otherwise, that its 
contents are obvious to the observer. 230 But as is the case in the portion of 
the Ross decision cited by the Jacobsen Court, this statement in Robbins was 
made only in the context of whether the opening and inspection of a container 
by law enforcement officials violates rights of privacy in contravention of the 
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches, not in the context 
of whether the opening and inspection of a container violates the fourth 
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures.231 
Furthermore, the cases cited in footnote 21 of Jacobsen,232 as supporting 
authority for the court's statement that "it is well-settled that it is constitu-
tionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize 'effects' that cannot 
support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant, based on prob-
able cause to believe they contain contraband, "233 do not in fact support this 
detention unduly long). 
When a container not supporting any expectation of privacy is seized from a person's pres-
ence, a court, in determining whether a temporary seizure of the container is unreasonable in 
violation of the fourth amendment, also might consider whether the police informed the person 
of the place to which they were transporting the container, the length of time he might be dis-
possessed of the container, and what arrangements would be made for return of the container if 
the investigation dispelled the police's suspicion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 710. 
224. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
225. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121 n.19 (citing cases as supporting authority for 
principle that containers no longer supporting any expectation of privacy may be seized, at least 
temporarily, without a warrant). 
226. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23. 
227. [d. at 800, 817, 825. 
228. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979). 
229. 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
230. [d. at 428. 
231. [d. at 423-24. 
232. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122 n.21. 
233. [d. at 121-22. 
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statement. The cited portion of United States v. Place234 states in dictum that 
law enforcement authorities, when they have probable cause to believe a con-
tainer holds contraband or evidence of a crime, may seize the container with-
out a warrant pending issuance of a· warrant to examine its contents, if 
exigencies demand it or some other exception to the warrant requirement is 
present (such as when police observe weapons or evidence in a public place).m 
The cited portion of Place does not state that a warrantless seizure of "ef-
fects" . that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy is not prohib-
ited if there is probable cause. The portions of the other cases236 cited in 
footnote 21 of Jacobsen refer only to warrantless seizures of property under 
the plain view seizure doctrine.237 Thus none of the cases cited in Jacobsen 
support the Court's stated principles with respect to the right of law enforce-
ment officers to make warrantless seizures of property not supporting any ex-
pectation of privacy. Furthermore, no policy arguments are provided by the 
Jacobsen Court in support of these principles. 
The determination of whether a warrantless temporary seizure of a container 
or an effect whose contents do not support a justifiable expectation of privacy 
violates the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures 
should be based upon a balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion 
on the individual's fourth amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. 238 Under this balancing 
approach, a warrantless temporary seizure of a container not supporting a jus-
tifiable expectation of privacy usually should be held to be reasonable when 
the seizure is based upon probable cause. 239 This conclusion is based in part 
234. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
235. [d. at 701-02; see text accompanying notes 150-65 supra and notes 373-77 infra (discuss-
ing exceptions to warrant requirement). 
236. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983) (plurality opinion); id. at 748 (Steven, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); O.M. Leasing 
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 
(1968) (per curiam). 
237. The cited ponions of these cases variously refer to warrantless seizures of items observed 
in plain view when the items are abandoned, publicly situated or discovered by a police officer 
executing a valid search, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment), or when the items are seized by a police officer who has a right to be in the 
position to have that view, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam), is in 
a public place, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980), or is in an open area. O.M. 
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977). The cited ponion of Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. at 741-42 (plurality opinion), simply refers to the seizure of property in plain view, 
involving no invasion of privacy, when there is probable cause to associate th~ property with 
criminal activity. See supra notes 131-209, 217 and accompanying text (discussing plain view doc-
trine). 
238. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (field test of contents of seized package 
represented minimal intrusion when police destroyed trace amount of suspicious material to de-
termine whether such material was contraband); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) 
(police officer stopped automobile and detained its occupants during spot check held unreasona-
ble in absence of aniculable and reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing). 
239. This balancing approach for measuring the reasonableness of a panicular law enforcement 
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on the fact that no "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment 
occurs when a container or an effect not supporting a justifiable expectation 
of privacy is opened and its contents inspected. 240 Consequently, a seizure of 
such a container or effect implicates only the fourth amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable seizures. When no search is involved in investigating the 
contents of a container or effect, and there is probable cause to believe that 
such a container or effect contains a seizable item, the law enforcement inter-
ests in a warrantless temporary seizure for purposes of inspecting the contents 
of the container or effect generally should outweigh the adverse effects caused 
by the interference with possessory interests that occur as a result of such a 
seizure. 241 If a warrant was required before seizing temporarily such a con-
tainer or effect, the container or effect might be moved from its original loca-
tion while a warrant was sought and police might not be able to monitor the 
movement nor determine the new location of the container or effect. 242 If, 
however, such a container or effect is seized without a warrant for more than 
a few minutes without a showing that law enforcement interests necessitated a 
lengthy delay for investigatory purposes, and such delay adversely affects a 
person's possessory interests in the container or effect or disrupt's a person's 
travel plans by requiring him to make inquiries and arrangements for return 
of the container or effect, such a warrantless temporary seizure should be held 
to constitute an unreasonable seizure in violation of the· fourth amendment. 243 
practice "usually requires, at a minimUm, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be 
capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be probable cause or a less 
stringent standard." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (footnotes omitted). 
240. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.l3 (not all containers found by police deserve 
full protection of fourth amendment). 
241. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (balancing nature and extent of intrusion 
against governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 703 (1983) (same). 
242. An alternative to temporary seizure of such a container or effect would be for police to 
engage in a controlled delivery, allowing a container or effect under bailment, or otherwise in 
the process of shipment, to be delivered to the addressee so that police may obtain evidence that 
would support the arrest and conviction of the addressee and, possibly, other persons. See lIIi-
nois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 769 (1983) (rather than seizing contraband, police delivered pack-
age to consignee in order to identify that consignee). A court, however, should not dictate how 
law enforcement officials should conduct an investigation of criminal activity when those officials 
follow a method of investigation that is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (when there was probable cause to search auto-
mobile both in dark parking lot and subsequently at police station, court allowed the subsequent 
search). Furthermore, the governmental action involved in resealing a container or effect that, as 
in Jacobsen, had been opened, arguably would be sufficient dominion and control over the con-
tainer or effect to constitute a seizure under the fourth amendment, and the time required to 
reseal the container or effect might be a longer period of time than that involved in a temporary 
seizure for purposes of investigating the contents of the container or effect. 
243. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 708-10 (ninety minute warrantless detention of 
luggage held unreasonable). 
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V. FIELD TESTS 
In United States v. Jacobsen,244 the Supreme Court held that a warrantless 
field test by federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents of a 
trace amount of a white powder, lAS which the agents had probable cause to 
believe was contraband,246 was a reasonable seizure under the fourth amend-
ment.247 The Court stated that the determination of whether this field test, 
which the Court characterized as a seizure subject to the fourth amendment,248 
was reasonable required it to " 'balance the nature and quality of the intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of 
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "249 Applying this 
244. 466 u.S. 109 (1984). 
245. The Jacobsen Court described the field test in question as involving "the use of three test 
tubes. When a substance containing cocaine is placed in one test tube after another, it will cause 
liquids to take on a certain sequence of colors. Such a test discloses whether or not the sub-
stance is cocaine, but there is no evidence that it would identify any other substances." [d. at 
112 n.l. 
246. [d. at 121 n.20. 
247. [d. at 125. The Court also held that the field test did not constitute a search subject to 
the fourth amendment. [d. at 124. Justice White agreed with the Court's conclusion in Part III 
of its opinion that the field test in question did not violate the fourth amendment. [d. at 127, 
133 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan, although 
dissenting in Jacobsen, agreed that the field test in question was not a search within the meaning 
of the fourth amendment, id. at 135, 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J .), but 
did not discuss the issue of whether the field test was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the 
fourth amendment. 
248. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125; see supra text accompanying notes 88-90 
(discussing relevance of duration in determining whether "seizure" took place). 
249. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 
703). The Jacobsen Court cited a number of cases as examples of authority directly supporting 
this quoted statement. [d. at 125 n.26 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046-47 (1983); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 
536-37 (1967». The cited portions of each of these cases state, although in varying terminology, 
that the reasonableness of warrantless conduct by a law enforcement officer (constituting a search 
or seizure) is to be determined by balancing the intrusion on a person's fourth amendment rights 
against the importance of the governmental interests asserted as justification for such warrantless 
conduct. 
A warrantless seizure may be held to be reasonable because of the presence of exigent circum-
stances, but when this approach is taken, a court usually does not also apply the type of balanc-
ing test applied by the Court in Jacobsen to determine the lawfulness of the field test. See supra 
text accompanying notes 373-81 (discussing justification of warrantless search due to exigent cir-
cumstances). The Court in Jacobsen did not argue that the warrantless seizure involved in the 
field test could be upheld on the basis of exigent circumstances. In fact, near the end of its 
discussion of the field test issue, the Court stated that "of course, where more substantial inva-
sions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unrea-
sonable in the absence of exigent circumstances.". United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 126 
n.28. The Court cited four cases to support its position. Two of these cases, Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), held warrantless 
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balancing test to the facts, the Court in Jacobsen concluded that the destruc-
tion of powder during the field test, although affecting possessory interests 
protected by the fourth amendment,250 was reasonable.251 In support of this 
conclusion, the Court stated that the law enforcement interests justifying the 
procedures were substantial because the suspicious nature of the material made 
it virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband.252 Con-
versely, according to the Court, the seizure resulting from the field test 
"could, at most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property 
interest" because "only a' trace amount of material was involved, the loss of 
which appears to have gone unnoticed by the respondents, and since the prop-
erty had already been lawfully detained. "253 Consequently, the Court con~ 
eluded that "the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance 
Fourth Amendment interests"254 and that the warrantless seizure involved in 
the destruction of the powder during the field test was reasonable. 255 
entries and searches of residences to be unreasonable. One cited case, Dunaway v. New York, 
442 U.S. 200 (1979), held that a warrantless arrest of a person without probable cause was un-
reasonable. The final cited case, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), held that a war-
rantless search of luggage within the exclusive control of law enforcement officers was 
unreasonable. 
250. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124-25. 
251. [d. at 125. 
252. The respondent conceded that the DEA agents had probable cause to believe the package 
holding the powder subjected to the field test contained contraband. [d. at 121 n.20. 
253. [d. at 125 (citing as authority to be conferred Cardwell v. Lewis 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 
(1974) (plurality opinion». The Jacobsen Court stated that Cardwell held that an "examination 
of [an] automobile's tires and [the] taking of paint scrapings was a de minimis invasion of con-
stitutional rights." [d. The plurality opinion in Cardwell, however, only made this statement in 
addressing the issue of whether such conduct by the police was a search under the fourth amend-
ment. See Cardwell v. Lewis 417 U.S. at 588-92 (no expectation of privacy protected by fourth 
amendment was infringed when search was limited to examining tire and taking paint scrapings 
from automobile parked in public parking lot). The plurality opinion in Cardwell did not address 
the issue of whether the tire examination and taking' of paint scrapings was a seizure or an 
unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
254. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125. 
255. [d. The Jacobsen Court cited one case, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973), as 
authority directly supponing its conclusion that the warrantless field test was reasonable. The 
Jacobsen Court described Murphy as holding that a warrantless search and seizure limited to 
scraping a suspect's fingernails was justified even when a full search may not be. United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 n.28. In fact, the Murphy decision only addressed the issues of 
whether the warrantless fingernail scraping was a reasonable search under the fourth amendment, 
and whether the warrantless seizure of the respondent's person while the fingernail scraping took 
place was a reasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. at 294-
95. The Murphy Court did not address the issue of the reasonableness of the warrantless seizure 
of the material that was scraped from the respondent's fingernails. [d. at 295 (only discussing 
fingernail scraping as a search). The Jacobsen Court also cited two cases as authority to be 
conferred regarding its conclusion that the warrantless field test was reasonable. United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125 n.28 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 703~ (described by 
Jacobsen Court as approving brief warrantless seizures of luggage for purposes of canine "sniff 
test" based on its minimal intrusiveness and reasonable belief that luggage contained contra-
band); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1979) (described by Jacobsen Coun 
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The Court's reference to the property already having been lawfully detained 
indicates that a prerequisite to a lawful warrantless field test is a finding that 
no unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment occurred when 
law enforcement officers exercised dominion and control over the package 
from which the trace amount of powder for the field test was removed.256 
Although concluding that the warrantless field test was a reasonable seizure 
under the fourth amendment, the Jacobson Court made clear that a key fact 
was its finding that the agents were "virtually certain" that the powder tested 
was contraband. This conclusion is based upon the Court's statement that "we 
do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of material is 
necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to take the 'white powder' 
he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl, or his medicine cabinet, and subject it to 
a field test for cocaine might well work an unreasonable seizure."257 However, 
the Court in Jacobsen does not make clear whether probable cause that a sub-
stance is cocaine (or some other type of contraband)258 is a prerequisite for 
conducting a warrantless field test, or whether a warrantless field test of a 
substance can take place on a lesser amount of information, such as the rea-
sonable suspicion that authorizes a warrantless stop and frisk.259 
as upholding detention of package based on reasonable suspicion because detention infringed no 
"significant fourth amendment interest"»; see infra note 259 (discussing cases balancing reasona-
bleness of intrusion against level of suspicion). 
256. See supra text accompanying notes 210-43 (discussing warrantless searches of effects not 
supporting any reasonable expectation of privacy). 
257. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 'at 126 n.28. The Supreme Court has stated that the 
balancing test applied by the majority in Jacobsen to determine the lawfulness of the warrantless 
field test "usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be 
capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be probable cause or a less 
stringent test." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). 
258. The Court does not make clear whether its holding is limited to the particular field test 
for cocaine involved in Jacobsen, or is applicable to other chemical tests that simply reveal 
whether or not a substance is a particular type of controlled substance. In Jacobson the Court 
found that the field test was not a fourth amendment search because the field test only revealed 
whether or not a particular substance is cocaine and Congress had decided that the interest in 
privately possessing cocaine is illegitimate. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. 
259. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 21 (1968) (to justify particular intrusion police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion). The Jacobsen Court cited two cases as 
authority to be conferred regarding its conclusion that the warrantless field test was reasonable. 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125-26 n.28 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
703-06 (1983) (approving brief warrantless seizures of luggage for purposes of canine "sniff test" 
based on its minimal intrusiveness and reasonable belief that luggage contained contraband); 
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970) (detention of package based on rea-
sonable suspicion justified because detention infringed no "significant Fourth Amendment inter-
est"»; see infra text accompanying notes 267-372 (discussing Place and Van Leeuwen decisions in 
detail). Since the Place and Van Leeuwen decisions are cited as authority to be conferred, this 
Jacobsen Court citation might be interpreted as implying that a field test can be made when 
there is reasonable suspicion that the substance to be tested is contraband. not just when there is 
probable cause to believe the substance is contraband, such as was the cocaine in Jacobsen. See 
United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 121 n.20 ("Respondents concede that the agents had 
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Justice White concurred with the majority's conclusion, in Part III of its 
opmlOn in Jacobsen, "that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
type of chemical test conducted here violated the Fourth Amendment. "260 His 
reasons for concurring with this conclusion were "that the clear plastic bags 
were in plain view when the agent arrived and that the agent thus properly 
observed the suspected contraband. "261 Justice White noted that the respon-
dents were only challenging the field test,262 which expanded the private search 
by Federal Express employees. 263 He argued that the Court should not have 
addressed the question of whether federal agents could have duplicated the 
prior private search had that search not left the contraband in plain view. 264 
However, Justice White did not discuss whether a fourth amendment seizure 
occurred when the agent picked up the tube and removed the bags in order to 
take a sample of the powder for the field test, nor whether any such seizure 
was unreasonable in violation of the fourth amendment. 
In holding that the field test in question was not an unreasonable seizure in 
violation of the fourth amendment, the majority required that no unreasonable 
probable cause to believe the package contained contraband"). However, the Jacobsen Court 
found that the law enforcement interest in conducting the field test was substantial because it 
was virtually certain that the substance tested was in fact contraband. [d. at 125. The law en-
forcement interest in conducting a field test on a substance arguably is not as substantial when 
there is only reasonable suspicion to believe the substance is contraband (but not the "virtual 
certainty" that Jacobsen appears to equate with probable cause). The law enforcement interests 
in such a situation therefore might not outweigh the impact of a field test upon fourth amend-
ment interests, thus making a field test conducted only on the basis of reasonable suspicion un-
reasonable and in violation of the fourth amendment. 
260. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 127 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
261. Id. Justice White did not agree with the majority's disregard of the finding by both the 
district court and court of appeals that when the first DEA agent arrived, the tube was in plain 
view in the box and the bags with the white powder were visible from the end of the tube. Id. 
at 126-27. Justice White also disagreed with the majority's determination in Jacobsen that the 
agent's removal of the tube from the box and the plastic bags from the tube, and his subsequent 
visual examination of the bags' contents, did not constitute a search even if the bags were not 
visible when the first DEA agent arrived on the scene. Id. at 127-33. 
262. Justice White noted that the respondents "argue here that whether or not the contraband 
was in plain view when the federal agent arrived is irrelevant and that the only issue is the 
validity of the field test." Id. at 127. 
263. Id. at 128. 
264. Id. Alternatively, Justice White argued in Jacobsen that if the majority found that the 
magistrate had erred in concluding that the white powder was in plain view when the first agent 
arrived and that the respondents had not abandoned their challenge to the agent's duplication of 
the prior private search, the better course would be to reverse the court of appeals' decision 
invalidating the field test as an illegal expansion of the private search and remand the case to 
allow the district court and court of appeals to review in the first instance the magistrate's find-
ings on the plain view issue. Id. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined in dissent, 
agreed that the case should be remanded for this purpose. Id. at 134 (Brennan, J., dissenting, 
joined by Marshall, J .). Justice Brennan agreed with the majority in Jacobsen that the field test 
was not a fourth amendment "search" but on grounds different than those given by the major-
ity, and he emphasized that the question involved consideration of the method used to search as 
well as the circumstances attending use of the field test. Id. at 139-41. 
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search or seizure occur while law enforcement officers exercise dominion and 
control over the package from which a sample is taken for a field test. 26S Fur-
thermore, the Court's conclusion that the warrantless seizure involved in a 
field test is reasonable under the fourth amendment is a proper one under the 
balancing test applied by the Court, because such a seizure must be based 
upon probable cause or reasonable suspicion and the law enforcement interests 
in eradicating contraband controlled substances substantially outweigh a field 
test's de minim'is impact upon the possessory interests protected by the fourth 
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures.266 
VI. TEMPORARY SEIZURES FOR INVESTIGATORY PURPOSES BASED ON REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
In addition to authorizing certain permanent seizures of property for investi-
gatory purposes under the Jacobsen decision's field test doctrine, the Supreme 
Court has held that in certain circumstances warrantless temporary seizures of 
personal property for investigatory purposes do not violate the fourth amend-
ment. 
A. United States v. Van Leeuwen 
In United States v. Van Leeuwen,267 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for a 
unanimous Court in one of the earliest Supreme Court decisions to address 
the issue of when a warrantless "seizure" of personal property is reasonable 
under the fourth amendment. The Van Leeuwen Court held that the fourth 
amendment was not violated when two suspicious packages, mailed at a 
United States post office, were detained for twenty-nine hours by a postal 
clerk while a policeman and customs agents investigated the respondent (who 
had mailed the packages), the return address, and addresses on the packages. 
The packages each weighed twelve pounds and were mailed at 1 :30 p.m. in 
the afternoon at a post office in the town of Mt. Vernon, Washington, which 
is located approximately sixty miles from the Canadian border. One of the 
packages was addressed to a post office box in Van Nuys, California, and the 
other to a post office box in Nashville, Tennessee. The respondent, who 
mailed the packages, had declared that they contained coins and sent them air 
mail registered, with each package insured for $10,000.268 A postal clerk at the 
post office told a police officer who was present that he was suspicious of 
these packages. The police officer then noticed that the return address on each 
package was a vacant housing area located nearby (and therefore a fictitious 
265. [d. at 124-25. 
266. [d. at 125. 
267. 397 U.S. 249 (1970). 
268. The pafties in Van Leeuwen agreed that this type of mailing was first class, making the 
packages not subject to discretionary inspection by postal authorities. [d. at 250. The Court reit-
erated in Van Leeuwen that first class mail cannot be inspected, except as to outward form and 
appearance, except with a search warrant. [d. at 251 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 
733 (1877». 
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return address),269 and that the respondent's automobile had British Columbia 
license plates. The police officer then called Canadian police, who called 
United States customs in Seattle. An hour and a half after the packages had 
been mailed (3 p.m.), customs agents called Van Nuys and learned that the 
addressee of one package was under investigation in Van Nuys for trafficking 
in illegal coins. Due to the time differential between Seattle and Nashville, 
Seattle customs agents were unable to reach Nashville until the following 
morning. At that time, they were informed that the Nashville addressee of one 
of the packages in question also was being investigated for trafficking in ille-
gal coins. A customs official in Seattle then filed an affidavit for a search 
warrant for both packages with a United States commissioner, who issued the 
search warrant at 4:00 p.m. that day (twenty-six and a half hours after the 
packages had been mailed). The search warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. that 
day (twenty-nine hours after the packages had been mailed), at which time the 
packages were opened, inspected and resealed, and then promptly sent on their 
way. The respondent was convicted of illegally importing gold coins in viola-
tion of Section 545 of Title 18 of the United States Code270 at· a trial at which 
gold coins in the two packages in question were offered into evidence, along 
with other evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the gold coins 
were improperly admitted into evidence because a timely warrant had not been 
obtained.271 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals. 
The Supreme Court in Van Leeuwen first reiterated that first class mail can-
not be examined and inspected, except for outward form and weight, without 
a search warrant. 272 The Court stated that the flow of first class mail cannot 
be encumbered by inspecting it, appraising it, writing the addressee about it 
and awaiting a response, before dispatching it. 273 However, the Supreme Court 
stated that even first-class mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection, and 
concluded that the conditions for detention and inspection of first class mail 
had been satisfied in the case.274 The Court held that the warrantless detention 
of the two packages while an investigation was made was justified because of 
the nature and weight of the packages, the fictitious return address and the 
British Columbia license plates of the respondent who made the mailing in a 
"border" town.27S Although stating that at the point of detention there was 
269. [d. at 250. 
270. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1982). 
271. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 414 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1969). 
272. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 251. 
273. [d. at 252 (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965». The Court 
indicated that newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and other printed matter were not subject to 
the protections afforded to first class mail, but did not discuss what procedures postal authorities 
or other law enforcement officers must follow before such printed matter can be opened and 
inspected. [d. at 251. 
274. [d. at 252. 
275. Although stating that the detention of the packages was on "the basis of suspicion," id., 
the Court did not explain what criminal acts the police could believe the respondent was commit-
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"no possible invasion of the right 'to be secure' in the 'persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment against 'unreasonable 
searches and seizures,' , '276 the Court noted that at some point detention of 
mail could become an unreasonable seizure of "papers" or "effects" within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment.277 
The Van Leeuwen Court noted that the detention of the packages for one 
and a half hours after they were mailed for an investigation was not exces-
sive.m This investigation led to a finding of probable cause to believe that the 
California package "was part of an illicit project"279 and that a warrant could 
have been obtained for that one package that day.2so The Court noted that 
"the mystery of the other package remained unsolved and federal officials in 
Tennessee could not be reached because of the time differential. "281 After re-
viewing the chronology of the acts involved in contacting the Tennessee offi-
cials and in obtaining and transmitting the search warrant, the Court stated 
that there had been a "speedy transmission" of the search warrant "consider-
ing the rush-hour time of day and the congested highway."282 
ting on the basis of the facts that were cited as justification for the detention of the two pack-. 
ages. But since the respondent was convicted of the crime of illegally importing gold coins, the 
Court may have concluded that these cited facts gave police reason to suspect that the respon-
dent was engaged in illegal importation of such coins or other items, or in illegal distribution or 
sale of contraband (such as a controlled substance). 
276. [d. What the Court appeared to be stating is that the respondent's fourth amendment 
rights were not violated at the first moment that the packages were detained. See supra notes 88-
90 (discussing definition of seizure of property in Jacobsen). 
277. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252. 
278. [d. The Court did not explain why this delay was not excessive. They may have believed 
that packages often stay in the post office where they were mailed for this length of time or 
longer before they begin their journey to the addressee, or that the suspicious nature of the 
packages justified this one and a half hour detention for investigative purposes even if the pack-
ages were detained for a period longer than normal. 
279. [d. 
280. [d. at 252-53. 
281. [d. at 253. 
282. [d. The Van Leeuwen decision thus suggests that when police have acquired probable 
cause to believe detained mail contains contraband narcotics or another item that is seizable be-
cause it has a nexus to criminal activity, see supra notes 54-61 (discussing definition of seizable 
items in Wa;den v. Hayden), the police may further detain the mail without a warrant for a 
reasonable period of time to obtain a search warrant authorizing them to open and inspect the 
contents of the mail. However, the police cannot open and inspect the contents of the mail 
without a warrant. See supra notes 268-73 (discussing need for search warrant to examine pack-
age beyond its outward appearance). This approach is consistent with the Court's general rule 
that police may not search a container which is within their exclusive control even though they 
have probable cause to believe the container contains contraband or another seizable item, unless 
some exigency is present or some exception to the general warrant requirement is present. See 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (where law enforcement authorities have proba-
ble cause to believe container holds contraband or evidence of crime, but have not secured war-
rant, the fourth amendment permits seizure of property, pending issuance of warrant to examine 
its contents, if exigencies of circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to war.-
rant requirement is present); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (defendant entitled to 
fourth amendment protection before privacy interests in contents of footlocker were invaded). 
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The Van Leeuwen Court concluded that the delay in forwarding the pack-
ages until the day after they were mailed, rather than the day they were 
mailed, invaded no interest protected by the fourth amendment, because the 
significant fourth amendment interest was in the privacy of this first class mail 
and that such privacy was not disturbed or invaded until the magistrate's ap-
proval was obtained.283 By stating that only significant privacy interests were 
involved (the interests protected by the fourth amendment's prohibition of un-
reasonable searches)284 and not referring to any possessory interest (significant 
or otherwise) as being invaded, Van Leeuwen might be interpreted as holding 
that the twenty-nine hour detention was not a seizure under the fourth amend-
ment. 28S Such an interpretation could be based upon the Court's interpretation 
of a fourth amendment seizure of property as a meaningful interference with 
an individual's possessory interests in that property,286 on the grounds that the 
twenty-nine hour detention of the two packages did not meaningfully interfere 
with respondent's actual possession of the packages.287 However, the Van 
Leeuwen decision should be interpreted as holding that the twenty-nine hour 
detention of the packages, although a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment,288 was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of the 
fourth amendment. 
Such an interpretation of Van Leeuwen is supported by the concluding para-
graph of the Court's decision. The Van Leeuwen Court there stated that 
"[t]he rule of our decision certainly is not that first-class mail can be detained 
29 hours after mailing in order to obtain the search warrant needed for its 
inspection, "289 but that its holding is only that, on the facts of the case,29O the 
283. United Sates v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 
705 n.6, Justice O'Connor stated that the Van Leeuwen Court "[e]xpressly limited its holding to 
the facts of the case" and that one commentator has noted that " 'Van Leeuwen was an easy 
case for the Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon 
either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the packages 
themselves.' " [d. (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6, at 71 (Supp. 1982». 
284. See supra notes 64-67 (discussing the difference between a seizure and a search). 
285. If this detention was not a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the 
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures would not be applicable. See United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (transfer of container concealing locational "beeper" did not 
interfere with anyone's possessory interests and therefore involved no seizure). 
286. See supra notes 62-122 (discussing definition of fourth amendment seizure). 
287. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (ninety minute detention of luggage made 
seizure unreasonable); see infra notes 304-72 and accompanying text (discussing details of deci-
sion in Place). 
288. The 29-hour detention of the two packages in Van Leeuwen probably would be held to 
be a "seizure" under current interpretations of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Ja-
cobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1984) (holding assertion of dominion and control for brief period 
over package not in owner's actual possession constituted fourth amendment "seizure"); see su-
pra notes 62-94 and accompanying text (discussing details of decision in Jacobsen). 
289. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253. 
290. The facts referred to by the Court at this point were "the nature of the mailings, their 
suspicious character, the fact that there were two packages going to separate destinations, the 
unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant of the two destinations, [and] the distance be-
tween Mt. Vernon and Seattle." [d. 
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twenty-nine hour delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant 
was not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.291 The 
former statement appears to recognize that such a lengthy detention constitutes 
a seizure, while the latter statement concludes that the warrantless seizure was 
not unreasonable in violation of the fourth amendment. 
The Court in Van Leeuwen also did not clarify whether the warrantless sei-
zure involved in the twenty-nine hour detention was not unreasonable because 
there were exigent circumstances or because the governmental interests involved 
outweighed the interference with fourth amendment interests occurred.292 The 
Van Leeuwen Court's concluding statement that "[d]etention for this limited 
time was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages enter the 
mails -and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying to locate 
them en route and enlisting the help of distant federal officials in serving the 
warrant, "293 might be interpreted either as being concerned with the exigent 
circumstances presented by the possible disappearance of the evidence in the 
two packages, or with the governmental interest in avoiding an extensive (and 
therefore costly) quest to locate the packages. Although exigent circumstances 
could justify a warrantless detention (seizure) of an article in the mail,294 a 
warrantless detention of a suspicious article29s in the mail for investigative pur-
poses also should be held reasonable and lawful under the fourth amendment 
when police diligently pursue their investigation, the addressor's or addressee's 
possessory interests in the contents of the mail are not significantly adversely 
affected by the delay, and the period of time that the mail is detained is not 
excessive. In such circumstances, a warrantless detention of an article in the 
mail should be held to be reasonable under the fourth amendment because the 
law enforcement interests furthered by the detention outweigh any adverse ef-
fects upon protected fourth amendment interests caused by the detention. 296 
291. [d. 
292. See supra note 2 (discussing general rule requiring search warrant and the exceptions to 
the rule). 
293. United States v. Van Leeuw.:n, 397 U.S. at 253. 
294. See infra notes 373-77 (discussing circumstances when warrantless seizure is valid). 
295. See infra notes 297-303 (discussing seizure based on reasonable suspicion). 
296. See Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1984) (risk of package's disappearance 
before warrant could be obtained outweighed owner's interest in possession); United States v. 
Hillison, 733 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1984) (nine hour segregation and detention of package did not 
violate fourth amendment); see infra text accompanying notes 304-72 (discussing details of deci-
sion in Place). Significant adverse effects on such possessory interests might be present if the 
contents of the article in the mail were perishable and significantly deteriorated during the period 
of detention, or if such detention caused significant adverse economic effects on the addressee or 
addressor. The Van Leeuwen decision implies that the permissible length of time for such a war-
rantless detention of mail should be determined by consideration of the type of investigation that 
is being pursued and the diligence with which law enforcement officers pursue their investigation. 
See supra notes 287-91 and accompanying text (discussing reasonableness of 29-hour detention); 
cf United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (in determining reasonable length of investiga-
tive stop courts must consider purposes served by stop as well as time reasonably needed to 
effectuate those purposes); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S., 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (same). 
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Application of the Van Leeuwen decision to other factual situations involv-
ing warrantless detention of mail for investigative purposes is difficult because 
Van Leeuwen did not indicate what level of suspicion is necessary to justify 
the warrantless detention of mail. The Court in Van Leeuwen clearly does not 
require the probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant as a 
prerequisite to a detention of mail for investigative purposes, because the 
Court referred to the detention of the packages on "the basis of suspicion"297 
and noted that probable cause justifying issuance of a search warrant for the 
two packages was obtained after the detention of the two packages.298 How-
ever, the Court in Van Leeuwen did riot indicate whether the information nec-
essary to justify a warrantless detention must give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity that would justify an investigative stop of the 
deliverer, addressee, or addressor of a package.299 Nor did the Court indicate 
whether the information must give rise to only a reasonable suspicion that the 
article contains contraband or some other seizable item.3°O The Court held in 
a.nother case that warrantless temporary detentions of luggage for investigative 
purposes are permitted when there is reasonable suspicion that the luggage 
contains contraband narcotics.301 Similarly, warrantless temporary detention of 
mail should be permitted when there is reasonable suspicion that the mail con-
tains contraband narcotics or other seizable items. 302 
297. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252. 
298. [d. at 252-53. 
299. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (in determining what is sufficient 
for police to stop person, totality of circumstances must be taken into account); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (informant's information sufficient to justify stop). See also 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (reasonable suspicion that person has com-
mitted a felony, based on specific and articulable facts, is sufficient for investigative stop). 
300. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 703 (reasonable belief based on specific and artic-
ulable facts that luggage contains narcotics is necessary to justify seizure of luggage); infra notes 
304-72 and accompanying text (discussing decision in Place). 
301. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 703. 
302. In Van Leeuwen, the Court did not state what the police initially suspected to be the 
contents of the two packages; the police ultimately learned that the packages contained illegally 
imported gold coins. The contents were therefore either contraband or evidence of crime, both 
of which are items that can be seized under the fourth amendment. See supra notes 54-61 and 
accompanying text (discussing definition of seizable items in Warden y. Hayden). In United 
States Y. Place, the Court limited its holding to situations where police have reasonable suspicion 
to believe that luggage contains narcotics, because the method of investigation at issue was the 
sniffing of luggage by a trained narcotics detection dog which disclosed only the presence or 
absence of narcotics, but no other information. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. This 
method of investigation was held not to be a "search." [d. If this investigative procedure had 
been held to be a "search," probable cause would have been required. [d. at 706. The Court 
implied that any other type of investigative procedure would be a "search" (requiring probable 
cause), stating that it was unaware of any other investigative procedure that was so limited both 
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information re-
vealed by the procedure. [d. at 707; see infra notes 304-72 and accompanying text (discussing 
details of decision in Place). On the other hand, the investigative procedures followed by the 
police in Van Leeuwen did not constitute a search, because no fourth amendment search occurs 
when police examine the exterior of a mailed package or envelope, see Annotation, Validity· Un-
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However, the Van Leeuwen decision may not be interpreted as authorizing 
warrantless detention of any effects other than mail because in Van Leeuwen 
governmental agents already had lawful dominion and control of the mail, due 
to the addressor's consensual posting, when the detention commenced. To ac-
quire effects other than mail for investigative purposes, governmental authori-
ties would have to acquire dominion and control over the effects-conduct 
that would constitute a "seizure"303 requiring either the authorization of a 
search. warrant or an exception to the general rule requiring a warrant for a 
seizure. 
B. United States v. Place 
In United States v. Place,304 the Supreme Court held that law enforcement 
authorities may temporarily detain personal luggage, without a search warrant, 
for the purpose of exposing it in a public place to a trained narcotics detec-
tion dog when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the luggage con-
tains narcotics.30s However, the Court in Place held that the ninety minute 
der Fourth Amendment of "Mail Cover", 57 A.L.R. FED. 742 (1982), examine the exterior of 
an automobile on a public street or other public area, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 
(1986), or obtain information from other public officials which the police have lawfully obtained 
through their investigations. Consequently, law enforcement officials should be allowed to detain 
mail and investigate it (through methods not constituting an unreasonable search or seizure in 
violation of the fourth amendment) when they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the mail 
contains any seizable item (fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of crime or contraband). 
303. See supra notes 62-96 and accompanying text (discussing elements of seizure in Jacobsen 
decision). 
304. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
305. [d. at 697-98, 707. This "holding" actually may be dictum because the resolution of this 
issue was unnecessary to the Court's decision. See United States v. Beale, 735 F.2d 1289, 1290-
91 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (sniff of luggage by trained narcotics detection dog did not consti-
tute search). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Place Court does not explain what law enforce-
ment officers are authorized to do if the trained canine gives a positive reaction after sniffing 
the luggage, indicating that the luggage contains narcotics. Although such a positive reaction 
probably gives law enforcement officers probable cause to believe that the luggage contains nar-
cotics, see Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813 n.8 (1984) (no possessory interest violated 
where possessors under arrest throughout search of items) (Part IV of the opinion of the Court 
by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J .), officers probably still need to obtain a warrant 
before searching the luggage. A fourth amendment "search" generally occurs when officers open 
and inspect the contents of a container that conceals its contents from plain view. See infra note 
352 (discussing cases that define search of containers). As a general rule, officers need a search 
warrant to search a container that is within their exclusive control even when they have probable 
cause to believe the container holds contraband narcotics or another seizable item. United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 15 (1977). As stated in Place: 
Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container 
holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court 
has interpreted the Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance 
of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand 
it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present. 
United States v. Place 462 U.S. at 701. When a trained canine has given law enforcement offi-
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detention of respondent Place's personal luggage could not be upheld under 
this rule because the length of the detention of respondent's luggage was un-
reasonable under the fourth amendment306 and because this violation was exac-
erbated by other conduct of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") 
agents who seized respondent's luggage.307 In Place, DEA agents seized with-
out a search warrant two suitcases that respondent Place claimed after arriving 
at La Guardia Airport on a flight from Miami.30s Since the agents did not 
have a trained narcotics detection dog at La Guardia Airport, the agents took 
Place's luggage to Kennedy Airport, where the luggage was subjected to a 
sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately ninety, minutes 
after respondent's luggage had been seized at La Guardia Airport, the narcot-
cers probable cause to believe that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, the exigent circum-
stances presented by the possibility or probability that the narcotics in the luggage will disappear 
to an unknown location or be destroyed (because the traveler has been alerted to the officer's 
suspicions) should authorize the officers to detain the luggage without a search warrant until a 
search warrant authorizing a search of the container has been obtained. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 397-403 (discussing factors concerning securing of premises while obtaining search 
warrant). 
306. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10. 
307. [d. at 710; see infra text accompanying notes 361-65 and accompanying text (discussing 
conduct of DEA agents in Place). Although the district court concluded that the DEA agents 
had reasonable suspicion to believe that Place was engaged in criminal activity when he was 
stopped and the luggage at issue seized, United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217, 1225-26 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue and did not address it in its 
review of the case. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 700 n.l. 
308. DEA agents seized Place's two suitcases because they suspected that Place was carrying 
narcotics. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99. Place's behavior at Miami International 
Airport had aroused the suspicion of law enforcement officers. The officers approached Place at 
the departure gate for his flight and asked him for his airline ticket and some identification. 
Place complied with this request and consented to a search of the two suitcases which he had 
checked, but the officers decided not to search his luggage because Place's flight was about to 
depart. Since Place, in parting, had remarked that he had recognized the officers as police, the 
officers checked the address tags on Place's checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the two 
street addresses on the tags. They determined by further investigation that neither address existed 
and that the telephone number Place had given the airline belonged to a third address on the 
same street listed on the address tags. These Miami officers then informed DEA agents in New 
York of the information they had acquired about Place. 
Two DEA agents met Place at his arrival gate at La Guardia Airport. His behavior aroused 
their suspicion. After Place claimed his bags and called a limousine, these agents approached 
Place and identified themselves as federal narcotics agents. Place replied that he knew they were 
"cops" and had spotted them as soon as he had deplaned. One of the DEA agents then told 
Place that they believed that he might be carrying narcotics. Place replied that police had 
searched his baggage at Miami Airport, but the agents responded that their information was to 
the contrary. After requesting and receiving identification from Place (a driver's license on which 
the agents ran a computer check that disclosed no offenses) and his airline ticket receipt, the 
agents asked Place for his consent to search his luggage. When Place refused to consent to 
search of his luggage, the agents told him they were taking his luggage to a federal judge to try 
to obtain a search warrant. The Supreme Court stated that a "seizure" of Place's luggage for 
purposes of the fourth amendment occurred at this point. [d. at 707. The agents then told Place 
that he could accompany them, but Place declined to do so. The agents therefore gave him a 
telephone number where one of the agents could be reached. 
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ics detection dog at Kennedy Airport reacted positively to the smaller of res-
pondent's two suitcases but ambiguously to the larger suitcase. Since this 
happened late on a Friday afternoon, the agents detained the luggage until 
Monday morning, when they obtained a search warrant for respondent's 
smaller suitcase. The agents found 1,125 grams of cocaine in the smaller suit-
case. After Place was indicted for possession of the cocaine with intent to 
distribute in violation of Section 841(a)(I) of Title 21 of the United States 
Code,309 he moved to suppress the cocaine seized from his luggage on the 
ground, among others, that the warrantless seizure of his luggage violated the 
fourth amendment. His motion to suppress was denied by the district court, 
which held that the standard of Terry v. Ohio,310 justified the warrantless de-
tention of respondent's luggage because there was reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that the luggage contained narcotics. 3I1 Place then pled guilty to the 
charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 
Although assuming both that Terry principles could justify a warrantless sei-
zure of baggage on less than probable cause and that reasonable suspicion ex-
isted to justify the investigatory stop of Place, the court of appeals reversed 
Place's conviction on the grounds that the warrantless seizure of Place's lug-
gage exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop and was 
a seizure without probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment.312 The 
Supreme Court affirmed.313 
The Place Court initially noted that as a general rule a seizure of personal 
property without a valid warrant is per se unreasonable under the fourth 
amendment. 314 However, the Court stated: 
Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe 
that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have 
not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the [Fourth] 
Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of 
a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circum-
309. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I) (1982). 
310. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry decision provided that a law enforcement officer, without a 
warrant, may stop and frisk the person. of a suspect when the officer has reasonable suspicion, 
short of probable cause, that there is criminal activity afoot and that the person is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or others. [d. at 30. A frisk is an exterior pat-down of a 
suspect's clothing for the purpose of locating weapons; an officer may only go beneath the sus-
pect's exterior clothing to reach for what reasonably felt like a weapon during the exterior pat-
down. [d. at 29-30. 
311. United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The district court also held 
that the stops of Place at the two airports were lawful because the agents had reasonable suspi-
cion that Place was engaged in criminal activity. [d. at 1225-26. The Supreme Court did not 
address this issue. 462 U.S. at 700 n.1. In addition, the district court rejected respondent Place's 
contention that the sniff test of his luggage was conducted in a way that tainted the dog's reac-
tion. 498 F. Supp. at 1228. 
312. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1981). 
313. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 700. 
314. [d. at 701. 
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stances demand it or some other recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement is present.m 
The Court did not explain why this rule did not authorize the warrantless sei-
zure of Place's luggage, but apparently it did not address this issue because 
the government did not contend that the DEA agents had probable cause to 
believe respondent's luggage contained contraband prior to the trained canine's 
positive reaction to the smaller of respondent's two suitcases. 316 With probable 
cause absent in Place's case, the Court accepted the federal government's ar-
gument that the principles of Terry v. Ohio317 should permit warrantless sei-
zures of luggage from the custody of the owner on the basis of reasonable, 
articulable suspicions (less than probable cause).318 Such reasonable suspicion 
must be based on objective facts indicating that the luggage contains contra-
band or evidence of a crime, and the seizure must serve the purpose of con-
ducting a limited investigation, without opening the luggage, that will quickly 
confirm or dispel such suspicion.319 
315. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. I (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971»; see infra text accompany-
ing notes 373-81 (discussing search and seizure of containers). An example of such seizures cited 
by the Court in Place is the warrantless seizure of objects such as weapons or contraband found 
in a public place by police. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 696. The Court has indicated 
that such seizures must be based on probable cause. See supra text accompanying notes 150-67 
(discussing seizures in public places). 
316. The Court stated that the government was asking it to recognize the reasonableness under 
the fourth amendment of warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner 
on the basis of less than probable cause. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 702. The Court 
noted that "[t)he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion 
that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause." Id. at 709. 
317. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
318. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 702. 
319. Id. Although the Place Court addressed the issue of whether a seizure based on less than 
probable cause is reasonable under the fourth amendment, it did not explicitly address the issue 
of whether the seizure of Place's luggage was unreasonable and in violation of the fourth 
amendment because of the absence of a search warrant. However, by implicitly authorizing sei-
zures of luggage based on reasonable suspicion less than probable cause, the Court implicitly 
authorized such seizures to be made without a search warrant, since the fourth amendment on its 
face only allows search warrants to be issued on the basis of probable cause. The fourth amend-
ment does not authorize the issuance of a search warrant on the basis of reasonable suspicion 
short of probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20 (law enforcement officers may stop 
and frisk suspect without warrant when they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity ex-
ists and that suspect is presently armed and dangerous). . 
If the issue of the reasonableness of acting without a search warrant had been raised in Place, 
the government might have argued that it was not unreasonable, in violation of the fourth 
amendment, to have seized Place's luggage and exposed it to a trained narcotics detection dog 
either because there were exigent circumstances, or because the governmental interests furthered 
by this intrusion of fourth amendment interests outweigh the nature and quality of the intrusion 
on Place's fourth amendment interests. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing 
fourth amendment protections regarding searches and seizures). 
Exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure of Place's luggage might have been 
found to be present on the grounds that the narcotics that Place was suspected of carrying in his 
1988] . WARRANTLESS SEIZURES 635 
The Place Court noted that Terry and subsequent cases authorize a police 
officer, without probable cause, to forcibly stop a person when the officer has 
a reasonable, articulabie suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to 
be engaged in criminal activity. 320 
This "exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the 
person in Terry and its progeny," and determination of the reasonableness of 
the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the fourth amendment's 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, was stated by the Place 
Court to rest on a balancing of the competing interests. 321 The competing in-
terests which Place requires to be balanced are "the nature and quality of the 
intrusion against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify 
the intrusion."322 Place states that "[w]hen the nature and extent of the deten-
tion are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, 
the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less 
than probable cause. "323 
luggage might have disappeared to an unknown location if the agents had attempted to follow 
Place until they had probable cause (or had obtained a search warrant based on probable cause) 
instead of seizing the luggage. at La Guardia Airport. Such a conclusion might have been based 
upon the facts that the address tags on Place's two suitcases were for two different addresses 
that were determined to be non-existent, Place had given a telephone number to the airline 
which belonged to a third address on the street, and Place had called for a limousine before 
DEA agents approached him at La Guardia Airport and seized his luggage. United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99; see supra note 308 (discussing facts of Place). Alternatively, the sei-
zure of Place's luggage without a warrant might be upheld under the balancing approach (which 
weighs the governmental interest furthered by this warrantless intrusion against the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on Place's fourth amendment interests), on the grounds that the substan-
tial governmental interest in preventing trafficking in drugs outweighs the minimal intrusions on 
a person's fourth amendment interests when luggage he is carrying is briefly detained and ex-
posed to a trained narcotics detection dog. This argument is similar to Justice O'Connor's argu-
ment in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 702-07, supporting the holding that a person's 
luggage may be briefly detained when there is reasonable suspicion, less than probable cause, 
that the luggage contains contraband and narcotics. 
320. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 702. 
321. [d. at 703 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20). 
322. [d. 
323. [d. Neither in Place, nor in any other case, did the Supreme Court address the issue of 
whether the presence of exigent circumstances (such as the possibility of the loss or destruction 
of evidence) could justify a 'seizure based on less than probable cause when the balancing test 
applied by the Court in Place would not justify such a seizure. The Court has implied that a 
warrantless seizure may be held to be reasonable under the fourth amendment because of exigent 
circumstances even though such a warrantless seizure would not be held to be reasonable under 
the type of balancing test applied by Place. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 
n.28 (1983); supra note 2SS (discussing Jacobsen holding that field test of cocaine was reasona-
ble); infra notes 373-81 and accompanying text (discussing seizures to prevent loss of evidence). 
If a seizure based on less than probable cause can be reasonable under the fourth amendment 
when exigent circumstances are present, the seizure of Place's luggage might have been held to 
be reasonable on the grounds that the narcotics that Place was suspected of carrying in his lug-
gage might have disappeared to an unknown location if the agents had attempted to follow Place 
until they had probable cause (or had obtained a search warrant based on probable cause) in-
stead of seizing the luggage at La Guardia Airport. See supra note 319 (discussing possible argu-
ments of exigent circumstances existent in facts of Place). 
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Justice O'Connor argued for the majority in Place that the governmental 
interest in briefly seizing luggage when there is a reasonable belief that the 
luggage contains narcotics is substantial because "[t]he public has a compelling 
interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal 
profit. "324 She reasoned that a sufficiently substantial law enforcement interest 
could justify an intrusion on fourth amendment. interests,32S rejecting the res-
pondent's argument that only a special law enforcement interest, such as offi-
cer safety, and not a generalized interest in law enforcement, can justify an 
intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment interests in the absence of 
probable cause.326 Justice O'Connor stated that such an intrusion requires only 
that the interests furthered by the intrusion be sufficiently substantial and that 
the interests furthered do not have to be "independent of the interest in inves-
tigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects. "327 However, she noted 
that "[t]he context of a particular law enforcement practice, of course, may 
affect the determination of whether a brief intrusion on fourth amendment 
interests on less than probable cause is essential to effective criminal investiga-
tion. "328 
Turning to the other side of the balancing test, Justice O'Connor's majority 
opinion in Place rejected the respondent's argument that. the rationale for a 
Terry stop of a person-"that a Terry-type stop of a person is substantially 
less intrusive of a person's liberty interests than a formal arrest" -was 
"wholly inapplicable to investigative detentions of personalty."329 The respon-
dent's argument was that in such cases "there are no degrees of intrusion" 
because dispossession is absolute once the owner's property is seized. 330 Justice 
O'Connor disagreed, asserting that "[t]he intrusion on possessory interests oc-
casioned by a seizure of one's personal effects can vary both in its nature and 
extent."331 She noted that a seizure of personal effects "may be made after 
the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as 
here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner. "332 In addition, 
324. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 703 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 561 (1980) (opinion of Powell, J .». Justice O'Connor later added in Place that "[blecause 
of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, allowing police to make 
brief investigative stops of persons at airports on reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking sub-
stantially enhances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into 
distribution channels." [d. at 704 (footnote omitted). 
325. [d. at 704. 
326. [d. at 703-04. Justice O'Connor based this conclusion upon quotations from Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981), and Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 704. 
327. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 704. 
328. [d. 
329. [d. at 705. 
330. [d. 
331. [d. 
332. [d. (footnote omitted). In a footnote to this statement, Justice O'Connor stated that 
"[o]ne need only compare the facts of this case with those in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 
397 U.S. 249 (1970)," and then summarized the facts and holding of Van Leeuwen. She noted 
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she noted that "police may confine their investigation to an on-the-spot in-
quiry-for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics 
detection dog-or transport the property to another location. "333 Justice 
O'Connor thus concluded that since seizures of property can vary in intrusive-
ness, "some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive 
of fourth amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests 
will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime. "334 
Applying this general principle to the facts of Place's case, Justice O'Con-
nor held that the principles of Terry and its progeny permit an officer, whose 
observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage 
that contains narcotics, to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circum-
stances that aroused his suspicion by exposing the luggage to a narcotics de-
tection dog.m She stated that the initial seizure of respondent Place's luggage 
that one commentator has stated that" 'Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the Court because 
the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon either a privacy interest in the 
contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the packages themselves.' " United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. at 705 n.6 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6, at 71 (Supp. 
1982»; see supra text accompanying notes 267-303 (discussing details of Van Leeuwen decision). 
333. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 705-06 (footnote omitted). 
334. Id. at 706. 
335. Id. at 706-07. Justice O'Connor supported this holding by quoting a similar decision: 
"We agree with the State that [the officers had) adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carry-
ing drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or 
dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detention." 
Id. at 706 n.7 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (emphasis 
added by Justice O'Connor in Place». 
The Court in Place held, however, that the length of detention of respondent Place's luggage, 
as exacerbated by other factors, made the seizure of his luggage unreasonable and thereby in 
violation of the fourth amendment in the absence of probable cause. Id. at 709-10. Justice Bren-
nan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurred in the judgment in Place, but argued that 
the Court's resolution of the issues of the constitutionality of the seizure of Place's luggage on 
less than probable cause and the exposure of that luggage to a narcotics detection dog was un-
necessary to its judgment. Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J. joined, concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Brennan argued that the judgment should be based on the ground that the 
seizure of respondent's luggage exceeded the permissible scope of a mere investigative stop and 
amounted to a violation of respondent's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 710-11. Justice Brennan 
also argued that the Court's authorization of warrantless temporary seizures of personal luggage 
from the custody of the owner on less than probable cause, for the purpose of having the lug-
gage sniffed by a trained narcotics detection dog, was not supported by Terry or its stop and 
frisk progeny. Id. at 715. He stated that the majority's holding "significantly dilutes the Fourth 
Amendment's protections against governmental interference with personal property," and repre-
sents "a radical departure from settled Fourth Amendment principles." Id. Justice Brennan noted 
that an officer cannot seize a person for a Terry stop without also seizing the personal effects 
that the individual has in his possession at the time and that a Terry stop therefore may involve 
seizures of personal effects incidental to the seizure of the person involved. Id. However, he 
argued that a seizure of property independent of, and not incidental to, the seizure of the person 
was not authorized by the Terry line of cases and must be based upon probable cause, since 
such a seizure significantly expands the scope of a Terry stop and the scope of the intrusion. Id. 
at 716-17. He argued that detention of respondent Place's luggage was a more severe intrusion 
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for the purpose of conducting this investigative procedure could not be justi-
fied on less than probable cause if this investigative procedure was itself a 
search requiring probable cause. 336 However, Justice O'Connor concluded that 
than a brief stop for questioning or even an on-the-spot pat-down search for weapons because it 
involved an independent dispossession of his personal effects.· Id. at 717. 
Justice Brennan also argued in Place that the Court's application of Terry's balancing test, in 
support of its holding authorizing temporary seizures of personal property based on reasonable 
suspicion, was inappropriate. He· argued this was so because the type of intrusion involved was 
not the "narrow" one contemplated by the Terry line of cases and because those cases involved 
only seizures of a person, not the seizure of both a person and property as in Place's case. Id. 
at 718. In conclusion, he asserted that "[tJhe Terry balancing test should not be wrenched from 
its factual and conceptual moorings," and "should not be conducted except in the most limited 
circumstances." Id. The general rule is that seizures of property must be based upon probable 
cause, not just be "reasonable." Id. at 719. 
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurring in the judgment, agreed with 
the majority in Place that because of the "significant law enforcement interest in interdicting 
illegal drug traffic in the Nation's airports," a temporary seizure of luggage for investigative 
purposes was authorized by Terry's balancing test when it involves a minimal intrusion. Id. at 
722 (Blackmun, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, concurring in the judgment). However, 
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the diligence of the police in 
conducting their investigation should be a relevant factor in determining whether the extent of 
the intrusion has resulted in a fourth amendment violation. Id. at 722 n.2. He asserted that "it 
makes little difference to a traveler whose luggage is seized whether the police conscientiously 
followed a lead or bungled the investigation" and that "[t)he duration and intrusiveness of the 
seizure is not altered by the diligence the police exercise." Id. However, he did concede that 
"diligence may be relevant to a court's determination of the reasonableness of the seizure once it 
is detennined that the seizure is sufficiently nonintrusive as to be eligible for the Terry excep-
tion." Id. 
336. Id. at 706. Justice O'Connor asserted that this conclusion would follow no matter how 
brief the seizure of respondent's luggage. Id. She offered no supporting analysis of why an in-
vestigative seizure of luggage, no matter how brief, could not be justified on less than probable 
cause if the sniffing of the luggage by a trained narcotics detection dog (or other investigative 
procedure) was a search requiring probable cause. She does not explain why a warrantless seizure 
of luggage based only upon reasonable suspicion is not lawful if the sniffing of the luggage by a 
trained canine (or other investigative procedure) is a "search" and is based only upon reasonable 
suspicion rather than probable cause. Justice O'Connor cited only four cases as authority directly 
supporting her holding. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S .• at 20; United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411, 421 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); and Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972». 
However, these cases cited by Justice O'Connor do not support the proposition that probable 
cause would be required to seize luggage and expose it to a trained narcotics detection dog if 
such exposure was held to be a fourth amendment "search." The Court in Terry, although stat-
ing that a search or seizure by police that is subject to the warrant requirement must be based 
upon probable cause, held that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required for a stop and 
frisk by police. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20. The grounds for this holding were that such 
procedures historically had not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subject to the 
warrant procedure. Id. In addition, the interest in effective crime prevention and detection au-
thorizes police, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, to approach a per-
son for investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make 
an arrest. Id. at 22. By analogy, it might be argued that police, without a warrant, should be 
permitted to stop a traveler at an airport (or other transportation terminal) and expose his lug-
gage to a trained narcotics detection dog when the police have reasonable suspicion that the 
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the exposure of respondent's luggage, located in a public place, to a trained 
narcotics detection dog was not a search within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment.337 Justice O'Connor thus indicated that the DEA agents' reasona-
person's luggage contains contraband narcotics, even if the sniffing of the luggage by the trained 
canine constitutes a "search" under the fourth amendment. The Adams Court simply restated 
Terry's holding that police, without a warrant, may temporarily stop and frisk a person when 
they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the person may be armed 
and dangerous. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146. The Brignoni-Ponce Court cited Terry and 
Adams for the proposition that the fourth amendment, in appropriate circumstances, allows a 
properly limited "s~arch" or "seizure" on facts that do not constitute probable cause to arrest 
or' search for contraband or evidence of crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 
881-82. The Brignoni-Ponce Court stated that the limited searches and seizures in Terry and Ad-
ams were a valid method of protecting the public and preventing crime. [d. at 881. Relying upon 
these principles, the Court held that the border patrol may stop (seize) a car briefly near the 
Mexican border when the officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that the vehicle 
may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, for the purpose of questioning the driver 
and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status and asking them to explain the 
suspicious circumstances that caused the officer to stop the vehicle. [d. at 881-92. The reasons 
given in support of this holding in Brignoni-Ponce were the importance of the governmental 
interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of such a brief stop, and the absence of practical alterna-
tives for policing the border. The Cortez Court merely reviewed and explained the holding in 
Brignoni-Ponce. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421. 
One might argue, by analogy to the reasons given in support of the holding in Brignoni-
Ponce, that a warrantless stop of a person and seizure of his luggage for the purpose of expos-
ing the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is lawful under the fourth amendment when 
there is reasonable suspicion, less than probable cause, that the luggage contains contraband nar-. 
cotics, even if the sniffing of the luggage by the canine is a "search." This would hold because 
of the importance of the governmental interests at stake, the minimal intrusion of such a brief 
stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for dealing with drug trafficking. See United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983) (Blackmun, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, con-
curring in the judgment) ("While the Court has adopted one plausible analysis of the issue, there 
are others. For example, a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could 
be justified in this situation under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion."). 
Further support for this argument can be found in the Supreme Court's holding that public 
school teachers and administrators, without a search warrant, may temporarily detain a public 
school student and search the person of the student and containers being carried by the student, 
when there is reasonable suspicion that the search will turn up evidence that the student has 
violated or is violating a law or a school rule. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). This 
holding was based upon the grounds that the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
freedom to maintain order in the schools outweighed the intrusion of such searches on the pri· 
vacy. interests of schoolchildren. [d. at 340-41. The governmental interest in preventing drug traf-
ficking would seem to be equal to or greater than the substantial governmental interest in 
maintaining order in the schools. In addition, the intrusion on fourth amendment interests in 
stopping a traveler, brietly detaining his luggage, and exposing the luggage to a trained canine 
may be less than the intrusion involved in stopping a public school student and searching the 
student's person and the belongings in his possession. 
337. Justice O'Connor based this conclusion on the grounds that a sniffing of luggage by a 
trained narcotics detection dog does not involve the opening of luggage or exposing of "noncon-
traband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view," and that it "discloses only 
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 
707. She thus concluded that the sniffing of respondent's luggage by a trained narcotics detection 
dog was not a fourth amendment "search" because "the manner in which information is ob-
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ble suspicion that Place's luggage contained narcotics authorized a brief seizure 
of Place's luggage for the purpose of exposing it to a narcotics detection dog. 
A number of questions need to be answered in determining how this holding 
in Place will be applied to other cases where police have reasonable suspicion 
that luggage contains a seizable item. One question is whether the Place 
Court's holding authorizes the seizure of any luggage which police have rea-
sonable suspicion to believe contains narcotics, or applies only to luggage rea-
sonably suspected of containing narcotics when such luggage is being carried 
by, or is in the immediate possession of, a traveler, or only applies narrowly 
to airline travelers at an airport. Place had just arrived at an airport after 
traveling on a commercial flight when his luggage was seized. Based on the 
facts, the Place decision might be narrowly interpreted as only applying to the 
seizure of luggage carried or possessed by airline travelers when the luggage is 
reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. The Court in Place stated that sub-
stantially enhancing the likelihood that police can prevent the flow of narcotics 
into distribution channels through the inherently transient nature of drug cour-
ier activity at airports was the strong governmental interest that justifies the 
police in briefly detaining luggage for the purpose of exposing it to a trained 
canine. 338 However, Justice O'Connor's holding authorizing a brief detention 
of luggage based upon reasonable suspicion, referred to a traveler carrying 
luggage. 339 This might lead a court to hold that Place should not be limited to 
persons traveling on commercial airplanes, but can be applied to a non-air-
plane traveler (any person who is about to travel, is traveling, or has just 
traveled on a commercial or private train, bus, ship, automobile or truck). 
However, for Place to be applied to persons traveling by means other than 
commercial air flights, a court might require a showing that a substantial 
amount of drug trafficking occurs by means of travelers utilizing such a 
method of non-airplane transportation. A court might also require a showing 
that authorizing police to make brief investigative stops of the luggage of such 
a non-airplane traveler substantially enhances the likelihood that police will be 
. able to prevent the flow of narcotics into distribution channels from such non-
tained is much less intrusive than a typical search" and because "the information obtained is 
very limited," ensuring "that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment 
and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods." [d. 
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurring in the judgment, took the 
position that the Court should leave "the determination of whether dog sniffs of luggage amount 
to searches, and the subsidiary question of what standards should govern such intrusions, to a 
future case providing an appropriate, and more informed basis, for deciding these questions." 
[d. at 720 (Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, concurring in the judgment). Justice 
Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurring in the judgment, also concurred with 
this position. [d. at 723-24 (Blackmun, J., with whom Marshall, J., joined, concurring in the 
judgment). 
338. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 704. 
339. [d. at 706. Later in the opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the impact of detaining luggage 
within the immediate possession of a traveler to support her conclusion that the 90-minute deten-
tion of Place's luggage was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. [d. at 708; see infra text 
accompanying notes 358-60 (discussing impact of lengthy detention of luggage on traveler). 
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. airplane travelers. If Place applies only to travelers (whether on airplanes or 
other transportation facilities), it is not clear whether Place authorizes seizure 
of a piece of luggage reasonably suspected of carrying narcotics only when the 
seizure takes place when the traveler is in an area that is located within or 
adjacent to a transportation facility or terminal (such as an airport, train sta-
tion, or bus station). It is also unclear whether Place also authorizes such a 
seizure when the seizure takes place after a substantial amount of time has 
elapsed since the person carrying or in possession of the luggage was engaged 
in actual travel (or takes place a substantial period of time before the person 
in possession of the luggage will commence actual travel). In any of these 
situations, the person from whom the luggage was seized might not be consid-
ered a "traveler," thus making Place inapplicable. 
The Place Court also did not indicate whether its holding applies to luggage 
carried by or in the possession of a person who is not a traveler. The Place 
decision should be extended to such luggage when the luggage is reasonably 
suspected to contain narcotics only if the governmental interest in preventing 
drug trafficking by non-travelers is as substantial as the governmental interest 
in preventing drug trafficking by travelers, and if the impact of the brief sei-
zure of luggage carried by a non-traveler is less than or equal to the impact 
of the brief seizure of luggage carried by a traveler. Arguably, the impact of 
seizure of luggage on a non-traveler may be even less than the impact of sei-
zure on a traveler because no disruption of travel plans occurs in the former 
situation. 
The Place Court did not indicate whether a brief seizure of luggage reasona-
bly suspected to contain narcotics must take place in particular locations. 
However, Justice O'Connor's statement that no search occurred when agents 
exposed respondent's "luggage, which was located in a public place, to a 
trained canine,"340 suggests that in order to seize luggage under Place, the lug-
gage must be located in a public place.341 
The Place decision is also unclear as to whether its holding applies only 
when a traveler or other person has the luggage in his immediate possession 
340. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
341. The Place Court did not define the term "public place," but it may have used the term 
to refer to a place to which police gain access without violating privacy interests that are pro-
tected under the fourth amendment. A "public place" under this approach would include a pub-
lic concourse or lobby of an airport. In Place, DEA agents apparently seized Place's luggage in 
the lobby of an airport near a baggage claim and limousine rental counter. [d. at 698-99 (de-
scribing seizure in Place). If the luggage is not in a public place when it is seized, the seizure of 
the luggage might be held to be in violation of the fourth amendment because it was the direct 
result of an unreasonable search (the police entry of the place where the luggage was seized). See 
United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890, 899 (9th Cir. 1984) (acquisition of probable cause dur-
ing an unlawful seizure does not cure illegality); id. at 901-03 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that intrusion of canine into defendant's apartment is a search subject to fourth amendment 
restrictions); c/. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (although a person may be arrested 
in a public place without an arrest warrant when police have probable cause to believe the per-
wn has committed or is committing a felony, police with such probable cause may not enter a 
person's home without an arrest warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances). 
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when it is seized (as was the case in Place),342 or can apply when the luggage 
is seized when it is not in the immediate possession of a person (such as when 
the luggage has been checked by the traveler at a baggage check-in counter). 
Justice O'Connor's holding in Place refers to a "traveler carrying luggage,"343 
but also refers favorably to the decision in United States v. Van Leeuwen,344 a 
case upholding a temporary seizure, based on reasonable suspicion, of mail 
not in the actual possession of the sender or addressee, as " 'an easy case for 
the Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion in-
truded upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a 
possessory interest in the packages themselves.' "34' This description o( Van 
Leeuwen implies that the Place decision should be interpreted as authorizing a 
seizure of luggage not in the immediate possession of the traveler when police 
have reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics.346 
The Place decision also seems to authorize seizure of luggage only when 
there is a reasonable suspicion that it contains narcotics, as opposed to rea-
sonable suspicion that luggage contains other kinds of contraband or other 
types of seizable items (such as evidence, fruits of crime, or instrumentalities 
of crime). Although Justice O'Connor stated in Place that some brief deten-
tions of personal effects may be justified "based only on specific articulable 
facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime, "347 the 
Court specifically held only that luggage may briefly be detained when "an 
officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying 
luggage that contains narcotics. "348 
342. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 708. 
343. Id. at 706. 
344. 397 U.S. 249 (1970). 
345. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 705-06 n.6 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURE § 9.6, at 71 (Supp. 1982»; see supra text accompanying notes 267-303 (discussing details of 
decision in Van Leeuwen). 
346. See United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.) (holding investigation of drug sus-
pect's luggage at airport by detection dog's sniffing does not constitute a "search" within mean-
ing of fourth amendment when interference with suspect's travel plans was de minimis), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). Although Place explicitly authorizes seizure only of "luggage" 
reasonably believed to contain narcotics, the Court's holding in Place probably authorizes the 
brief seizure of any container which is a "personal effect" protected by the fourth amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures. See supra text accompanying notes 21-50 (discussing 
types of property protected under fourth amendment). Paper bags and plastic trash bags reasona-
bly believed to contain narcotics therefore might be subject to seizure under Place. 
347. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 706. 
348. Id. The reasoning in support of Place's holding, the strong governmental interest in sub-
stantially enhancing the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of narcotics into 
distribution channels through the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, 
id. at 704, also indicates that Place authorizes only brief detention of luggage reasonably sus-
pected of containing contraband narcotics. 
Yet another question not answered by Place is whether reasonable suspicion to believe luggage 
contains narcotics can be based upon an officer's own personal observations, or can be based, 
either wholly or in part, upon personal observations of other law enforcement offi.:ers relayed to 
the officer who actually seizes the luggage, or upon observations of an informant. In Place, the 
1988] WARRANTLESS SEIZURES 643 
The Place Court's apparent holding that the only type of investigation that 
can be performed on such luggage is exposure of the luggage to a trained 
narcotics detection dog, for the purpose of disclosing only the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics, further supports a conclusion that Place authorizes a brief 
seizure of luggage only when there is reasonable suspicion that the luggage 
contains narcotics. Although the Place Court held that an officer with reason-
able belief that luggage contains narcotics is permitted "to detain the luggage 
briefly. to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided 
that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope,"349 the Court only 
approved of exposing luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog. 3sO Justice 
O'Connor implied that no other type of investigation can be performed on 
luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. First, Justice O'Connor 
stated that "the canine sniff is sui generis" both in the manner in which in-
formation is obtained (the luggage is not required to be opened and does not 
expose non-contraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public 
view) and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure (the 
sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics). Second, she stated 
that "[w]e are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited 
both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of 
the information revealed by the procedure. "3S1 Consequently, luggage that has 
been briefly seized on the basis of reasonable suspicion that it contains narcot-
ics cannot be opened or exposed to an X-ray machine or magnetometer (metal 
detector), because such investigation might reveal non-contraband items other-
wise hidden from public view and thus might reveal more than the presence or 
absence of narcotics. Justice O'Connor apparently believed that any type of 
investigation of luggage other than exposure to a trained canine is a 
"search"3s2 that can be conducted only when there is probable cause. 
DEA agents who seized the luggage from respondent Place relied upon their own observations of 
Place in New York as well as observations made and information acquired by other law enforce-
ment officers in Miami. See supra note 308 (describing the seizure in Place). The Court in Place 
did not address the issue of whether the officers who seized Place's luggage had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 700 n.1. However, Justice O'Connor's 
holding refers to "an officer's observations" leading him reasonably to believe that a traveler is 
carrying luggage that contains narcotics. Id. at 706. This reference might be interpreted as imply-
ing that the reasonable suspicion for a brief seizure of luggage under Place must be based upon 
the seizing officer's personally observed or acquired information. The Supreme Court, however, 
has allowed a stop' to be based upon information contained in a "wanted flyer" based on infor-
mation obtained by other law enforcement officers from an informant, United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221 (1985), or upon information acquired directly from a sufficiently reliable inform-
ant. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
349. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 706. 
350. Id. at 706-07; see United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating 
Place does not authorize warrantless seizure of a suspect's package by federal agents who did 
not seize the package for purposes of an investigation, but for the purpose of holding the pack-
age until they obtained the suspect's consent to open it or a search warrant). 
351. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
352. Opening and inspecting the contents of a container which conceals its contents from plain 
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There might be situations, however, where strong governmental interests 
might justify the warrantless seizure of luggage or another container for a 
brief period. If the search is based on reasonable suspicion that it contains a 
seizable item other than contraband narcotics, it may be searched for the pur-
pose of subjecting it to an investigation that is minimally intrusive of fourth 
amendment interests. An example of such a justifiable seizure would be where 
police have reasonable suspicion that a person has checked a suitcase contain-
ing a time bomb as luggage that will be loaded aboard an airplane. Since 
there are exigent circumstances in such a situation, such a reasonable suspicion 
should justify exposing such a suitcase to an X-ray machine, or even opening 
the suitcase, without a warrant and without probable cause. 3S3 
Although holding that a brief seizure of luggage for the purpose of exposing 
it to a "canine sniff" is lawful when there is reasonable suspicion that the 
luggage contains narcotics, the Court in Place held that the ninety minute de-
tention of Place's luggage could not be upheld under that principle.JS4 Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion in Place first observed that the manner in which 
a seizure is conducted is "as vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it was] 
warranted at all,"JSS and therefore the court had to examine the agent's con-
duct to determine whether it "was such as to place the seizure within the gen-
eral rule requiring probable cause for a seizure or within Terry's exception to 
that rule."JS6 She then rejected the government's argument that the point at 
which probable cause for seizure of luggage from a person's presence becomes 
necessary is more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person him-
self because seizures of property are generally less intrusive than seizures of 
the person.3S7 This premise was rejected on the grounds that it was faulty on 
the facts of Place's case, even though it might be true in some circumstances, 
because the seizure of luggage in question had been from a traveler's immedi-
ate possession and, particularly in such a case, intruded both on the traveler's 
possessory interest in his luggage and his liberty interest in proceeding with his 
itinerary.3S8 Justice O'Connor explained that although a person whose luggage 
is detained is "technically still free to continue his travels or carry out other 
view is a fourth amendment search, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982), unless 
the container has previously been opened by a person other than the traveler and the traveler 
has not regained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the container. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 
U.S. 765, 771 (1983); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-20 (1984). Lower courts have 
held that a fourth amendment "search" occurs when a container's contents are examined by 
means of an X-ray machine, or by means of a magnetometer. C/. United States v. Beale, 736 
F.2d at 1291 (en bane) (holding sniff of luggage by trained narcotics detection dog did not con-
stitute search). 
353. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (holding "sniff" of luggage by narcotics 
detection dog was not fourth amendment search in view of its limited nature); supra note 337 
tdiscussing details of Place decision). 
354. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 710. 
355. [d. at 707-08 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,28 (1968». 
356. [d. 
357. [d. 
358. [d. 
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personal activities pending release of the luggage" and is "not subjected to the 
coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement or to the public indignity of 
being personally detained," a person nevertheless "effectively" is restrained by 
such a seizure "since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel 
plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return. "359 
Consequently, she concluded that "the limitations applicable to investigative 
detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative 
detention of the person's luggage on less than probable cause" and that "the 
police conduct [in Place] exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type inves-
tigative stop" under this standard. 360 
The Place Court held that "[t]he length of the detention of respondent's 
luggage alone" precluded the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the 
absence of probable cause, although Justice O'Connor declined to adopt any 
outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop.361 She explained that al-
though seizures longer than the momentary ones involved in Terry and several 
subsequent cases had been recognized as reasonable, "the brevity of the inva-
sion of the individual's fourth amendment interests is an important factor in 
determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable 
on reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in assessing the effect of the length of the 
detention, we take into account whether the police diligently pursue their in-
vestigation. "362 Turning to the facts of Place's case, Justice O'Connor ob-
served that DEA agents knew the time when Place would arrive at La Guardia 
Airport and had ample time to arrange for their additional investigation at La 
Guardia. 363 Justice O'Connor noted that if the agents had done so, they 
"could have minimized the intrusion on respondent's Fourth Amendment 
359. [d. In a footnote to this latter statement, the Court added: "At least when the authori-
ties do not make it absolutely clear how they plan to reunite the suspect and his possessions at 
some future time and place, seizure of the object is tantamount to seizure of the person. This is 
because that person must either remain on the scene or else seemingly surrender his effects per-
manently to the police." [d. at 708 n.8 (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6, at 
72 (Supp. 1982». 
360. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709. 
361. [d.; see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-86 (1985) (declining to accept a per se 
rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justified under the Terry doctrine). While not-
ing the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities with a clearly-defined rule, Justice 
O'Connor in Place questioned the wisdom of a rigid time limitation for a permissible Terry stop, 
stating that "[s]uch a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to 
graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation." United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. at 709 n.lO; see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700-01 n.12 (1981) (asserting that 
police must under certain circumstances be able to detain an individual for longer than the brief 
time period involved in Terry). 
362. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709; see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 
(stating that in determining whether police diligently pursued their investigation a court "should 
take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such 
cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing"). The Sharpe Court also stated 
that "[t]he question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the 
police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it." [d. at 687. 
363. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709. 
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interests"364 and "also would have avoided the further substantial intrusion on 
respondent's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to an-
other location. "365 
Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court had never approved a seizure of 
the person for the ninety-minute period involved in Place's case and could not 
do so on the facts of Place's case. She therefore held that the ninety-minute 
detention of respondent's luggage was sufficient to render the seizure unrea-
sonable.366 As a final point, Justice O'Connor stated that "the violation was 
exacerbated by the failure 'of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the 
place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he 
might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of 
the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion." 367 She consequently 
held that the detention of respondent's luggage went beyond the authority 
conferred upon the police earlier in the opinion to detain briefly luggage rea-
sonably suspected to contain narcotics, that the evidence obtained from the 
subsequent search of Place's luggage was inadmissible, and that Place's con-
viction must be reversed. 368 If, however, police detain luggage reasonably sus-
pected to contain narcotics for no longer than twenty minutes and exercise 
reasonable diligence in exposing the luggage to a trained narcotics detection 
dog, the seizure of the luggage should be held to be reasonable under the 
fourth amendment. 369 
If the Place decision authorizes police to seize luggage which is neither car-
ried by nor within the immediate possession of a person when police have 
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics,370 police might be per-
mitted to detain the luggage for more than the ninety-minute detention in-
volved in the Place case if such detention did not significantly interfere with 
the traveler's travel plans371 and if police used reasonable diligence in pursuing 
364. Id. 
365. [d. at 709 n.9. 
366. Id. at 709-10. 
367. Id. at 710. 
368. Id.; see Moya v. United States, 745 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding three-hour 
detention of defendant's shoulder bag violated fourth amendment); United States v. West, 731 
F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding time lapse of 45 to 60 minutes between seizure and sniff test 
was not unreasonable under fourth amendment). Justices Brennan and Blackmun, joined by 
Justice Marshall, although concurring in the Place Court's judgment, argued that the judgment 
should have been based solely on the ground that the 9O-minute detention of Place's luggage 
exceeded the scope of a permissible investigative stop and amounted to a violation of Place's 
fourth amendment rights. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 710-11 (Brennan, J., with whom 
Marshall, J., joined, concurring in the judgment); id. at 720 (Blackmun, J., with whom Mar-
shall, J., joined, concurring in the judgment). 
369. C/. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682-86 (reasonableness of detention must be 
judged in view of circumstances and police responsiveness in swiftly-developing situations). 
370. See supra text accompanying notes 347-52 (discussing possible implications of Place). 
371. Such interference might occur if the detention of luggage that had been checked at an 
airline baggage check-in counter by a commercial airline traveler caused the luggage not to be 
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their investigation. 372 
VII. SEIZURES OF PROPERTY TO PREVENT Loss OF EVIDENCE 
The Supreme Court has indicated, albeit in dictum, that police acting with-
out a search warrant may temporarily seize a particular premises or container, 
and any item located within such premises or container, when probable cause 
exists to believe that the item has a nexus to criminal activity, such as when 
the item constitutes contraband or fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a 
crime,373 and when the item may disappear to an unknown location or be de-
stroyed if police seek a warrant rather than immediately seize the item-that 
is, when exigent circumstances exist. 374 However, the Court has not ruled di-
transported on the traveler's flight. The traveler's luggage would not be able to be picked up by 
the traveler at the completion of his flight, causing his travel plans to be interrupted while he 
located his luggage and arranged for its return. The detention should also not otherwise signifi-
cantly interfere with the traveler's possessory or privacy interests in the luggage, such as by caus-
ing the traveler to suffer adverse economic impacts. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 
(discussing possible interpretations of decision in Jacobsen). 
372. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 709 (courts must consider whether police diligently 
pursued their investigation in assessing the effect of the detention length). This conclusion is 
supported by the Place Court's discussion of Van Leeuwen v. United States, 397 U.S. 249 
(1970), where the Court upheld a 29-hour detention of two packages after they had been posted 
(and were therefore not in the immediate possession of the sender or the addressee) based upon 
reasonable suspicion. The Place Court described Van Leeuwen as "an easy case for the Court 
because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon either a privacy inter-
est in the contents of the package or a possessory interest in the packages themselves." United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 705 n.6 (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 267-
303 (discussing details of decision in Van Leeuwen). 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61 (discussing historical origins of warrantless sei-
zures of items with criminal nexus). 
374. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Supreme Court held that police violated 
the fourth amendment by opening and inspecting, without a search warrant, the contents of a 
suitcase after it had been seized from the trunk of a taxicab stopped by police. Although the 
police had probable cause to believe that the suitcase contained marijuana, id. at 761, the Court 
in Sanders held that the police violated the fourth amendment by searching the suitcase without 
a search warrant because they had the suitcase exclusively and securely within their control and 
there was no danger to themselves or risk that the evidence would be lost. [d. at 766. However, 
the Court in Sanders stated that "[h)aving probable cause to believe that contraband was being 
driven away in the taxicab,. the police were justified in stopping the vehicle, searching it on the 
spot, and seizing the suitcase they suspected contained contraband." [d. at 761 (citing Chambers 
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970». This statement in Sanders technically was dictum because 
the respondent conceded at oral argument that the stopping of the taxicab and the seizure of the 
suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. [d. at 761-62. In Sanders, the police apparently 
had no idea where the taxicab was being driven. 
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I (1977), the respondent did not contest the warrant-
less seizure of a footlocker by federal narcotics agents. The agents had probable cause to believe 
the footlocker contained contraband narcotics. [d. at 11. The agents had seized the footlocker 
from the open trunk of an idle automobile, after the footlocker had been loaded into the trunk 
by recent travelers on a passenger train. The agents apparently had no idea where the automo-
bile was about to be driven. However, as in Sanders, the Court held that the agents violated the 
fourth amendment by conducting a warrantless search after they had exclusive control of the 
footlocker and where no exigency was shown to support the need for an immediate search. [d. 
at 15. In 11n;tt'd States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1985), the court concluded after 
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rectly on whether there must be probable cause that the evidence will disap-
pear or be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, or if a mere 
possibility (reasonable suspicion sufficient for a Terry stop) that the evidence 
will disappear or be destroyed will be acceptable.37S A warrantless seizure 
reviewing Sanders, Chadwick and decisions of lower federal and state courts, that the warrantless 
seizure of personal property is unconstitutional unless there is both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. 
375. In United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, the circuit court stated that the exigent circum-
stances which are a prerequisite for the warrantless seizure of property exist when "a reasonable 
person believes that prompt action is necessary to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence or 
prevent other consequences that may improperly frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts." 
[d. at 543. The majority in Licata found that where "[t]he agents faced the possibility that 
contraband within their control would be lost or destroyed if they had not instructed the airline 
to hold the packages," id., exigent circumstances existed because "it would not have been unrea-
sonable for the government agents to have been concerned that Licata's friends might obtain the 
package," and because of "[t]he usual risk of loss of contraband left unsecured." [d. at 544. 
The dissent in Licata argued, however, that exigent circumstances were not present because a 
warrant could have been obtained to seize the checked packages upon their arrival at their desti-
nation, and because there was no showing that the agents who seized the packages without a 
warrant were concerned that a friend of Licata might remove the package. [d. at 545-56 (Norris, 
J ., dissenting). 
Lower courts have tended to hold that "(w]here a warrantless search is based upon the de-
struction or removal of evidence, the surrounding circumstances must present a specific threat to 
known evidence .... To justify the warrantless search the officers must reasonably believe that a 
strong likelihood exists that the removal or destruction of the evidence is imminent. . . . Several 
cases suggest that the requirement is that the destruction or removal be in progress." Stackhouse 
v. State, 298 Md. 203, 213-14, 468 A.2d 333, 339 (1983) (citations omitted). Although this pas-
sage discusses only the validity of a warrantless search to prevent destruction of evidence, the 
court in Stackhouse also refers to whether a warrantless search or seizure can be justified be-
cause of a threat of loss or destruction of evidence. [d. at 216, 468 A.2d at 340. Because the 
court mentions a reasonable belief of a "strong likelihood," it seems to support a requirement 
of probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion. 
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, where the Court in dictum approved of the warrantless 
seizure of a suitcase that was in a taxi being driven on a public road, the police were unaware 
of the taxicab's intended destination. However, the Sanders Court did not indicate whether there 
must be either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that an item will disappear to 
an unknown location or be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained in order to justify an 
immediate warrantless seizure of the item. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, the police 
did not know the intended destination of the automobile into which the footlocker had been 
loaded. The possibility or probability that the luggage in Sanders and Chadwick would have 
disappeared to an unknown location or been destroyed before a warrant could have been ob-
tained depended upon the ability of the police to have followed the automobile in question, 
which was dependant upon such facts as traffic conditions, the timing of traffic lights and 
whether the persons in the automobile being followed suspected they were being followed. 
Chief Justice Burger argued in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), that "just as 
there was no immediate threat of loss or destruction of evidence in (Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42 11970)]-since officers could have followed the car until a warrant issued-so too in 
Sanders officers could have followed the taxicab. Indeed, there arguably was even less fear of 
immediate loss of the evidence in Sanders because the suitcase at issue had been placed in the 
vehicle's trunk, thus rendering immediate access unlikely before police could act." Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. at 808 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined 
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might be permitted on the basis of a reasonable SuspICIOn that the item will 
disappear or be destroyed before a search warrant can be obtained, on the 
grounds that the substantial government interest in preventing the disappear-
ance or destruction of the evidence outweighs the nature and extent of the 
intrusion upon the individual's fourth amendment rights.376 Whether a seizure 
to prevent a disappearance or destruction is based upon probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion, such seizures should be permitted without a search warrant 
because of either exigent circumstances (the probability or possibility of disap-
pearance or destruction of the item before a search warrant can be obtained), 
or because the substantial governmental interest in preventing the disappear-
ance or destruction of criminal evidence outweighs the nature and extent of 
such intrusions on fourth amendment interests.377 
only by O'Connor, J.). 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court held that police did not 
violate the fourth amendment by having a blood sample taken from the petitioner against his 
consent and without a search warrant, where the sample was taken by reasonable means. The 
police took the blood sample from the petitioner to determine his blood alcohol content. At the 
time the blood sample was obtained, the police had probable cause to arrest petitioner for the 
offense of driving an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor. [d. at 768-69. The 
petitioner apparently argued that the warrantless extraction of the sample of blood from his per-
son violated his fourth amendment rights because it constituted an unreasonable search of his 
person and depended "antecedently" upon an unreasonable seizure of his person. See id. at 767 
(Court discusses unreasonable search of person but it is not clear if the argument was submitted 
by petitioner). It is unclear whether the petitioner also argued that the taking of the blood sam-
ple itself was an unreasonable seizure of the person or effects of the petitioner in violation of 
the fourth amendment. Although stating that ordinarily warrants are required where intrusions 
into the human body are concerned, id. at 770, the Court in Schmerber excused the lack of a 
warrant authorizing the extraction of the blood sample from the petitioner because the officer in 
the case "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which 
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of 
evidence.' .. [d. (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964». This was due to 
the fact that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking of 
alcohol stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system, and because, "[p]articularly 
in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to 
investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a 
warrant." [d. at 770-71. Given these special facts, the Court held that this securing of blood 
alcohol content was appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. [d. at 771. The Court thus did 
not actually excuse the absence of a search warrant for the blood sample on the exigent circum-
stances of potential destruction of evidence. The Schmerber Court also did not make clear 
whether its reference to the officer's reasonable belief that he was confronted with an emergency 
threatening the destruction of evidence was meant to refer to probable cause or only to reasona-
ble suspicion, or neither standard. 
376. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-07 (1983) (reasonable belief of officer that 
luggage contained narcotics only justified brief detention of luggage). 
377. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (fourth amendment interests limited to searches 
and seizures). In Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), Chief Justice Burger asserted that 
underlying the decisions in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. I (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), "is a belief that socie-
ty's interest in the discovery and protection of incriminating evidence from removal or 
destruction can supersede, at least for a limited period, a person's possessory interest in prop-
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As a general rule, however, when police have probable cause to believe that 
contraband or a seizable item is located within a container and the container 
is within their exclusive control, they may not search the container without a 
search warrant. They may, however, temporarily seize the container pending 
authorization to search it. 378 
In some cases, when police believe that evidence may disappear or be de-
stroyed before a search warrant can be obtained, the may need to engage in a 
warrantless search, such as by entering a residence or an automobile, in order 
to seize that evidence. The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that when 
police are faced with the exigency of imminent loss or destruction of evidence, 
they are excepted from the general rule requiring a search to be performed 
under a search warrant. 379 
erty, provided that there is probable cause to believe that property is associated with criminal 
activity." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 808 (citing with approval United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696 (1983»; c/. Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720-21 (Mass. 1975) (police 
may not avail themselves of exigent circumstances exception to general warrant requirement if 
exigent circumstances could have been foreseen by police and police have no justifiable excuse 
for their prior delay in obtaining a warrant); 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5(b), at 
662 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing decisions holding exigent circumstances exception unavailable when 
police created the exigency by alerting occupants of premises of their presence). 
378. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 13 (1977) (holding that a person's expectations of 
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile); see Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 (1979) (holding that automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
does not apply to the warrantless search of personal luggage merely because it was located in an 
automobile lawfully stopped by police). Numerous exceptions to this general rule prohibiting war-
rantless searches of containers have been recognized. See Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738, 
742 (1987) (holding that police may open containers pursuant to valid inventory search of van); 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (holding that inventory search of "the personal 
effects of a person under arrest as part of routine administrative procedure at police station 
incident to booking and jailing" is permissible and absence of a warrant or probable cause is 
immaterial); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (holding that an "individual's ex-
pectation of privacy in an automobile and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given 
to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband"); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 
(1981) (holding that search of jacket found in passenger compartment of automobile was lawful 
in that jacket had been "within the arrestee's immediate control"). 
379. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). The Court in Vale held that a warrantless search 
of a house violated the fourth amendment. In "support of this holding the Court noted, inter 
alia, that the goods that were seized in the house were neither in the process of destruction nor 
about to be removed from the jurisdiction. [d. at 35. Justice Black argued in dissent that 
"[n]one of the cases cited by the Court supports the proposition that 'exceptional circumstances' 
exist only when the process of destruction has already begun. On the contrary we implied that 
those circumstances did exist when 'evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or de-
struction.' " [d. at 39 (Black, J., with whom Burger, C.J., joined, dissenting) (quoting Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948»; see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 377, § 6.5(a), at 653-55 
(describing this reasoning of the Vale majority as "baffling"). 
In United States v. Jeffers," 342 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court, after holding that the warrantless 
search of a hotel room violated the fourth amendment, observed that there was no "imminent 
destruction, removal or concealment of the property intended to be seized." [d. at 52. In Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), the Court held that the warrantless search of 
petitioner's residence violated the fourth amendment, with the Court noting that the property 
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In some situations, police can prevent the destruction or disappearance of 
evidence simply by guarding the premises where the evidence is located while a 
warrant is sought to authorize seizure of the evidence. The Supreme Court, 
however, has not addressed the issue of whether the police are required in 
such situations to guard the premises to prevent the destruction or removal of 
evidence while the process to obtain a warrant is underway.380 However, the 
was not in the process of destruction or as likely to be destroyed as the opium paraphernalia in 
the Johnson case. [d. at 455. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the Court held 
that a federal agent violated the fourth amendment by making a warrantless, unconsented entry 
into the petitioner's hotel room, from which the officer had smelled opium fumes while standing 
in a hallway outside the room. The Court in Johnson stated that the case did not involve "ex-
ceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the 
right of privacy, ... a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with." [d. at 14-15. 
The Johnson Court explained that "[nlo evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or 
destruction, except perhaps the fumes which we suppose in time would disappear. But they were 
not capable at the time of being reduced to possession for presentation to the court. The evi-
dence before the search 'was adequate and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not 
perish from the delay of getting a warrant." [d. at 15. The Johnson Court's statement about no 
evidence or contraband being threatened with destruction was quoted approvingly in Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961), in support of a holding that a warrantless search of a 
tenant's leased house violated the fourth amendment. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 
(1976), the Court implied, as an alternative holding, that the warrantless search of the defen-
dant's home was permissible because there was a "realistic expectation that any delay would 
result in destruction of evidence." [d. at 43. 
However, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court held that the fourth 
amendment was violated when police conducted a warrantless search of premises where a crimi-
nal homicide had occurred, the Court noted that "[tlhere was no indication that evidence would 
be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a warrant." [d. at 394. 
In United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973), the 
Court stated: 
When government agents . . . have probable cause to believe contraband is present 
and, in addition, based on the surrounding circumstances of the information at 
hand, they reasonably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed be-
fore they can secure a search warrant, a warrantless search is justified. The emer-
gency circumstances will vary from case to case, and the inherent necessities of the 
situation at the time must be scrutinized. Circumstances which have seemed relevant 
to courts include (1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time neces-
sary to obtain a warrant . . . ; (2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to 
be removed . . . ; (3) the possibility of danger to police officers guarding the site of 
the contraband while a search warrant is sought ... ; (4) information indicating the 
possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their trail . . . ; and 
(5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge "that efforts to 
dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic behavior of persons engaged in 
the narcotics traffic. 
[d. at 268-69 (citations omitted); see 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 377, § 6.5(b), at 658-70 (discuss-
ing various federal circuit court decisions dealing with waiver of the warrant requirement due to 
the likely destruction of contraband or evidence). 
380. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), after holding that a warrantless entry of 
the defendant's hotel room violated the fourth amendment because there was no imminent de-
struction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be seized, the Court added: "In 
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Court in Segura v. United States indicated that police under certain circum-
stances may, in their discretion, secure premises while simultaneously seeking a 
search warrant authorizing the seizure of items if they have probable cause to 
believe the items named in the warrant are on the premises. 381 
VIII. SECURING OF PREMISES PENDING ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
In Segura v. United States,382 the Supreme Court held that the fourth 
amendment's proscription. against unreasonable seizures is not violated when 
fact, the officers admit they could have easily prevented any destruction or removal by merely 
guarding the door." [d. at 52. 
In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court held that a warrantless search of prem-
ises where a criminal homicide had occurred violated the fourth amendment, and noted in its 
reasoning that "[t)here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed 
during the time required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard at the apartment 
minimized that possibility. And there is no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and 
conveniently have been obtained." [d. at 394. However, the Court did not hold explicitly in 
either Jeffers or Mincey that the fourth amendment was violated because the officers did not 
pursue less intrusive means such as guarding the door rather than entering the premises when 
that course of conduct might have prevented any destruction or removal· of evidence. 
Similarly, less intrusive options may be available to police than seizing an automobile that is 
being driven or is about to be driven away on a public road. Police officers might attempt to 
follow the automobile while other officers seek a search warrant authorizing seizure of the item. 
The Court noted in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), that this may not be satisfactory 
because "[f)olIowing the car until a warrant can be obtained seems an impractical alternative 
since, among other things, the car may be taken out of the jurisdiction. Tracing the car and 
searching it hours or days later would of course permit instruments or fruits of crime to be 
removed from the car before the search." [d. at 51 n.9. Possibly for these reasons, the dictum 
in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761 (citing as directly supporting authority Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52), approving of the warrantless seizure of the suitcase in question ap-
pears to reject implicitly a requirement that the police attempt to follow an automobile when the 
police have probable cause to believe there is a seizable item in an automobile or within a con-
tainer in the automobile. 
Under the so-called "automobile exception" to the general warrant requirement, an automobile 
that is lawfully stopped while being driven on a public road can be searched without a warrant 
when there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains a seizable item, United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), because, "[f)or constitutional purposes, [the Court) sees no 
difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable 
cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a 
warrant." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52. Today, an automobile may be stopped and 
searched without a search warrant under the "automobile exception" when there is probable 
cause to believe that seizable items are located somewhere in the automobile, but not in specific 
containers, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); exigent circumstances may not be re-
quired to stop and search an automobile under the "automobile exception" provided such proba-
ble cause is present. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 
478 (1985); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982). 
The type of situation presented in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), where police only 
have probable cause to believe that a specific container in an automobile contains a seizable 
item, is not considered to be a situation covered by the "autQmobile exception." United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 812·13 (1982); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 n.3 (1983); see 2 
W. LAFAVE, supra note 377, § 6.5(c) (providing general discussion of impoundment alternative). 
381. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
382. [d. 
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law enforcement "officers, having probable cause, enter premises, and with 
probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate possessory interests 
in its contents and take them into custody and, for no more than the period 
here involved [approximately nineteen hours), secure the premises from within 
to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of 
obtaining a warrant. "383 In Segura, after receiving authorization from an As-
sistant United States Attorney to arrest petitioners Andres Segura and Luz 
Marina Colon, agents of the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force ar-
rested Segura at 11:30 p.m. on February 12, 1981, when he entered the lobby 
of the New York city apartment building where he and Colon shared an 
apartment. Prior to entering and securing the apartment, the agents had prob-
able cause to believe that petitioners Segura ·and Colon were trafficking in co-
caine from their apartment.384 Agents had received their authorization to arrest 
Segura and Colon between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. that same day. The Assistant 
United States Attorney who provided this authorization advised the agents that 
a search warrant for the petitioners' apartment probably could not be obtained 
until the following day because of the lateness of the hour, but that they 
should "secure the premises to prevent the destruction of evidence. "38S After 
arresting Segura in the lobby of the apartment building where he resided, task 
force agents went to Segura's third floor apartment, which they entered, with-
out requesting or receiving permission, after Colon opened the· door to the 
apartment in response to the agents' knock on the door. After checking the 
apartment to see who was occupying it, the agents arrested Colon and then 
took Colon, Segura and three other occupants of the apartment (who had 
been discovered in the living room of the apartment) to Drug Enforcement 
Administration headquarters. Two task force agents remained in petitioners' 
apartment until a warrant for the apartment was issued and executed at ap-
proximately 6:00 p.m. on February 13, 1981, some nineteen hours after task 
force agents had initially entered the petitioners' apartment. 386 Almost three 
pounds of cocaine, ammunition, records of narcotics transactions, and more 
than $50,000 cash were seized during the search pursuant to the warrant. 387 
Petitioners Colon and Segura, who were charged with conspiring to distrib-
ute, and of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute, cocaine in 
violation of Sections 841(a)(l) and 846 of Title 21 of the United States 
Code,388 moved to suppress. all of the evidence seized from their apartment. 
The district court granted this motion, holding that the evidence seized under 
the valid warrant was "fruit of the poisonous tree" of the illegal entry and 
"occupation" of the apartment because "Colon might have arranged to have 
the drugs removed or destroyed, in which event they would not have been in 
383. [d. at 798. 
384. [d. at 799. 814. 
385. [d. at BOO. 
386. [d. at 801. "Because of what is characterized as 'administrative delay' the warrant appli-
cation was not presented to the Magistrate until S p.m. the next day." [d. 
387. [d. 
388. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(I). 846 (1982). 
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the apartment when the search warrant was made. "389 The court of appeals 
reversed this ruling of the district court, which required suppression of the 
evidence seized under the valid warrant executed the day after the initial entry 
of the petitioners' apartment, on the grounds that the district court's decision 
to suppress the evidence simply because it could have been destroyed had the 
agents not entered was "prudentially unsound. "390 The defendants were con-
victed of the crimes they were charged with committing and the court of ap-
peals affirmed. 391 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of 
appeals that the cocaine, cash, records and ammunition were properly admit-
ted into evidence. 392 
389. Id. at 802. The district court also ordered the suppression of items which the agents had 
observed in plain view during the security check of the apartment on the night of February 12, 
which the agents had not seized until the search pursuant to the warrant. Id. at 801-02. The 
court of appeals affirmed this part of the district court's ruling. United States v. Segura, 663 
F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court did not consider in Segura whether the items which 
were observed in plain view during the security check of the apartment, but which were not 
seized until the next day during execution of the warrant, should have been suppressed. Segura 
v. United States, 468 U.S. at 804. 
390. United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1981). 
391. Segura v. United States, 697 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1982). 
392. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 816. The Supreme Court's securing-of-the-premises 
holding is contained in Part I of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court, which was joined 
by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. See Dressler, A Lesson in Incaution, Over-
work and Fatigue: The Judicial Miscrajtsmanship oj Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 375, 394-96, 417-18 (1985) (arguing that Segura was not an appropriate case for resolu-
tion of the issue of securing premises). Chief Justice Burger set forth his reasoning in support of 
the Court's securing-of-the-premises holding in Part IV of the opinion of the Court, to which 
only Justice O'Connor joined. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 797. 
The Court in Segura also held that the items seized from the premises in question, pursuant to 
a search warrant that was issued while law enforcement officers were securing the premises, were 
not inadmissible under the exclusionary rule as "fruit of the poisonous tree" of the (assumed) 
illegal entry (search) of the premises that enabled the officers to secure the premises, because the 
affidavit establishing probable cause for issuance of the warrant was obtained from an indepen-
dent source and did not derive from the illegal entry of the premises. Id. at 813-15. The Court 
in Segura declined to adopt the speculative argument that if law enforcement officers had not 
entered the premises but instead secured the premises from the outside, one of the occupants of 
the premises or her friends could have removed or destroyed the evidence in question before the 
warrant was issued. /d. at 815-16. The Court rejected this speculative argument on the grounds 
that the exclusionary rule should not be extended "to further 'protect' criminal activity" and 
that there is no .. 'constitutional right' to destroy evidence." Id. at 816. 
Chief Justice Burger, in Part IV of his opinion for the Court, noted that the petitioners' argu-
ment that the entire contents of their apartment were "seized" when the agents entered and 
remained on the premises was advanced to avoid the independent source exception to the exclu-
sionary rule, on the grounds that "[i)f all the contents of the apartment were 'seized' at the time 
of the illegal entry and securing, ... the evidence now challenged would be suppressible as pri· 
mary evidence obtained as a direct result of that entry." Id. at 806 (Part IV of the opinion of 
the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J.); see Dressler, supra, at 405 n.145 
(noting theory that evidence must be suppressed as primary and not tainted secondary evidence). 
Chief Justice Burger avoided this issue by holding that even if the securing of the petitioners' 
apartment constituted a "seizure" of the contents of the petitioners' apartment within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, that seizure was not unreasonable. Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. at 806. 
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In holding that the agents' warrantless securing of the premises was not an 
unreasonable seizure,393 the Court in Segura referred, without further explana-
tion, to the agents having had "probable cause" when they entered the prem-
ises.394 The probable cause the Court was referring to in Segura apparently is 
the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a search warrant for the 
premises-probable cause to believe a seizable item (contraband, or fruits, in-
strumentalities, or evidence of a crime)39S will be found on the premises that 
officers are securing pending issuance of a search warrant authorizing seizure 
of such items on the premises.396 
However, Segura's securing-of-the-premises holding does not require the 
presence of exigent . circumstances in the form of probable cause or just rea-
sonable suspicion to believe that the seizable items which police have probable 
cause to believe are on the premises will be removed from the premises or be 
destroyed while a search warrant is obtained unless the premises are secured 
from within.397 Rather, Segura's holding authorizes law enforcement officers, 
who are seeking a search warrant authorizing the seizure of an item located 
on particular premises, to secure the premises from within to preserve the 
status quo398 in order to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence.399 Se-
curing of the premises is authorized for the purpose of thwarting any possible 
attempts that might be made to remove or destroy the item sought to be 
seized, even in the absence of any facts providing the officers with probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion to believe that such an attempt will be 
made. The Segura securing-of-the-premises holding is therefore distinguishable 
from the emergency destruction or disappearance-of-evidence exception to the 
general rule requiring a warrant for a seizure, since that exception requires law 
enforcement officers to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe 
393. The Court in Segura assumed for purposes of this holding that "there was a seizure of 
all of the contents of the petitioners' apartment when agents secured the premises from within." 
Segura v. United States. 468 U.S. at 798 (emphasis in original). 
394. [d. 
395. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61 (discussing decision in Warden v. Hayden. 387 
U.S. 294 (1967). rejecting prohibition on the seizure of mere evidence). 
396. In United States v. DiCesare. 765 F.2d 890 (9th CiT. 1985). the court held that in order 
to secure premises under Segura. police must. at the time of the securing of the premises. have 
probable cause to search the secured premises. Chief Justice Burger stated that the agents who 
entered the petitioners' apartment "had abundant probable cause to believe that there was a 
criminal drug operation being carried on in petitioner's apartment; indeed petitioners do not dis-
pute the probable cause determination." Segura v. United States. 468 U.S. at 810. 
397. The government did not seek review in Segura of the court of appeals' and district 
court's conclusion that the initial warrantless entry and the limited security search of the peti-
tioners' apartment were not justified by exigent circumstances. [d. at 798. 802 n.4. 804. The 
government's concession that there were no exigent circumstances present in Segura justifying the 
warrantless entry and security search apparently was viewed by the Court as applicable to the 
securing-of-the-premises issue. because there is no reference to the presence of exigent circum-
stances in the discussion of the securing-of-the-premises issue in the opinion of the Court. 
398. [d. at 798. 
399. ld. at 810 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger. C.J., joined only by O'Con-
nor. J.). 
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that the item will be destroyed or will disappear before a search warrant is 
obtained.400 
The Segura securing-of-premises holding also does not require police to es-
tablish that any exigency (such as a threat of destruction or removal of evi-
dence or a threat to the safety of law enforcement officers) or other law 
enforcement interest necessitated the securing .of the premises from within 
rather than staking out and guarding the premises from the outside.401 A war-
rantless securing of premises is authorized under Segura, however, only when 
"the occupants who have legitimate possessory interests in its contents" are 
arrested based on probable cause and taken into custody.402 This formulation 
appears to require that all occupants of the premises with legitimate possessory 
interests in the premises' contents have been arrested and taken into cus-
tody.403 
400. See supra text accompanying notes 373-81 (discussing emergency exception doctrine con-
cerning prevention of loss of evidence). Both the Segura securing-of-the-premises holding and the 
emergency exception authorize the warrantless seizure or' personal property. However, the Segura 
holding, unlike the emergency exception, also authorizes the warrantless seizure of the premises 
containing personal property for up to 19 hours. The emergency doctrine only authorizes seizure 
of an automobile or other premises containing seizable personal property for the period of time 
necessary to seize such personal property. 
401. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 811-12. 
402. [d. at 798. The Court in Segura did not indicate whether the occupants must be under 
lawful arrest in order for its securing-of-the-premises holding to apply. The Segura Court's secur-
ing-of-the-premises holding refers to probable cause for arresting the occupants, which is a pre-
requisite for arresting a person, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979), but the arrest 
of Colon inside her residence without an arrest warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances 
violated the fourth amendment. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (warrantless 
police entry to arrest defendant based on probable cause but without exigent circumstances or 
consent for entry violated fourth amendment); Dressler, supra note 392, at 400 n.119. Justice 
Stevens argued in dissent in Segura that: 
While Segura was lawfully in custody during this period [when the premises were 
secured from within), Colon and her three companions were not. They were un-
known to the agents prior to the illegal entry and, as the District Court noted, 
would have been able to remain in the apartment free from governmental interfer-
ence had the unlawful entry not occurred. 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 822 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
403. Chief Justice Burger did not state explicitly in Segura whether all of the occupants of the 
premises remained under arrest and in custody during the entire period that the premises in ques-
tion were secured by government agents. Although in Part II of the opinion he stated that peti-
tioners "Colon, Segura, and the other occupants of the apartment were taken to Drug 
Enforcement Administration headquarters," Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 801, he stated 
in Part IV only that "Segura and Colon, whose possessory interests were interfered with by the 
occupation, were under arrest and in the custody of the police throughout the entire period the 
agents occupied the apartment." [d. at 813. There is no statement whether the three other per-
sons who were occupants of the apartment at the time petitioner Colon was arrested in the 
apartment were under arrest and in custody during the entire period that the apartment was 
secured from within; this omission may have occurred because these three occupants were not 
petitioners in the Segura case and therefore their personal rights were not at issue. [d. at 800-01. 
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Even if each arrested occupant is the victIm of a seizure of some of their 
personal property that is within the premises that is secured from within,404 
securing of the premises arguably causes very little, if any, interference with 
the occupants' possessory interests in the premises and its contents when they 
are under arrest and in the custody of the police for the entire period that law 
enforcement officers secure the premises from within.40s If not, all of the oc-
cupants of the premises that are secured from within are under arrest and in 
police .custody for the entire period that police are inside the premises, the 
securing of the premises might be held to be an unreasonable seizure of the 
apartment and its contents, in violation of the fourth amendment rights of 
such occupants, if the occupation of the premises significantly interferes with 
such occupants' use and enjoyment of the premises and its contents. However, 
when the occupants of premises are not using and enjoying the premises while 
the premises are secured from within because they are away on travel or vaca-
tion or for other reasons, the securing of the premises would no more affect 
the occupants' possessory interests in the premises and its contents then is. the 
case when all of the occupants are under arrest and in police custody while 
the premises are secured from within. Segura explicitly authorizes securing of 
the premises only when the occupants of the premises with legitimate posses-
sory interests in its· contents are under arrest and in police custody. 
Segura explicitly authorizes a warrantless securing of premises only when the 
securing is for a period no longer than the approximate nineteen hours in-
volved in Segura and when the officers seeking the search warrant for the 
premises have been acting in good faith.406 Segura does not state whether a 
warrantless securing of premises may ever be permitted for a period exceeding 
nineteen hours, or whether a warrantless securing of premises for a period of 
less than nineteen hours might ever be held to violate the fourth amendment. 
However, Segura's "good faith" criterion may be interpreted as implying that 
a securing of premises for more than the nineteen hours involved in Segura 
might be authorized by the fourth amendment if the officers seeking the war-
rant for the premises were acting in "good faith" during such a lengthy secur-
ing of the premises. In addition, this good faith criterion might be interpreted 
to imply that a securing of premises for less than nineteen hours violates the 
fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures if the police 
seeking the search warrant for the premises were not acting in good faith. But 
Segura does not indicate whether good faith is to be determined by the actual 
subjective state of mind of the officers seeking the search warrant for the se-
cured premises or by an objective standard that determines whether police of-
404. If the Segura Court's reference to "occupants with legitimate possessory interests in the 
contents of the premises" is interpreted as a reference to occupants who are the victim of a 
fourth amendment seizure-because the securing of the premises constitutes a meaningful inter-
ference with each occupant's possessory interests in personal property located in the apartment-
the securing of the petitioners' apartment in Segura constituted a seizure of the contents of the 
apartment legitimately possessed by each occupant. 
405. [d. at 813; see infra text accompanying notes 413-42 (discussing Part IV of Segura). 
406. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 798. 
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ficers who sought the search warrant for the secured premises acted as 
reasonably well-trained police officers should act. 407 Segura also does not indi-
cate what factors a court should consider in determining whether police acted 
in good faith while seeking a warrant for the secured premises, although the 
primary focus may be on what actions police officers took in seeking to ob-
tain the search warrant after the premises were .secured and whether any de-
lays in obtaining the search warrant were attributable to bad faith or 
unreasonable conduct by police officers.408 
Under this interpretation of Segura's good faith criterion, the permissible 
length of time of a warrantless securing of premises would be determined on a 
407. The Supreme Court has stated, technically in dictum, that "almost without exception in 
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has first undertaken an objec-
tive assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts. and circumstances then known to 
him," Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978), and that "[s]ubjective intent alone, ... 
does not make otherwise lawful conduct ... unconstitutional." [d. at 136. However, the Scott 
Court also stated in dictum that "[o]n occasion, the motive with which the officer conducts an 
illegal search may have some relevance in determining the propriety of applying the exclusionary 
rule." [d. at 139 n.13. The Supreme Court's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is 
determined by whether the police officers who obtained or executed the. search warrant in ques-
tion acted with objective good faith ("objective reasonableness"), United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984), without regard to the subjective state of mind of the law enforcement 
officer who seized the evidence in question. [d. The Leon good' faith exception focuses on 
"whether a reasonably well-trained police officer would have known that the search in question 
was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." [d. The Supreme Court's inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule, however, does not include a threshold showing of police good 
faith. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984). Professor Dressler has noted that the Court in 
Segura offered no precedent for the good faith element of its securing-of-the-premises holding 
and that "there is none." Dressler, supra note 392, at 419. 
408. Chief Justice Burger stated in Segura that "a seizure reasonable at its inception because 
based upon probable cause may become unreasonable as a result of its duration or for other 
reasons." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 812. He noted that the "delay in securing the 
warrant in a large metropolitan center unfortunately is not uncommon; this is not, in itself, 
evidence of bad faith." [d. He later added that more than half of the delay in Segura in secur-
ing the search warrant was between 10:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. the following day, "when it is 
reasonable to assume that judicial officers are not as readily available for consideration of war-
rant requests." [d. at 812-13. Chief Justice Burger also added that there was "no suggestion that 
the officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed obtaining the warrant. The asserted explanation is 
that the officers focused first on the task of processing those whom they had arrested before 
turning to the task of securing the warrant. It is not unreasonable for officers to believe that the 
former should take priority, given, as was the case here, that the proprietors of the apartment 
were in custody of the officers throughout the period in question." [d. at 812. He also added 
that the agents "simply awaited issuance of the warrant" and did not "in any way" exploit 
their presence in the apartment. [d. Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the good faith issue in 
Segura thus focuses on both what police officers did during the period that a search warrant was 
sought for the secured premises and whether the officers' actions during this period were in good 
faith or were reasonable. Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Segura, however, that "as the Gov-
ernment candidly admits, the fault here lies not with the judiciary, but with the United States 
Attorney's office for failing to exercise due diligence in attempting to procure a warrant." [d. at 
818 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Dressler also has asserted that the delay in obtaining 
the search warrant in Segura "[a]pparently ... resulted from the failure of the United States 
Attorney to apply in timely fashion for the warrant.·' Dressler, supra note 392, at 386-87. 
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case-by-case basis, taking into account the good faith (subjective or objective) 
of the police seeking the search warrant for the premises (and, possibly, the 
effect of the securing of the premises on the occupants' possessory interests in 
the premises and its contents). Interpretation of Segura as establishing a per se 
rule authorizing warrantless securing of premises for nineteen hours or less (if 
the other criteria of probable cause, arrest and custody of all occupants of the 
premises, and good faith, are satisfied) would serve the goals of giving the 
police~ the courts and the public clear guidelines as to the authority of the 
police and the rights of the public.409 However, a maximum nineteen hour pe-
riod for warrantless securing of premises might not be long enough in rural 
areas where a lengthy trip to a magistrate is necessary in order to obtain a 
search warrant for the premises, or in mass arrest situations where lengthy 
processing of arrestees is required, precluding any police officer from seeking 
a search warrant until such processing is completed. A per se rule permitting a 
warrantless securing of premises for a period of time much longer than the 
nineteen hours involved in Segura might not encourage police to fail to exer-
cise diligence in seeking a search warrant for the premises if the good faith 
criterion was strictly interpreted. Yet, such a per se rule might cause police to 
delay in releasing arrested occupants of the premises from custody until they 
were notified that a search warrant for the premises had been obtained, in 
order to comply with Segura's requirement that all occupants of the premises 
be under arrest and in custody while the premises are secured. Consequently, a 
case-by-case determination of the reasonableness of the duration of a warrant-
less securing of premises is preferable. 
One final uncertainty about Segura's securing-of-the-premises holding is 
whether police, when they satisfy the elements of Segura's holding, are author-
ized to guard the premises from the exterior and prohibit occupants of the 
premises from entering the premises while a search warrant for the premises is 
obtained, rather than securing the premises from within. 410 Chief Justice 
Burger in Segura would apparently extend the securing-of-premises holding to 
such exterior stakeouts. He found that "both an internal securing and a pe-
rimeter stakeout interfere to the same extent with the possessory interests of 
the owners"411 and that a perimeter stakeout probably would have a lesser in-
terference with the privacy interests protected by the "search" clause of the 
409. Cf. New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454. 459. 460 (1981) (stating that the holding that 
police may. incident to lawful custodial arrest of occupants and absent exigent circumstances. 
search interior of arrestees' automobile and any containers therein will become a general princi-
ple ending disagreement among courts formerly divided on the issue). 
410. Justice Stevens states in his dissent in Segura that "[s)ince these premises were impounded 
'from the inside,' I assume impoundment would be permissible even absent exigent circumstances 
when it occurs 'from the outside' - when the authorities merely seal off premises pending the 
issuance of a warrant but do not enter." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 824 n.15 (Stevens, 
J., with whom Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun. J.J., joined. dissenting). 
411. [d. at 811 (Part IV of the Opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Con-
nor, J.). 
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fourth amendment because it does not expose the intimate details of the inside 
of a person's home to police observation.412 
Although a majority in Segura supported the securing-of-the-premises hold-
ing, only Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice O'Connor, issued an opinion 
providing reasoning in support of this holding. This reasoning is provided in 
Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Burger.413 Chief Justice 
Burger first noted in Part IV of Segura that a seizure affects only the person's 
possessory interests, while a search affects a person's privacy interests.414 He 
then asserted that the Supreme Court, recognizing the generally less intrusive 
nature of a seizure,4ls has frequently approved warrantless seizures of prop-
erty, on the basis of probable cause, for the time necessary to secure a war-
rant, where a warrantless search was either held to be or likely would have 
been held impermissible.416 He then argued that the Supreme Court had "fo-
cused on the issue notably" in Chambers v. Maroney,417 which he argued had 
authorized the warrantless seizure of an automobile, on the basis of probable 
cause, "to protect the evidence from destruction even though there was no 
immediate fear that the evidence was in the process of being destroyed or oth-
erwise lost. "418 He noted that the Court in Chambers had acknowledged that 
following the car until a warrant could be obtained was an alternative to sei-
zure of the automobile, "albeit an impracticable one," but that the seizure 
had been authorized nonetheless because otherwise the occupants of the car 
could have removed the evidence in question. 419 
412. However, as noted by Chief Justice Burger in Segura, "[s)ecuring of the premises from 
within, however, was no more an interference with the petitioners' possessory interests in the 
contents of the apartment than a perimeter 'stakeout'." [d. Consequently, there is no distinction 
between securing·of-premises from within and an exterior stakeout of premises (which involves 
preventing all of the occupants of the premises from entering and using the premises) in terms 
of interference with the possessory interests protected by the fourth amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable seizures, because both types of police actions deprive the occupants of the use and 
enjoyment of the premises and its contents to the same extent. 
413. Justice White, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist joined all but Part IV of the opinion 
of the Court by Chief Justice Burger. As noted earlier, Justice O'Connor joined all parts of the 
opinion of the Court. 
414. [d. at S06 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Connor, 
J .). 
415. [d. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 13 n.S (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970». This proposition may have been abrogated implicitly by the majority's 
statements in Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), that neither the interest protected by the 
fourth amendment injunction against unreasonable searches nor its injunction against unreasona-
ble seizures "is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection," and that the 
Court has never "drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree 
of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action." [d. at 1154. 
416. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 806 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J.) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979». 
417. 399 U.S. 42 (1977). 
41S. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 807. 
419. [d. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51 n.9). Chief Justice Burger failed to 
acknowledge that the Chambers Court's reference to removal of evidence from an automobile by 
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Chambers v. Maroney, which applied the "automobile exception" to the 
general rule requiring a search or seizure,42o should not be interpreted as au-
thority for allowing warrantless seizures of residential premises for the time 
necessary to secure a search warrant, because the automobile exception's au-
thorization of warrantless seizures and searches of automobiles on the basis of 
probable cause is based upon both the inherently mobile nature of functioning 
automobiles and the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles due to 
the extensive regulation of the operation and maintenance of automobiles.421 
Neither of these factors are present in the case of residential premises subject 
to Segura's securing of premises holding. 
After discussing Chambers v. Maroney, Chief Justice Burger discussed 
United States v. Chadwick422 and Arkansas v. Sanders423 in Part IV of Se-
gura. 424 He asserted that there was no immediate threat of loss or destruction 
of evidence in either Chambers or Sanders because the vehicles containing the 
evidence in question in each case could have been followed until a search war-
rant was obtained.42' But Chadwick and Sanders should not be interpreted as 
authority justifying securing-of-premises when there is no probable cause or 
even reasonable suspicion to believe that the items in the premises will disap-
pear or be destroyed. In Chadwick and Sanders there were exigent circum-
its occupants occurred after Chambers held that an automobile cannot be searched without a 
warrant in all cases where there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains seizable 
items, but only when there are exigent circumstances. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51. 
The Court indicated in Chambers that exigent circumstances were present because the automobile 
was stopped on the highway where the car was movable, the occupants were alerted and the 
automobile'S contents might never have been found again. [d. But subsequent to Chambers, the 
Supreme Court held that exigent circumstances were not required in order to conduct a warrant-
less search of an automobile based upon probable cause either when the automobile is stopped 
while being operated on a public road, Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982), or when the 
automobile is lawfully in police custody, United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985). Fur-
thermore, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), might be interpreted as abrogating the re-
quirement of exigent circumstances as a prerequisite to a lawful warrantless search of an 
automobile based upon probable cause. Carney holds that a vehicle can be searched without a 
warrant on the basis of probable cause when the vehicle is capable of being used on the highway 
and is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is not being used as a resi-
dence. 
420. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52 (automobile lawfully stopped on public road 
may be searched upon probable cause). 
421. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (search of mobile home permitted under 
vehicle exception to warrant search requirement). 
422. 433 U.S. I (1977). 
423. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
424. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 806 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, 1.); see supra notes 374-75 (discussing details of decisions in 
Chadwick and Sanders). 
425. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 806 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J .). Chief Justice Burger added in Segura that "there arguably 
was even less fear of immediate loss of the evidence in Sanders because the suitcase at issue had 
been placed in the vehicle's trunk, thus rendering immediate access unlikely before police could 
act." [d. 
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stances since the luggage that was seized was about to be taken to an 
unknown location.426 Segura's securing-of-the-premises holding, on the other 
hand, does not require that there be exigent circumstances.427 Chief Justice 
Burger failed to note that these key facts, present in Chadwick and Sanders, 
were not present in Segura. Despite the fact that Chambers, Chadwick and 
Sanders do not support Segura's securing-of-the-premises holding, Chief Justice 
Burger asserted in Part IV of Segura that "[u]nderlying these decisions is a 
belief that society's interest in the discovery and protection of incriminating 
evidence from removal or ·destruction can supersede, at least for a limited pe-
riod, a person's possessory interest in property, provided that there is probable 
cause to believe that that property is associated with criminal activity. "428 
After referring to two cases429 where the Supreme Court had suggested that 
the temporary securing of premises to preserve the status quo while a search 
warrant is sought does not violate the fourth amendment,430 Chief Justice 
Burger stated that the Court saw no reason, as suggested in those two cases, 
"why the same principle applied in Chambers, Chadwick, and Sanders should 
not apply where a dwelling is involved. "431 He then stated that Segura's secur-
ing-of-the-premises holding did not violate the fourth amendment. Such a sei-
zure, he argued, does not implicate the heightened protection accorded privacy 
interests. A seizure of premises affects only possessory interests, whereas the 
sanctity of the home in fourth amendment terms is based primarily on the 
occupants' privacy interests in the activities that take place within, not because 
of the occupants' possessory interests in, the premises. 432 Chief Justice Burger 
provided no authority in support of his categorization of the protections af-
forded by the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures as be-
ing inferior to the protections afforded by the fourth amendment's prohibition 
of unreasonable searches. Furthermore, in 1987 the Supreme Court made clear 
that these two prohibitions of the fourth amendment are to be accorded equal 
protection.433 
Chief Justice Burger next argued in Part IV of Segura that for purposes of 
the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, there is no dif-
ference between securing the premises from within and securing the premises 
426. See supra notes 374-75 (discussing details of decisions in Chadwick and Sanders). 
427. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing details of Segura holding). 
428. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 808 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.l., joined only by O'Connor, l.) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983». 
429. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
430. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 809 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.l., joined only by O'Connor, l.). 
431. [d. at 810. 
432. [d. The Court reaffirmed, he noted, "that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless 
search-such as that invalidated in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970)-is illegal." 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 810 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, C.l., 
joined only by O'Connor, l.). 
433. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987) (seizure in dwelling house requires proba-
ble cause). 
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from the outside by a "stakeout. "434 He did not state that police must justify 
their decision to secure premises from within rather than from outside by exi-
gent circumstances, such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe 
that evidence will be removed or destroyed, or that the safety of police offi-
cers will be threatened if police secure the premises from the outside rather 
than from within.435 But he did state that the fact that the entry of the peti-
tioners' apartment "may have constituted an illegal search, or interference 
with petitioners' privacy interests, requiring suppression of all evidence ob-
served during the entry," did not "render the seizure any more unreasonable 
than had the agents staked out the apartment from outside. "436 However, be-
cause the court assumed that the warrantless entry of the petitioners' apart-
ment was illegal, since exigent circumstances were not present, neither Chief 
Justice Burger nor any of the other Justices in the majority in Segura dis-
cussed the issue of whether the right to conduct a warrantless securing of 
premises from within under its holding includes the right to make a warrant-
less entry of the premises. Since police must enter premises in order to secure 
the premises from within, the authority to secure premises from within without 
a warrant arguably should include the authority to enter the premises without 
a warrant in order to secure the premises from within. Chief Justice Burger 
also cited no authority in support of his assertion that it is irrelevant, in de-
termining whether a warrantless securing of premises from within violates the 
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, that police en-
tered the premises illegally in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition 
of unreasonable searches.437 He did, however, argue that the Court did not 
"heighten the possibility of illegal entries by a holding that the illegal entry 
and securing of the premises from the inside do not themselves render the 
seizure any more unreasonable than had the agents staked out the apartment 
from the outside. "438 
434. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 811 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J.). 
435. He did state that "[a]rguably, the wiser course would have been to depart immediately 
and secure the premises from the outside by a 'stakeout' once the security check revealed that 
no one other than those taken into custody were in the apartment," but "the method actually 
employed does not require a different result under the Fourth Amendment, insofar as the seizure 
is concerned." [d. 
436. [d. 
437. See Dressler, supra note 392, at 414 n.20l. 
438. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 811 (Part IV of opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J.). Chief Justice Burger provided the following argument in 
support of this conclusion: 
In the first place, an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is illegal. We are 
unwilling to believe that officers will routinely and purposely violate the law as a 
matter of course. Second, as a practical matter, officers who have probable cause 
and are in the process of obtaining a warrant have no reason to enter the premises 
before the warrant issues, absent exigent circumstances which, of course would jus-
tify the entry. Third, officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evi-
dence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed, as it was by 
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Chief Justice Burger then acknowledged in Part IV of Segura that "a sei-
zure reasonable at its inception because based upon probable cause may be-
come unreasonable "as a result of its duration or for other reasons. "439 
However, he argued that this was not the case in Segura because there was no 
evidence that the delay in obtaining the warrant was due to bad faith by the 
officers.440 He argued that the agents in no way exploited their presence in the 
apartment,441 and the actual interference with the petitioners' possessory inter-
ests in their apartment and its contents by the securing of the apartment was 
"virtually nonexistent" because petitioners Segura and Colon were under arrest 
and in police custody during the entire time that government agents secured 
their apartment. 442 
Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Segura that "it is uncontested that the 
warrantless entry of petitioners' apartment was unconstitutional" because there 
were no exigent circumstances,443 and "that the subsequent 18-20 hour occupa-
tion of the apartment was independently unconstitutional for two separate rea-
sons."444 His first reason for the latter argument was that the occupation of 
the petitioners' apartment was an unreasonable "search" in violation of the 
fourth amendment.44s His second reason was that the agents' occupation of 
the petitioners' apartment was an unreasonable "seizure" in violation of the 
the Court of Appeals in this case. Finally, if officers enter without exigent circum-
stances to justify the entry, they expose themselves to potential civil liability under 
42 U.S.C. §1983. 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 811-12 (citations omitted). 
439. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 811-12 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 
(1983». 
440. [d. at 812 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Con-
nor, J.). 
441. [d. at 812 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Con-
nor, J.). Chief Justice Burger stated that the agents "simply awaited issuance of the warrant." 
[d. 
442. [d. at 813. Prior to this statement, he quoted the Court's observation in United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983), that "[tJhe intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a 
seizure ... can vary both in its nature and extent. The seizure may be made after the owner has 
relinquished control of the property to a third party or . . . from the immediate custody and 
control of the owner." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 813 (Part IV of the opinion of the 
Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J.). Chief Justice Burger distinguished the 
Place Court's holding that a 90-minute detention of a traveler's luggage was unreasonable on the 
grounds that that detention was based only on suspicion, not probable cause; he noted that it 
was not suggested in Place that the detention of the luggage for three days after probable cause 
was acquired provided an independent basis for suppression of the evidence eventually discovered 
in the luggage. [d. at 813 n.8. 
443. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
444. [d. 
445. [d. He argued that this was the case because the agents' prolonged occupation of the 
petitioners' apartment "inevitably involved scrutiny of a variety of personal effects throughout 
the apartment," id. at 821, thus unreasonably infringing the petitioners' privacy interests. [d. at 
821-22. He argued that Chief Justice Burger had ignored "this point, assuming that there is no 
constitutional distinction between surveillance of the home from the outside and physical occupa-
tion from the inside," and that his assumption was "untenable." [d. at 822. 
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fourth amendment. 446 Justice Stevens asserted that even if there had been exi-
gent circumstances that justified the entry and securing of the premises pend-
ing a warrant (which circumstances no one argued existed), "the duration of 
the seizure would nevertheless have been unreasonable.' '447 
After asserting that warrantless police conduct that is justified by exigent 
circumstances must be " 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify 
its initiation,' "448 Justice Stevens argued that the cases cited by Chief Justice 
Burger in support of the Court's securing-of-the-premises holding were inappli-
cable. 449 Justice Stevens argued further that the eighteen to twenty hour occu-
pation was an unreasonable seizure because "the agents unreasonably delayed 
in seeking judicial authorization for their seizure of petitioners' apartment."450 
Justice Stevens then criticized the three reasons given by Chief Justice 
Burger in support of his conclusion that the eighteen to twenty hour occupa-
tion of the petitioners' apartment was not unreasonable, arguing that none of 
these reasons had "any merit. "451 Justice Stevens first criticized Chief Justice 
Burger's reliance upon the officers' processing of the persons they had arrested 
prior ~o seeking a warrant to justify the delay, 452 on the grounds that there 
was no evidence of difficulties in processing the arrests.4S3 Justice Stevens next 
446. [d. at 822. He argued that the occupation of the petitioners' apartment was a "seizure" 
of the contents of the apartment because it subjected the petitioners' possessory interests with 
respect to their apartment to meaningful governmental interference. [d. at 822-23. 
447. [d. at 823. 
448. [d. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968». 
449. [d. at 823. In particular, Justice Stevens criticized Chief Justice Burger's analysis, id. at 
813 n.8, of United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), on the grounds that the Court in Place 
had no occasion to reach the issue of the legality of the 3-day detention of Place's luggage. 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 823 n.14. 
450. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He asserted that there 
was no contention that the 18-20 hour detention "was even remotely necessary to procure a 
warrant." [d. at 823-24. Justice Stevens also argued that the unreasonableness of the 18-20 occu-
pation of the petitioners' apartment was "graphically" illustrated by contrasting this period of 
occupation to the 90-minute detention of luggage which was held to be unreasonable in United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); he did not, as did Chief Justice Burger, Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. at 813 n.8 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, c.J., which was 
joined only by O'Connor, J.), distinguish Place on the grounds that the detention in Place was 
based upon reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as in Segura. Justice Stevens also distin-
guished Place from Segura on the grounds that the seizure of luggage in Place was lawful in its 
inception whereas the seizure of the petitioners' apartment in Segura was unreasonable "from the 
moment it began," because neither a search of a horne nor the seizure of its contents may be 
conducted without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances. [d. at 824 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
451. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 825 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
452. [d. at 812 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, C.J., joined only by O'Con-
nor, J.). 
453. [d. at 825 (Stevens J., dissenting). He also added, after asserting that "the arrest of the 
occupants [of the apartment] itself was unconstitutional," that "it is truly ironic" that Chief 
Justice Burger "uses one wrong to justify another." [d. He then stated: "Of greater significance, 
the District Court expressly found that the length of the delay was unreasonable and that the 
Government had made no attempt to justify it; that finding was upheld by the Court of Ap-
peals, and in this Court the Government expressly concedes that the delay was unreasonable." 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
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criticized Chief Justice Burger's reliance upon the lack of bad faith by the 
agents who sought the warrant for the petitioners' apartment,454 on the 
grounds that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that a police officer's 
good or bad faith in undertaking a search or seizure is irrelevant to its consti-
tutional reasonableness. "455 Finally, Justice Stevens disagreed with the conclu-
sion that the securing of the petitioners' apartment did not significantly 
interfere with the petitioners' possessory interests in their apartment because 
they were in custody. 456 Justice Stevens argued that the petitioners retained a 
protected possessory interest in their home and effects that could be infringed 
without a warrant even though they were in custody. 457 
454. Id. at 798 (opinion of the Court); Id. at 812 (part IV of the opmlOn of the Court by 
Burger, C.J., which was joined only by O'Connor, J.); see supra text accompanying notes 406-
08. 
455. Id. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 22 (1968); Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); and United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 n.13 (1984». Justice Stevens noted that the officers' lack of 
bad faith was raised despite the fact that there was "no finding as to whether the agents acted 
in good or bad faith" and that "the reason is that the litigants have never raised the issue." Id. 
at 825. 
Beck v. Ohio, Henry v. United States, and United States v. Leon, three of the cases cited by 
Justice Stevens in support of his proposition that an officer's good or bad faith is irrelevant in 
determining fourth amendment reasonableness, only stated that a p~lice officer's subjective good 
faith alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Terry 
v. Ohio, the other case cited by Justice Stevens in support of this proposition, only indicates 
that subjective good faith of an officer is not the test for determining whether an officer has the 
reasonable suspicion that is a prerequisite for making an investigative stop. None of these cited 
cases hold that a police officer's good or bad faith is irrelevant to determining the reasonable-
ness of a seizure. The Court's decision in Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985), 
decided subsequent to Segura, held that the determination of whether a fourth amendment viola-
tion has occurred does not turn on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged 
action took place. [d. Therefore, under Macon, an officer's subjective good or bad faith is irrel-
evant to the determination of whether a seizure is unreason&ble under the fourth amendment. 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issue of whether a court, in determining the 
reasonableness under the fourth amendment of a search or seizure, should consider whether the 
officers whose conduct is being challenged acted in objective good faith. See supra text accompa-
nying note 408. The court, however, states in dictum that "almost without exception in evaluat-
ing alleged violations of the fourth amendment, the Court has first undertaken an objective 
assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him." 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 137. 
456. Segura v. United States. 468 U.S. at 813 (Part IV of the opinion of the Court by Burger, 
C.J., joined only by O'Connor, J .). 
457. [d. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In support of this argument, Justice Stevens cited 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The 
Mincey and Chimel decisions, however. only addressed the issue of whether warrantless entries 
and inspections of the contents of a person's residence were unreasonable searches in violation of 
the fourth amendment; neither Mincey nor Chimel addressed the issue of whether such conduct 
by police constitutes an unreasonable seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. See Mincey 
'/. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (holding that warrantless four-day search of defendant's apart-
ment, after arrest following a shooting in the apartment, could not be justified under so-called 
"murder-scene exception"; that fact of a homicide did not give rise to exigent circumstances so 
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Justice Stevens argued that a person in custody still "owns his house and 
his right to exclude others-including federal narcotics agents-remains invio-
late. "458 He also noted that the Court's securing-of-premises holding allowed 
the authorities to benefit from their unlawful warrantless arrest of petitioner 
Colon, because "[i]f the agents had decided to obey the Constitution and 
not arrest Colon, then she would not have 'relinquished control' over the 
property and presumably it would have been unreasonable for the agents to 
have remained on the premises under the Chief Justice's analysis. However, 
because the agents conducted an unlawful arrest in addition to their previous 
unlawful entry, an otherwise unreasonable occupation becomes 'reasona-
ble.' "459 
In addition to being vague as to its application because of uncertainty with 
respect to the meaning of its "good faith" element and with respect to the 
permissible period of time that premises may be secured without a war-
rant,460 Sequra's securing-of-premises holding is an unreasonable interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment. The holding is unsound because it authorizes 
a warrantless securing of premises although the entry of the premises is as-
sumed to be an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amendment. 
The holding is also unsound because exigent circumstances (probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to believe that evidence otherwise will be removed or 
destroyed) are not a prerequisite to securing of premises and because police 
do not need to justify (in terms of preventing removal or destruction of evi-
dence or threats to the safety of police officers) why the premises are se-
cured from within rather than from without. State appellate courts should 
interpret their state constitutions and state common law in a manner that 
rejects Segura's securing-of-the-premises holding. 461 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment's prohibition of 
unreasonable searches as protecting legitimate expectations of privacy, but has 
interpreted the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures as 
protecting only a narrow range of property and possessory interests. Although 
as to justify four-day warrantless search; and that fact of defendant's arrest did not lessen pri-
vacy right in apartment); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that warrantless 
search of defendant'S house, incident to arrest, was unreasonable as extending beyond defen-
dant's person and the area from which he might have obtained either a weapon or evidence). 
458. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
459. [d. at 826-27. 
460. See supra text accompanying notes 406-08. 
461. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 265, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (1984) ("police may 'secure' 
premises only in the sense of allowing no one to enter"). States are permitted to interpret their 
state constitutions in a manner differently than the United States Supreme Court interprets the 
United States Constitution. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). See Spiering v. State, 
58 Md. App. I, 8-12, 472 A.2d 83, 86-89 (1984) (reviewing lower court decisions, decided prior 
to Segura, dealing with the legality of securing of premises while a search warrant for the prem-
ises is sought). 
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the Supreme Court's definition of a fourth amendment seizure of property 
may protect persons in constructive possession of property as well as persons 
in actual possession of property, the definition of a fourth amendment "sei~ 
zure" of property should be expanded to protect individuals' non~possessory 
interests in real and personal property. 
The Supreme Court has held that a "seizure". of real or personal property 
without a search warrant or without probable cause, or without either, is not 
unreasonable and in violation of the fourth amendment either when exigent 
circumstances are present or when governmental interests in conducting such a 
seizure outweigh the intrusion of individual rights. However, recent Supreme 
Court decisions authorizing warrantless seizures of property, or seizures of 
property on less than probable cause, often fail to define precisely when law 
enforcement officers are authorized to conduct such seizures. These decisions 
also fail to identify and fully analyze all policy considerations that are rele~ 
vant to the determination of whether particular seizures of real or personal 
property by law enforcement officers should be permitted without a search 
warrant or without probable cause. The Supreme Court should attempt to 
avoid such shortcomings in future decisions addressing the issues of whether 
seizures of property should be permitted without a search warrant or without 
probable cause. 
